Class PP60 Book Sch 8

WITHDRAWN

# OUTLINES OF CHRISTIAN APOLOGETICS

19-39
52-118
204-318


The
Co.

# OUTLINES OF CHRISTIAN APOLOGETICS

*FOR USE IN LECTURES*

BY

HERMANN SCHULTZ, PH.D.

AUTHORIZED TRANSLATION FROM THE SECOND ENLARGED EDITION (1902)

BY

ALFRED BULL NICHOLS
PROFESSOR OF GERMAN IN SIMMONS COLLEGE

New York
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
LONDON: MACMILLAN & CO., LTD.
1905

*All rights reserved*

QH

Pp60
Sch 8

COPYRIGHT, 1905,
BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY.

---

Set up and electrotyped. Published June, 1905.

*Norwood Press*
*J. S. Cushing & Co. — Berwick & Smith Co.*
*Norwood, Mass., U.S.A.*

# PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

THE subject-matter of Apologetics makes it still more difficult than in the case of Dogmatics and Ethics to say what is necessary clearly and sufficiently within the allotted limits. Hence, more than usual of the task of explanation and of supplement must be left to oral instruction, especially in the philosophy of religion. Especial attention is therefore called to the aim of these outlines, in order to anticipate unjustifiable expectations.

H. SCHULTZ.

GÖTTINGEN,
February, 1894.

24966

# PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

With the wish to make the reading of this little book easier for those who have not heard my lectures, I have increased the material and in its presentation abandoned somewhat more the character of a "dictation." But I hardly need to say that, even in this form, the work makes no other claim than that of a sketch that aims neither at giving the material exhaustively and independently nor at developing fully the reasons for the conclusions reached.

H. SCHULTZ.

Göttingen,
July, 1902.

# CONTENTS


PAGE

INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1

1. The Problem . . . . . 1

2. History of Apologetics . . . . . 5

BOOK I

DEFENCE OF THE RELIGIOUS VIEW OF THE WORLD

PART I: NATURE OF RELIGION . . . . . 12

3. Historical Survey of Views on the Nature of Religion . 12

4. True Nature of Religion . . . . . 19

PART II: POSTULATES OF THE RELIGIOUS VIEW OF THE WORLD . . . . . 40

5. The Living Personal God . . . . . 40

6. Revelation . . . . . 45

7. Miracle and Mystery in Revelation . . . . . 55

8. Inspiration . . . . . 77

PART III: THE REASONABLENESS OF THE RELIGIOUS VIEW OF THE WORLD . . . . . 82

9. The Necessity of Faith (Duty of Belief) . . . . 82

10. Materialism and Pessimism . . . . . 92

11. The Proofs for the Existence of God . . . . 100

## BOOK II

### PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. RELIGION IN ITS HISTORICAL PHENOMENA

PAGE

PART I: NATURE RELIGIONS . . . . . 119

12. The Primitive Nature Religions . . . . . 119
13. Ancient Semitic Paganism . . . . . 129
14. The Paganism of the Indo-Europeans . . . . 135

PART II: CULTURE RELIGIONS . . . . . 141

15. The Hamitic Priestly Religions . . . . . 141
16. The Philosophical Priestly Religion of the Hindoos . 151
17. The Ethical Poetic Religions . . . . . 159
18. Ethical State Religions . . . . . 166

PART III: PROPHET RELIGIONS . . . . . 172

(*a*) *On Aryan Soil*

19. The Reformation of the Aryan Religion of Light (Dualism) 172
20. Buddha. The Prophet's Reformation of the Brahminic Priestly Religion (Pessimism) . . . . . 179

(*b*) *Semitic Prophet Religions*

21. The Prophet Religion of Israel (Old Testament Theology) 187
22. Islam. The Reformation of Arabian Paganism under the Influence of Biblical Religion . . . . . 194

## BOOK III

### CHRISTIANITY THE PERFECT EMBODIMENT OF RELIGION: DEFENCE OF CHRISTIANITY

PART I: THE NATURE OF CHRISTIANITY . . . . . 204

23. Jesus in History . . . . . 204
24. Christianity as Faith in Jesus the Christ . . . . 220

PAGE

PART II: CHRISTIANITY THE PERFECT RELIGION . . . 236

*Section 1: Christianity the Revelation of Perfect Salvation*

25. The Kingdom of God . . . . . 236
26. Deductions from the Christian Idea of the Highest Good 254

*Section 2: Christianity the Perfect Revelation*

27. Christ . . . . . 271
28. Deductions from the Fact of Christian Revelation . . 290
29. Christianity as the Solution of the Religious Problems of Civilization . . . . . 299

INDEX . . . . . 319

# OUTLINES OF CHRISTIAN APOLOGETICS

## INTRODUCTION

### I. *The Problem*

1. APOLOGETICS, as a theological science, aims at the scientific comprehension of the nature of Christianity and of its place in the spiritual development of man. It seeks to maintain the validity of the religious view of the world over against the tendencies that would disown religion, and to establish Christianity's claim to be, for our age as for others, the perfect embodiment of religion over against those who dispute its permanent significance. This task can be achieved only within certain carefully drawn limits. Faith is a practical personal conviction and establishes its claims by the vigor and happiness that spring from it (evidence of the Spirit and of power). We can neither know God as we know the world, nor can religious truths be made evident to every thinking man by the method of abstract argument as can logical or mathematical ones which are postulated by the mind itself and hence can be deduced from it by analysis. Furthermore, every Christian will defend Christianity after the fashion of his special form of ecclesiastical conviction, and hold the methods current in other sects inadequate. But Christianity, as a religious fact, stands unmistakably above all differences of

creed, for whose correctness or incorrectness the comprehension of the real nature of Christianity and of its place among religions affords the most valuable criteria. And it can certainly be shown (1) that no necessity of surrendering the religious view of the world can be deduced from true science, and (2) that a consistent view of the world within which we, as rational and moral beings, find ourselves, is impossible apart from this religious point of view, while with it it is easy. But such a view we are compelled to seek by an inner necessity, as personalities playing a part in the world. Christianity, it is true, disputes the claim of reason to set up its theoretic results as standards for religious convictions.[1] But it appeals to the verdict of conscience and of reason[2] just as the Old Testament has done over against doubters and idolaters.[3] God draws us to Christ by no magic bond, but by one grounded in the life of reason.[4] And the impression which Jesus and his work have made ever afresh on men's souls is by no means wrought without presuppositions and convictions of which, in case of need, a scientific account can be given. Apologetics can, by itself, neither convert nor save. God alone can arouse within us the faith that makes us righteous and

[1] 1 Cor. 2, 14: *ψυχικὸς δὲ ἄνθρωπος οὐ δέχεται τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ θεοῦ· μωρία γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ δύναται γνῶναι ὅτι πνευματικῶς ἀνακρίνεται.* Matt. 11, 25: *ἀπέκρυψας ταῦτα ἀπὸ σοφῶν καὶ συνετῶν.* (Heb. 11, 1.)

[2] Matt. 6, 23; 7, 9; 13, 16; 16, 3. John 7, 17. (Light in man, signs of the time, he who will do his will.) John 1, 5; 5, 44. (Fear of the light and hypocrisy, longing of the flesh for honor, if one does not "believe.") Rom. 1, 19–21: *γνόντες τὸν θεὸν, ἡ ἀΐδιος αὐτοῦ δύναμις καὶ θειότης*; 2, 14: *ἑαυτοῖς εἰσὶ νόμος.* Acts 17, 27: *οὐ μακρὰν ἀπὸ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου ἡμῶν ὑπαρχῶν.*

[3] Against the "fools" who say "there is no God," the mockers: Ps. 1, 14, 49, 53, 73. Prov. 14, 6; 21, 24. Against pagan idolatry: Is. 40, 19 ff.; 41, 21 ff.; 44, 9 ff.; etc. Against pessimism and weak faith: Job 36 ff.

[4] John 6, 44: *οὐδεὶς δύναται ἐλθεῖν πρὸς μέ, ἐὰν μὴ ὁ πατὴρ ὁ πέμψας με ἑλκύσῃ αὐτόν.* 1 Cor. 2, 11: *τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ οὐδεὶς οἶδεν, εἰ μὴ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ θεοῦ.*

alive. And it is not only since the invention of the microscope and telescope that we know that neither the soul nor its aim are accessible to scientific experiment, and that God and his heaven cannot be found beyond the clouds. He who refuses to go beyond the boundaries of sense experience and of logic can gain no assurance of religious truths. Nor is this assurance a self-evident common property of all beings capable of reason, though it can be shown that whoever rejects the religious view of the world must also deny the qualitative difference between the life of the individual spirit and the processes of nature, and must look with scepticism on the world as an insoluble riddle.

2. Apologetics, although older in the church than dogmatics, has not yet taken its assured place in the system of theology. After the overthrow of paganism in western Europe, Christianity passed for centuries as the self-evident presupposition of European culture. Judaism was looked on as an obstinate denial of one's own better conscience, Islam as an enemy to be fought with the sword. Amid all the conflicts of creeds and parties the universal, undisputed thesis was maintained that the Christian religion was a revelation and demanded recognition by divine right. Even the struggle against Rationalism in the eighteenth century limited itself at bottom to the question how Christianity had arisen. Moreover, all adequate knowledge of the real historical development of religion, which is essential to a true appreciation of Christianity, was lacking. A scientific apologetic, alongside of polemics, ethics, and dogmatics, was not felt in the evangelical church to be an indispensable part of systematic theology. Its material was for the most part interwoven incidentally

with the prolegomena of dogmatics or with dogmatics itself.

3. The evangelical church of to-day, if it is to continue to exist as a power among educated men, needs apologetics. And the theologian, as an expert in matters of religion, cannot take his place among the promoters of knowledge with a good scientific conscience without it. We have become like the church before Augustine, and passed from the dogmatic to an apologetic stage of theology. The better comprehension of the nature of religion, for which Kant and Schleiermacher prepared the way, no longer permits us to gauge the truth of Christianity by the correctness of individual dogmas of the church or of reason, or by the miraculously approved character of its origin, nor to be content with a *fides historica*. Since the discoveries of the last century the history of religion lies before us in an entirely different shape than before. (Hieroglyphics, clay cylinders of Mesopotamia, the civilization of western Asia, Vedas, Avesta, Tripitaka.) It puts the conditions under which the religion of Israel and the oldest Christianity arose in a new light in many ways. Christian Europe has come into contact with the lands in eastern Asia, where an ancient religious culture reached a high stage of development. Christian missions can no longer dispense with the deeper appreciation of Brahminism and Buddhism. Islam and Buddhism in turn have made their appearance in Europe in apologetic and polemic. (Syed Emir Ali and Achmed Chan Bahadur; Buddhist catechisms by Henry S. Olcott, 1887, and Subhadra Bikshu, 1888; the person of Jesus interwoven in Buddhist legend.) In Christian Europe itself the open denial of the foundations of Christianity has taken a more

and more undisguised and successful form in David Strauss, Feuerbach, Comte, Friedrich Nietzsche. Science, intoxicated with its successes, is groping for a new metaphysic and religion, while the hostile passions of the misguided masses reject all religious life. And in men like De Lagarde and Eduard von Hartmann we meet with the claim to be the prophets and forerunners of a new and loftier faith, which has nothing in common with Christianity except admiration for the piety of its founder. We live in an age of contrasts and of attempts at reconciliation, of efforts to revivify dead forms of religious cults (Edda, Greece, Buddhism), of eclectic philosophies, of a lofty morality "without religion," of the closest association of the believer with the opponents of religion. Hence theology must submit to a scientific test those foundations of faith which the simple Christian holds as an immediate religious certainty.

In apologetics, in distinction from dogmatics and ethics, only those facts and statements can pass for proof which are susceptible of scientific demonstration to any one. Hence it is unscientific to include apologetics in dogmatics, and must, if done, blunt the sense of real certainty. Apologetics, as a body of principles, is the foundation of systematic theology. Its task is (1) to understand the nature and claims of religion, (2) to comprehend the historical phenomena of religion, (3) to exhibit the nature and perfection of Christianity.

## 2. *History of Apologetics*

1. The defence of Christianity has not followed the demands of system and addressed itself first to unbelievers and sceptics, then to pagans, and lastly to Jews, but has,

as need and opportunity offered, defended first the right of belief in Jesus on the common ground of the Old Testament;[1] has then addressed itself to the slanders spread among the people by the Jews, who reproached the Christians with practising an immoral and criminal secret cult; and finally has met the attacks of Greek mockery, which partly jeered at religion itself, partly antagonized Christianity as a superstitious innovation, hostile alike to culture and to reverence for the past.[2] In the age of the Antonines the intellectual superiority is plainly on the side of Christianity,[3] and in the attacks on it a certain respect for it is unmistakable (Celsus).[4]

[1] Paul; Epistle to the Hebrews; Epistle of Barnabas; *Altercatio Jasonis et Papisci;* Justin, *Dial. c. Tryphone;* Tertullian, *Adv. Judæos;* Cyprian (?); Origen, *c. Celsum*, I, II. (Eusebius of Emesa; Chrysostom, six Homilies in Antioch; Agobard of Lyons; Isidor of Seville.)

[2] Tacitus, Fronto, Crescens. (Pliny.)

[3] Quadratus, Aristides, Melito, Claudius Apollinaris, Miltiades, Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, Theophilus, Tatian, Bardesanes, Clement of Alexandria, Irenæus, Melciades. Latins: Minutius Felix, Tertullian (Cyprian?). Cf. Clement, *Homilies*, and the *Epistle to Diognetus.*

[4] Chief points of apologetics according to Tertullian: (1) The persecution of the Christians is illegal. Accusations of *flagitia* cannot be disproved by mere denial of a name. All religions must be voluntary. Human edicts are changeable. Religious absurdities and denial of the gods are not punished in pagans and philosophers. (2) The lives of Christians show nothing worthy of punishment. The *flagitia* are slanders. The Christians look on the Roman Empire as the last bulwark against evil. They are good citizens and hold aloof from vice and luxury, but not from social and civil life. They honor the emperor and refuse only to pay him religious homage, which they refuse in general. (3) Their secession from the religion of the state is not criminal. They pray for the aversion of God's wrath and so protect the realm. Heathen sacrifices dedicated to deified wretches, at whom the pagans themselves mock, are devoured by demons. These flee before the exorcisms of Christians. (4) The Christian religion is thoroughly reasonable. Pagans turn Christian, but never Christians pagan. Reason can argue from the world to the one Creator to whom the *vox populi*, the *anima naturaliter christiana*, also involuntarily bear witness. Philosophy, too, teaches the Logos. The incarnation

2. With the renaissance of paganism and its philosophy in the age of the Severi, a harder struggle begins against a view of the world that owed much to Christian elements, — a view which saw in mythology the shell of esoteric wisdom, in the gods of polytheism servants of the great God, and in Christianity a barbaric misinterpretation of philosophical thought; a view which put Orpheus, Apollonius of Tyana, Pythagoras, and Plato alongside of Jesus, and which tried to defend both the religion of the fathers and the civilization of the old world against the new religion of the uneducated, which was hostile to culture and drew down on the land the anger of the gods.[1] This tendency, which had its roots in later Stoicism, finds its best expression in Neoplatonism, whose origins often lie close to the Christian movement. It aimed to escape from evil realities by asceticism and ecstasy, and conjured up, as a link between the hidden godhead and the empirical world, to reconcile their contrasts, a series of more or less divine "potencies," in which it saw the divinities of classic paganism by means of allegorical interpretation. Thus it aimed to take the place of Christianity as a religion of redemption, — even to surpass it, — and at the same time to rescue the treasures of ancient culture from barbarism and "monkish" contempt. Over against it apologetics points to Christianity as the salvation of a

is not more incomprehensible than heroic legend. The statements of Pilate bear witness to Christ's resurrection and ascension. The sacred writings of the Jews, which point to Christianity, are older than the wisdom of the Greeks. Hence, the Christians, whose exemplary care of the poor, charity, harmony, fraternal love, and edifying ritual no one can deny, deserve, at least, tolerance from the authorities. And that the persecutions make Christianity stronger instead of weakening it, that the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church, gives the state, as a legal body, no right to proceed arbitrarily.

[1] Porphyrius, Hierocles, Philostratus (Julian), cf. Lucian.

world perishing in vice, and rejects the new wisdom as an artificial and untrustworthy invention.[1] Christian mockery here fights with the weapons forged by pagan rationalism. The holding up to ridicule of the "mob of gods" had become, since Panætius, Mucius Scævola, Cicero, and Seneca, as little novel in Rome as in the Athens of Aristophanes. Lucian furnishes the scoffers with inimitable caricatures of the world of the gods. Hence it was not difficult to confute the artificial attempts to exhibit in these phantasms philosophical profundity and religious warmth. Conjuring and artificial mystical excitement cannot hold their ground against historical forces and personal faith; and what gives satisfaction only to the intellectual aristocrat is helpless against that which makes the "poor in spirit" happy. With Constantine apologetics becomes a cry of triumph over a conquered enemy,[2] a fashion of the schools,[3] or a philosophy of history.[4]

3. The apologetics of the Middle Ages, directed against pagans,[5] Jews,[6] and Moslems,[7] serves practical purposes less than the reënforcement of the Christian consciousness. On the other hand, with the rise of the Renaissance begins a defence of Christianity,[8] which, if pretty

[1] Methodius, Apollinaris, Origen. (Gregory of Nazianzes, Philip of Sida, Photius.)

[2] Eusebius of Cæsarea, Arnobius.

[3] Lactantius. (Maternus, Commodian, Athanasius, Cyril of Alexandria, Orosius.)

[4] Augustine, *De Civ. Dei.* [5] Thomas Aquinas, *Contra gentiles.*

[6] Rabanus Maurus, Gilbert of Westminster, Ruprecht v. Deutz, Peter de Blois, Walter of Châtillon, Nicolaus of Lyra, Andronikos Comnenos (*διδασκαλία Ἰακώβου νεοβαπτίστου*, 640, ed. Bonwetsch. Thaddeus Pelusiota, 1265).

[7] Raimundus Martini, Petrus Venerabilis, Nicolaus of Cusa, Torquemada, Saumonas of Gaza. (Joh. Kautakuzenos.)

[8] Marsilius Ficinus, Picus of Mirandola. (Savonarola.) Revival of Neoplatonism, but in learned and artificial form.

artificial and lifeless, was continued in both churches through the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and has never ceased since.[1] The most important work of apologetics of these older times is the fragmentary *Pensées sur la religion* by Blaise Pascal (*ob.* 1670) (ed. Prospère Faugère, 1844). Pascal, in his youth a sceptical man of the world, always remained a sceptic in the sphere of philosophy. Converted under the influence of miracles and ecstasies which he experienced (November 23, 1654), and living in closest contact with the world of miracle at Port Royal, he passed his life in heroic renunciation of the "natural" and "comprehensible," and of the world. His last years were *une thébaide et un calvaire* (Victor Cousin). He tried to picture "the misery of man apart from God" and "the bliss of man with God" in two books, and so make men disposed to believe "until God gave belief." Leibnitz, in his *Théodicée* and his *Pensées sur la religion et la morale*, is far inferior to Pascal as a religious genius.

4. The church saw itself driven to a really serious defence of its interests by the denial of supernatural revelation and of the historical uniqueness of Christianity by Deism[2]

[1] Catholic, in the sixteenth century, Ludwig Vives; in the seventeeth, Campanella and Huet. Protestant, in the sixteenth century, Duplessis Mornay; in the seventeenth, Hugo Grotius, G. Calixt, Limborch, Jaquelot, Pictet, Le Clerc, Hale, Allix, Cudworth, Grey. (J. Abbadie: *Sur la vérité de la religion chrétienne*, 1684, contains the literature.)

[2] In the seventeenth century: Thomas Hobbes (religion of the state), Charles Blount (reason and morals), Edward Herbert, Baron Cherbury (natural religion). In the eighteenth century: Toland, Tindal, Chubb, (against mysteries, Christianity as old as the creation), Thomas Morgan (against the Old Testament), Collins (against the prophecies), Woolston (against miracles). So Connor, Craig, etc. Hume's scepticism opposes also "natural religion." (Lechler, *Gesch. des engl. Deismus.*) In France Voltaire (*Évangile du jour*), Rousseau (*Confession de foi d'un vicaire savoyard* in *Émile*, Bk. 4).

and Rationalism,[1] with which a tendency essentially hostile to Christianity and all religion had early become associated.[2] The struggle was carried on, on practically the same lines, into the nineteenth century in English,[3] French,[4] and German.[5] But as it was limited at bottom to the effort to beget a *fides humana* toward Christian revelation by pointing to miracles, prophecy, and inspiration, and to find universally valid proofs for the existence of God in the world, the possibility of a real success was excluded from the start (Lessing, Schleiermacher).

5. In the presence of the various forms of a mood hostile either to Christianity or to religion in general in the present, numerous speakers and writers have tried to address apologetics to the mass of educated men, for the most part in the interest of the conservative school of theology over against freer tendencies. It is enough to

[1] *E.g.* H. Samuel Reimarus.

[2] *E.g.* Maudeville, Chubb, Bolingbroke, Shaftesbury, Holbach, D'Alembert.

[3] Apologists in the grand style are Bentley, Jerkin, Leland, Beveridge, Paley, Chalmers, Thomas Erskine. Against natural religion, Waterland, John Conneybeare, Jackson, Law, Stelling, Horler. The Old Testament is defended by Chapman, Leland, Burnet, S. Chandler, W. Warburton; prophecy by Clarke, Sykes, Sherlock, S. and E. Chandler, Jeffery, Bullock, Stackhouse (thirty-five pamphlets against Collins in three years); miracles, by Gibson, Pierce, Lardner, Smalbrooke (sixty pamphlets against Woolston), etc. Against J. J. Rousseau, the editors of the *Christian Magazine*, 1765. On the resurrection of Jesus stood West, Ditton, Sherlock; on the conversion of Paul, Littleton. More modern English apologetes, John Barclay, 1836; Charles Hardwick, 1863. Important and with better method, Arthur Balfour, *The Foundations of Belief;* and Seeley, *Ecce Homo.*

[4] Bernard, Bitaubé, Houtteville, Alfonse Turretin, Bonnet, Bergier, Châteaubriand, Bullet, Guénée, Clemence.

[5] Buddeus, Lilienthal, Nösselt, Less, A. F. W. Sack, Kleuker, Spalding, Pfaff, Mosheim, A. v. Haller, Jerusalem, Reinhard, Seiler, Köppen, Töllner, Tittmann.

refer to collections like the Bridgewater Treatises, the Hulsean Lectures, and the books of the Hague *Genootschap tot vertidiging van den christlyken Goddienst* in their original aim, and to the *Beweis des Glaubens;* or to names like Luthardt, Christlieb, Stutz, Riggenbach, Auberlen, v. Zezschwitz, W. Bauer, Düsterdieck, Uhlhorn. Alongside of these has arisen, from the feeble beginnings of Erasmus, Müller, Franke, Stein, H. Sack, Steudel, and Stirm, among both Catholics [1] and Protestants,[2] a scientific treatment of apologetics, which has accomplished much.

[1] Perrone, pt. I, Frayssinous, Drey, Dieringer, Staudenmeyer, Hettinger, Alb. Maria Weiss, Paul Schanz.

[2] Franz Delitzsch, Ebrard, Eduard Baumstark, Tölle, Kratz, E. G. Steude, Kaftan, Nagel (Pfleiderer, Rauwenhoff), Ihmels, Tröltsch (Siebeck, Eucken).

# BOOK I

## *DEFENCE OF THE RELIGIOUS VIEW OF THE WORLD*

## PART I: NATURE OF RELIGION

### 3. *Historical Survey of Views on the Nature of Religion*

1. VULGAR opinion, where it does not see in religion an invention of ambitious priests and statesmen[1] or an illusion of the fancy begotten by egoistic desires,[2] or a deceptive precipitate of the process of civilization and its ideals,[3] is wont to seek the essence of religion in ritual and in its doctrine concerning divine things, that is, in those external phenomena that are accessible to sense experience.[4] And this view underlies in various forms that distaste of scholars for religion which Schleiermacher tried to meet in his *Reden über die Religion.* Over against this superficially empirical view, Kant was the first to conceive of religion as a practical certitude of the spirit, springing from the moral law, and to distinguish it fundamentally from the effort of thought which aims at metaphysical knowledge. It is true that theoretic reason has also a necessary impulse toward

[1] Sophists. [2] Hume, Feuerbach, Comte.

[3] Bender's view can be misinterpreted in this direction.

[4] *Deum cognoscere et colere* ("Religion in the narrower sense is the special virtue of reverence of God; in the wider, it embraces, along with religious exercises, religious doctrine" concerning God and his relation to man. — Schwane, Catholic).

the infinite; but it can arrive by the speculative path only at an endless vista, not at that final nature of things which it seeks. It is limited to the phenomenal world. Only by practical paths does reason really reach the supersensual. It is also true that the moral law, as a categorical demand of practical reason, must be conceived of as absolutely independent of religion. But by imposing itself imperiously on man and making him feel that his own will — in so far as he is himself empirical (phenomenon) — is not coextensive with the content of the law (radical evil), it compels him to believe in the invisible (transcendental) world of freedom and in the omnipotent power of good. Religious faith is therefore the duty of man as a moral being (postulates). And hence we can see how the moral law itself could not come to the clear consciousness of empirical man in history except through a divine revelation, that is, by the path of religious history. The reasonableness whose expression is the moral law, is just as little the actual reason of mankind as it is that of the individual. Religion is therefore, for Kant, the understanding of moral duties as divine commands. So religion becomes for him an auxiliary concept of ethics, made necessary by the sensual nature of man. Any real and living relation to God, however, seems to him unjustified and an illusion. Entirely right though he is in protesting against the confounding of religion and metaphysics and in emphasizing the inner connection between true morality and religion, Kant is nevertheless able to offer no explanation of a number of the experiences of Christian piety. Ritual must be to him incomprehensible; prayer, penance, childlike joy, the consciousness of reconciliation,

are at bottom illusions. And the highest phenomenon of morality must be, for Kant, not the "son of God" who lives in his Father, but the autonomous virtuous hero who stands by himself outside of religion.

2. J. G. Fichte introduces with prophetic power into the view of Kant the elements, first of his subjective atheistic idealism, and then of his objective acosmic mysticism. Religion is for him life, experience, practical knowledge, immediate consciousness of the true world which reveals itself to us in our freedom. In the first stage of his philosophy he sees in the religious process man's liberating consciousness of the living pure ego concealed in him; in the second, the surrender of finite being with its egoistic illusions to the one true being (German mysticism). Above that lowest view of the world which takes the phenomenal for the real, above the loftier conception of the world as a realm of moral law, and above the still more sublime conception of the world as a realm of moral freedom, stands the religious conception, which sees in the morally good the revelation of the inmost being of God (judgments of worth). Its creed is the joyful doing of God's will. Its interpretation constitutes the philosophic view of the world, which, as "science," recognizes the How of that which religion experiences. Religion is a view of the world (γινώσκειν) which is born of moral freedom and of the love of the Good, One, and True, which carries with it bliss (Johannine). For the comprehension of religious history and ritual and for the independence of religion over against morality, Fichte, too, has no feeling. And decisively though he himself bases religion on the practical life of the spirit ("it depends on what one loves"), nevertheless his system

leads to misunderstanding, as if religion were a popular form of metaphysics.

3. Hegel really arrives at the same result. For him the essence of absolute spirit is thought. God comes to a consciousness of himself in the finite spirit, first in vague feelings, then in representation, where thought is still bound to the image, finally in the act of thinking. Hence religion is an act of God within the spirit of man. Beginning on the level of feeling, it rises to the level of representative knowledge, and so to a popular and preliminary stage of philosophic thought. The content is the same in philosophy and in religion, viz. the unity of the absolute and the finite spirit. But religion has this content still in an imperfect form, which the reflecting intellect, by separating image and thought, completes. Thus not only theology, but religion itself, becomes merely a preliminary stage of philosophic thought. What ritual seeks in vain, viz. to abolish the separation of God and man, philosophy achieves. On the pure ethereal heights of thought the sage dwells, above the religious life. Life here is transformed into an idea, and feeling into a stage in the evolution of abstract knowledge. Blessed are the rich who do not need the kingdom of heaven. Hegel fails to see that the essence of spirit is not merely "thought," and that feeling is not a lower form of knowledge. Knowledge has always been only a subordinate factor in religion. Were religion at bottom "a stage of knowledge for those incompetent of thought," the goal of human civilization would have to be the transformation of religion into knowledge (J. S. Mill, Schopenhauer). Hence Hegel has not promoted the comprehension of religion, although he is right in conceiving it as at bottom

an act of God in man (Hemann, Gloatz, A. Dorner). With his intellectualized conception he really falls back on the verdict of Rationalism on religion (Krause).

4. We meet the mystical side of Fichte's definition of religion (but without its ethical roots) in the æsthetic conception of Schleiermacher, which is allied to romanticism, (Jacobi).[1] For him religion is neither action nor knowledge, nor a union of the two, but feeling, a feeling of absolute dependence. Feeling, as the unity of being amid the alternation of knowing and willing and as having reference to the subject only as determined by impressions, constitutes the underlying presupposition of the acts with which ethics and metaphysics have to do. Only in feeling can God really be in us.[2] Feeling, when it has outgrown the dreamy confusion of its beginnings, feels itself at once determined by the world, and that in a continually alternating relationship of freedom and dependence. But on the basis of the impressions of the world[3] man feels himself determined, together with the whole world, by a power over against which there is no play of freedom. He feels himself and the whole world to be absolutely dependent. In this feeling he has religion and possesses God. And in the soul of every man lies the absolute necessity of experiencing this feeling. Hence religion can be aroused in the soul of the individual only by the revelation of God. Religious feeling is, in itself, simple unity, and gets its variety only from the impres-

[1] "With the whole intellect a pagan, with the whole heart a Christian." View of the world from the point of view of the reason of the heart.

[2] God is the annulling of the contradictions of the world. In thought he is idea; in will, conscience.

[3] The impression of law in the world and of the unity of reason gives the transition.

sions of the world, without which it cannot by itself fill a moment, and its phases only by the capacity or incapacity of the soul to let it be begotten in it with ease and purity. With knowledge and will it is of course empirically always united, but it is itself wholly independent of them. And the true nature of religion is disguised by the fact that it actually appears always in the form of ritual and doctrine. Even Schleiermacher's view,[1] though in its fundamental thought and its denials essentially correct, is nevertheless one-sided. It overlooks the fact that religion always carries with it, as one of its elements, the practical personal attitude of the individual in the world. It fails to see the element of will, without which religion cannot arise. It undervalues the significance of religious knowledge, because it lays too little emphasis on the unity of the life of the soul. It does not explain the history of the lower religions. And because it views only the psychological process of religion, without conscious reference to that which produces it, it offers no adequate security against a corruption of religion by æsthetic substitutes (art, enjoyment of nature),[2] or against the danger of mistaking religion for a mere subjective mood which might be mere illusion.

5. The great majority of modern Christian theologians and philosophers recognize with Schleiermacher that the essence of religion cannot be sought in ritual and knowledge. But almost all emphasize the significance of the practical need of human personality[3] and its moral aptitude

[1] Novalis (cf. Fries, De Wette): "The sphere of religion is presentiment, necessary conviction from pure feeling." Recently Duhm: "The true religious process is achieved as a mystery, in ecstasy." [2] David Strauss.

[3] In a hostile sense Hume and Feuerbach emphasize the "egoistic" desires that find expression in religion by identifying the essence of religion with its imperfect and childish historical beginnings.

for religion in another way than Schleiermacher. Man's natural and moral need of help (Herbart), the striving after real goods (Zeller, Kaftan), the ethical impulse of self-assertion (Vinet, Schenkel), the need of the maintenance of moral personality within the world of natural phenomena (Ritschl, Hermann, Reischle), are emphasized to explain the origin of religion. Lipsius and Pfleiderer hold freedom in God, I. H. Fichte and Hase restoration of harmony in man by love, to be the true essence of religion; while Kähler and Holsten lay only a general emphasis on the relation of man to a revealed God (Beck, "divine inner witness"). All recognize that religion includes a relationship to the world as well as a relationship to God, and that it must be at once an act of God and an act of freedom. The factor of knowledge in religion has been most strongly emphasized by Rauwenhoff, according to whom religion arises from the conjunction of the feeling of reverence with the activity of the imagination endowing nature with life (animism); and by Julian Köstlin, who describes it as practical conduct determined by the kindling of feeling and imagination (Peschel, Tiele, Dorner, Jr.). Tröltsch, too, sees in religion, as in all the experiences of consciousness, a union of ideas and accompanying feelings, out of which various motions of the will arise, and thinks that the starting-point is always an idea, however simple, because the intellect always holds the primacy over against the will. According to him it is a question of an ideal perception. But it can be no illusion and must be looked on as a necessary demand of human life, as something given in consciousness; for the religious feeling of need cannot arise until one experiences what one needs. What assumes the morally best as self-evident cannot be self-deception.

The dispute turns at bottom on whether the need of happiness or the consciousness of the moral task plays the chief rôle in evoking religion. The answer will be different according as we seek the essence of a phenomenon in its history or in the ideal (norm) that comes to expression in it. The question, too, has been asked, whether religion has its roots in the nature of the creature as such, or only in the imperfection of the conditions of earthly life.

## 4. *True Nature of Religion*

1. Neither by the method of psychology, nor of archæology,[1] nor of etymology,[2] is it possible to extract the essence of religion from its varied, contradictory phenomena, now alluring, now repellent. The beginnings of religious history are a dark realm of mystery, in which not even the progress from primitive to higher forms can be scientifically established. The psychological process in religion is one so involved and so debated that it cannot be taken as the starting-point. And the etymological results could be decisive only for the religious peculiarities of definite peoples. All the other higher phenomena of humanity appear at the start intermingled with foreign elements, like children of need and desire. And what finally turns out to be the thing of most value may at first seem very feeble and incidental. And on the other hand, it would not be justifiable to construct the idea of religion from the nature of Christian piety as it lies com-

[1] Statius, *Thebaïs*, 3, 661, *timor fecit Deos.* (Lucretius.) Hume, Strauss, Feuerbach.

[2] *Religio*, according to Cicero (*De Nat. D.* 2, 27) from *relegere* (Terence, *Andria*, 941 (scrupulosity), Gellius, *Noctes atticæ*, 4, 9); according to Lactantius (*Inst. div.* 4, 28) from *religare*; better from *lig* (San. *lôk*, λεύσσω, to look). (*Reverentia*, legality, civic virtue, is the Roman idea of religion.)

plete before us. On the contrary, it is a question of ascertaining what is common to the historical religions and essential to them all (Kaftan), and thence to frame a normal conception. Only then can we have success in analyzing the psychological process in religion (subjective).

2. Unquestionably religion always implies the relation of man to a (divine) power distinct from the things of objective experience,[1] by which he conceives his life in the world to be influenced. The gods of Epicureanism, who do not trouble themselves about men, are as little objects of religion as the God of Deism. The "divinity" is always presupposed in religion as really existing; not on the ground of logical thought (*e.g.* according to the laws of causality), but involuntarily and necessarily by the imagination, which conjectures, behind the effects and phenomena of the world, acting powers, or feels in the mysterious life of the human soul something permanent and invisible (animism, worship of souls). The existence of these powers is made self-evident and certain to man through his experience of the influence of the life of nature on his fortunes. Their personification springs from the involuntary action of the imagination of the living personality. But this "childish metaphysic" does not become religion until man, urged by his desires and needs, puts himself in a practical personal relation to this "divinity." Religion and metaphysics touch, — but "back to back" (Siebeck).

And religion always begets a cycle of ideas (faith) and induces a special method of action (ritual). But it is not born of the theoretic interest in comprehending the world

[1] Even the fetich worshipper appeals to the "spirit" in his natural objects.

(metaphysics, mythology). And it by no means coincides with moral effort, although when perfect it is closely bound up with it. Its convictions are of a practical sort (judgments of worth), and the goal which it seeks is not properly the morally good, but the maintenance of one's own interests amid the uncertainties of temporal life (possessions, happiness). The effort after the maintenance of the common interests of the clan has worked here earlier and more powerfully than that for the attainment of the private interests of the individual; and in this the ethical impulse and the impulse to form a community have, in all religions, their roots.[1] Man believes in a power which is able to influence worldly affairs, and tries by communion with it (*i.e.* by worshipping it) to become master of the world, as a whole or in part, as he cannot through his own relations to the world. That is the inalienable content of the lowest, as of the highest, religions. The highest goal of religion is therefore the winning of a supernatural good that is common to all (*i.e.* moral) by a blessed communion with a deity conceived of as absolutely supernatural, one who is no longer a naïve assumption based on uncomprehended processes of nature, but a God historically revealed as love. The community of the clan becomes a human community, happiness becomes eternal life, influence on the world the moral control of the world. Hence it is certainly correct to say, that for man on the summit of religious development, religion is inseparably connected with morality and has its soundest roots in the moral demands. But he who does not limit religion to its loftiest manifestations will

[1] The interests of private life belonged, in the classic religions, in the realm of "superstition," not of "public religion."

look for its universal foundation, not in the moral impulse, but in longings for benefits. The lower religions seek simply worldly advantage for the individual by magical methods. And even Christianity claims to bring, not morality, but bliss (Ζωὴ αἰώνιος).

3. Only in the life of the human soul can the process of religion really be understood. Its external phenomena are only the reflex of its essence, often only a deceptive appearance. Apologetics, in investigating this psychological process, is far from taking sides in questions of scientific psychology or claiming a scientific knowledge of the soul as such. Only the activities of the soul which offer themselves to unquestioned observation can come in question. The mental life of the higher animals divides itself on observation into two great groups of phenomena. First, the living being becomes immediately conscious of itself (feeling) as something influenced pleasurably or painfully by external things, and necessarily under the influence of this feeling frames judgments of worth and experiences impulses of the will which spring immediately from it. Secondly, there is born in it an idea of the nature of that which influences it and the desire to know it better. This objective consciousness, developing from vague images into definite concepts, gives rise of itself to no impulse of the will, but can merely guide the blind will, while finding its own goal in itself. Even the impulse toward knowledge, up to its highest forms, is doubtless originally roused by practical incentives and accompanied by them, and even in knowing the soul has a feeling of satisfaction. But in itself this impulse is satisfied when we understand its objects, and has to do, not with the interests of our personal life, but with the things them-

selves. It passes no independent judgments of worth and seeks to free itself more and more, as it rises in the scale of development, from the influence of the interests of the will. This two-sidedness of the activity of the soul is necessarily involved in the attitude of the living, knowing subject toward the external world. In the same way feeling is the fundamental phenomenon, because the subject is always first conscious of itself as something influenced.

In this whole region the mental life of man is distinguished from that of the higher animals, so far as we can draw inferences concerning the latter, only in degree. Feelings may be very vague and intermittent, just as the transitions from plant to animal life are imperceptible and obscure in their gradations. Even in the mental life of animals, feelings are often very complicated, delicate, and strong. And it is not otherwise with ideas and acts of the will. Even the combination of feelings prolonged by memory, the control of momentary movements of the will by these (training), and the uniting of various trains of ideas in order to arrive at a decision, occur unquestionably among the higher animals. The word "instinct" (inherited feeling for the purposeful) by no means explains such facts. The deliberate exaggeration of the kinship of the mental life of animals with that of man in which the modern naturalistic school delights, as did that of antiquity (Celsus), should not prevent us from recognizing the element of truth in the observations on which it is based, — truth which a one-sided idealistic study of nature has often overlooked or despised.[1] There are no gaps in nature.

But certain though it is, that shadowy hints of a higher

[1] Cartesius held animals to be automata.

mental life are found among animals in their fidelity, in their feeling for their families, and in their delight in sound and colors, it is just as certain that the capacity for religion, morality, and knowledge in the true sense of these words is found only in the human soul.[1] It is true that apologetics has no scientific right to claim a new substance in the human body, or even a new grouping of substances already existing in it;[2] nor, in the fashion of the older idealism, to assume a "spirit" which has been added to the animal mentality. But beyond all doubt, and to be proved at any moment by experiment, is the fact that man alone of all creatures is able, starting from phenomenal impressions, to feel himself above phenomena, to act freely (*i.e.* morally), and to think in ideas, — although he brings with him at birth no innate ideas or moral principles or fixed æsthetic laws. Amid the whirl of the impressions of the phenomenal world that throng upon him through the senses, he is able to feel the permanent impression of something supersensual, which reveals itself in their relations to one another. The feeling for the beautiful, the sublime, the good and true, the necessary and purposeful, can be roused, in one way or another, in every man. And

[1] The pious elephants and wise ants of classic naturalism prove as little as the apes, ravens, and dogs of modern materialistic collections of anecdotes.

[2] What is the significance of the relative mass of the gray matter of the brain, the great extent of the surface of the brain, the finer convolutions in the brain and its furrows and folds, the relative shortness of the spinal cord and of the cerebellum, the peculiarly human relations between the skull and the facial angle, the human hand, the upright posture, etc., in relation to the mental life, and whether they have not come about through evolution and inheritance, can be established only by reasoning in a circle. In this sphere probability is certainly not on the side of naturalism. But it does not beseem apologetics to base itself on what is merely probable. The idealism of the eighteenth century has been here too little cautious.

hence he is able to frame judgments of worth which are independent of the judgments based on sense impressions, and are even able to contradict them (the pleasant *v.* the good). And the action of the will of the good man is determined by such fixed judgments of worth, not by the impulses of sense experiences or their combination (wisdom of the world). He is able to act according to principles (freely). He who denies this must also deny the facts of art, of law, and of morality.

And man is able to base his judgments not merely on sense impressions which he is able to frame and combine into conceptions. He can understand the unity and necessity in the phenomena, that is, their laws, and can frame conceptions. And being a thinker, he can speak. For the mere production of significant sounds is not speech (λόγος). He who denies this must deny, not merely philosophy, but all knowledge. The soul of man is spiritual. And this fact, however it may have arisen, is more certain than all our knowledge of the phenomenal world, and can be established for all normally developed men of every race. Looked at in detail, the mental life of man can be compared to that of the animal; as a whole, it is absolutely unique. Therewith man enters an order of life for which phenomenal standards no longer suffice. He is competent of social, intellectual, and civil intercourse. He is freed from spacial isolation and temporal change in the centre of his life, though always on the condition of the maturity of the animal life in him, and with the presupposition of his physical relationship to the world.

The consciousness of this spirituality gives at once the assurance that the spiritual impressions and the spiritual functions have the absolute right to rule the soul in feel-

ing, willing, and thinking (reason), and in case of dispute to disown the lower mental processes as immoral and illusive.[1] To the totality of these higher phenomena of self-consciousness we give the name of "personality" as distinguished from mere individuality (a whole over against a whole, a supersensual centre). And while man as part of nature, like all creatures, is for others as much means as end, he knows himself, as personality (reasoning being), absolutely the end for nature, even for his own. That false theology which looked on man as part of nature, existing for the purposes of the world, has long ago been given up to well-deserved contempt. Every part of nature is under the laws of causality and is unfree. Nature knows no ends. Man is a means from the point of view of the animal world, as it is from his. But by thought he lifts what is separated in time and space to the unity of idea, and by the moral effort of the will frees himself from the alternation of changing motives, and places himself under the unchangeableness of principle. And so he becomes, as a spiritual and reasoning being, an end for the nature in him and outside of him. In this sphere alone can religion be looked for.

4. Religion certainly does not belong among the phenomena of objective consciousness. Although it is certain that it is never without a set of ideas which are in various ways related to metaphysical thought on the divine, and that it always presupposes some idea, however primitive, it is just as certain that the measure of the achievements of thought in relation to such ideas

[1] Rom. 1, 32: *τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπιγνόντες ὅτι οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα πράσσοντες ἄξιοι θανάτου εἰσίν.* Even if man sinks himself to the standpoint of animal wisdom, he abandons it in his judgment on others.

is never the measure of religion (clearness and completeness). Not the best theologian or philosopher, but the childlike souls most deeply sunk in God (*μικροί*, עניי) are the really typical phenomena of piety. Hence its essence cannot lie in the sphere of knowledge; and where we find only a thought about God, without regard to our own practical relation to him, where, that is, the impulse toward knowledge is the decisive motive, we do not speak of religion at all. Religion belongs to the practical side of the life of the human spirit. Hence it must begin in feeling and have its inalienable foundation in feeling. The degree of religion must be gauged by the strength, purity, and uniformity of religious feeling; not by physiologically conditioned excitability and the striking unusualness of the expression of feeling, for these depend on temperament and sex, on climate and race, but by the vigor and persistence with which this feeling asserts itself amid all sense impressions and their change, and determines personality.

Religious feeling is conditioned by personal self-consciousness, and it must be evoked by influences which, though produced by the world, do not belong to the world, but are akin to the inner nature of the life of reason. Man becomes religious by becoming conscious of himself as determined by "God." Hence religion has its place within the great cycle of feelings for the beautiful, good, just, sublime, necessary. It does not beget necessarily a theoretic knowledge of the divine (philosophy), but invariably judgments of worth on the divine, *i.e.* on its significance for our own personality. These judgments can and must be objects of knowledge, that is, beget a practical view of the world (an assurance of salvation) which, when elevated into a science, becomes

theology. And it begets, not simply a moral act of the will, but an act of the will under the impression of the significance of the divine for our own personality, which can and must in turn be classified under ethics and lends it its religious character. It appears first as the will to act with reference to the divine (ritual), and only with the higher development of religion does it become the will to act under the impression of the self-revealed divine (λογικὴ λατρεία). In the immediate certainty of these judgments of worth (religious conviction), and in the power of this will as lord of life (joy in sacrifice), religion finds the test of its health over against the illusion of impressions of God begotten by the imagination. "By their fruits ye shall know them" (Matt. 7, 16). The heroes of religion are the men who put the visible alongside of the invisible (Heb. 11).

The spiritual life never works by natural processes, but always by setting the consciousness of personality in motion. And the influence of the supersensual cannot make itself felt unless entrance is opened to it. Hence religion cannot arise unconsciously and without participation of the will. There is no belief without the "will to believe." Thus religion is distinguished from all the æsthetic feelings which arise from the impressions of the world and of the harmony revealed in it, without participation of the will. The higher æsthetic feelings are, to be sure, related to the religious ones in their phenomena, but they are always only substitutes for it, and therefore, if fostered in a one-sided manner, very dangerous to the health of religion.

5. Religion is consciousness of God roused by impressions of God on the reasoning personality. Hence it is

either an illusion, or God himself must evoke it in man (revelation). And he can do this only because something akin to him dwells in man; only because personality is other than nature and has the immediate certainty of standing above the world. "We are his offspring." But he who feels this certainty knows also that it holds of every man. Therefore where religion is present, it is something that binds men together, a universal human interest, although, on the other hand, it is something most unique and special for each human soul.

God can evoke religion, like every other spiritual experience, only by letting the world work upon us in a definite fashion. For our spiritual life receives its impressions only through the physical one. It is evoked neither by the beauty of the world nor by its obedience to law. In the awful secrets of nature faith finds its nourishment as well as in its fair and delightful phenomena. And "wonder is religion's dearest child." Nor is it evoked through admiration of the sublimity of nature nor through human morality as developed in history. In religion man demands to be free from nature. And for him who does not yet believe, history is anything but a revelation of moral law. Just as little is the consciousness of the moral task, over against nature's absolute indifference to morality, the primary determinant. Else the history of religion would begin with Jewish prophecy. All primitive piety among men aims not at the good, but at good things. But the world evokes religion by its incongruence with the personal spiritual life of man and his needs, *i.e.* by showing itself incapable of satisfying claims which spiritual personality cannot and dare not renounce. And this by no means merely because of the obstacles and the physical

ills which it brings us, nor even because of our sins; even if conceived as sinless (*si integer stetisset Adam*, Calvin) we could find no peace in the world as world, and all the pleasure of the world cannot satisfy the soul; but because a self-determining personality feels itself unhappy, *i.e.* in contradiction with its deepest consciousness of self, if it be a mere temporary link in the causal chain. Personality, which feels itself free, which makes nature its means, and conquers space and time in the realm of thought and morality, feels itself at the same time under the compulsion of the causal law, inextricably entangled in the change and isolation of time and space. The true nature of this contradiction dawns on us first, it is true, with the perception of the absolute nature of moral duty. But it is astir even in the lowest religions when men turn in physical fear and longing to their god. And it must exist in glorified spirits, as well as in struggling sons of earth. Not, it is true, in the form of longing for deliverance from the world, but as the blissful consciousness of not belonging to the world. Because we are more than the world, the world bears witness to us of a power above the world, which rules it. *Tu fecisti nos ad te et inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te* (Augustine). We feel the compulsion to experience this world-controlling power in a life akin to our life of reason, and to be freed from the world by being determined by that power. Thus God uses the world to rouse the religious impulse. And he creates religion by revealing himself and exhibiting in impressions of his might a power which can satisfy the demands of personality.

That the impulse toward religion is more than subjective longing and illusion can, of course, not be proved to one who denies it, by formal proof. But for the devout

this doubt can arise as little as can doubt of the reality of his mental life in general. Man can assert the dignity of his reasoning personality in the mechanism of the world only by taking himself for God, or by being devout. In religion man possesses the power to "overcome the world." At first he thinks to accomplish it by religious magic, then by faith in the miraculous, at last by consciousness of his sonship of God. And this gives him a comprehension of the world as one in which there is place for his own self-consciousness. The world becomes the material of a divine purpose which is recognized and appropriated by the spiritual personality. Hence the devout man feels it to be a human duty to have religion. Not because he needs a religious conception where logical knowledge stops (Herbert Spencer), but because a reasoning personal being dare not place itself absolutely in the sequence of causal law (regard itself as like the world). Religious faith is a postulate of practical reason. This whole process would, of course, be impossible if a conviction (even though an unconscious one) of something "divine" in the world were not involved in the conditions of our personal reason. But for real religion it comes, nevertheless, only in the shape of longing for freedom from the world (blessedness). This longing would, to be sure, be unable by itself to prove that religion is not self-deception; but the devout man feels that a spiritual personality in the natural world would be an absurdity if this world were not God's world. Faith becomes real certainty only when the religious demand is met by a revelation of God.[1]

[1] Hence religion rests upon the conviction of reason of something above the world as self-evident for personality. But it itself arises by God awaking

6. Where there is religion the wish must also arise to let our own life be determined by our relation to God. This finds expression first in ritual worship, from its rudest to its most spiritual forms. Its essence is always (1) devotion to the god (sacrifice, adoration, renunciation); (2) the effort to become a partaker of the divine (sacrament, devout practices). This is always the same, in spite of the immeasurable distance between profit-seeking sacrifice and magic rites on the one hand, and the worship of God in spirit and truth and sacrament on the other. Worship is always a proof that religion is present or has been present. A superficial view gauges religion in general by it, whereas only the feeling from which it sprang or springs, not the act of worship itself (which may be a mere survival of a dead feeling, body without soul), belongs to religion (danger of "ecclesiasticism"). Without the impulse to worship there can be metaphysics, but no real religion.[1] As long as the divinity is felt only as above the world, as a power determining the world, a tendency toward morality need not be involved in the impulse of the will that proceeds from religion.[2] But the more the divinity becomes one with the idea of the good, the more are moral elements included in worship, and the more is it felt that

the longing for communion with him by the impression of the insufficiency of the world, and by satisfying it by revelation of his supernatural power, directed to the personal aims of man. It is completed when God, revealing himself as man, becomes known to man as the power of love which overcomes the world.

[1] Incapacity of Rationalism for worship. Artificial ritual of Comte and St. Simon. Dreariness of æsthetics trying to veil the want of religion.

[2] *E.g.* sacrifices to a capricious despot (sacrifice of children, ritual immorality). In the lower forms of Christianity energetic practice of ritual exists along with great moral indifference. Where religion is of this sort, a distaste for it can arise on moral grounds.

the really impelling motive of religion is the consciousness of the moral task and of the moral rights of personality (personal dignity). The goal is the complete absorption of worship in the moral tasks of life as the will of God (kingdom of God, λογικὴ λατρεία). Morality becomes one with holiness, immorality becomes sin against God, moral freedom becomes obedience to God (service of God).

7. To the capacity of the reason for morality, especially for that determined by religion, modern races give names which correspond to the Greek συνείδησις, the Latin *conscientia*, the English "conscience." These names have all had originally a wider significance (self-consciousness) and have gained their special meaning only as the frank naïve participation of the individual in the customs and religion of the community began to give way to personal reflection and judgment.[1] The older races, in the period of their uninterrupted development, judged themselves simply by the objective standard which the popular life (that included religion) presented to the individual, and hence did not need a special court of appeal sitting in judgment in the individual soul. Conscience has primarily nothing to do with religion. Least of all is it a "central organ of religion." It is only the necessity, involved immediately in the practical constitution of reason, of letting one's own moral quality be judged, favorably or unfavorably, by inwardly acknowledged ideals. The verdict of conscience, like æsthetic judgments, becomes effective without intention or reflection, and even against our own wishes, although it is variously conditioned and anticipated. Conscience is

[1] Chrysippus, Epictetus, Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, — Philo, — Paul, Peter, Epistle to the Hebrews, — לב טהור, Ps. 51, 12.

therefore primarily not a teacher or a norm for moral action, as if it were a code of duties imposed on man by God, but a judge that presupposes a definite ideal. And since this ideal may be changed or be astray, the verdicts of conscience differ in content, and there can be such a thing as a weak or erring conscience. Conscience may condemn one man for an act, for whose omission it blames another (vengeance for blood, war, revering of relics). Hence no one can rely absolutely on and appeal to the verdict of the consciences of others (natural capacity). But in the *form* of its verdict conscience is unerring, and for the individual it is the final court from which there is no appeal; so that whoever acts contrary to his conscience, though objectively rightly, feels himself justly condemned (Rom. 14, 23). For him who loses his self-respect there is no compensation in the approval of others, even when they can judge more justly than he. Conscience becomes a guide only on deliberate reflection, by giving a verdict on actions merely thought of as if they were already accomplished. It becomes a champion against unjust human judgments, while at other times the "good" conscience is as little felt as is health. Concerning the fundamental conditions of social life, the conscience of every educated man passes, of course, the same verdict. For the foundation of reason is for all the same. And there are demands without which a moral social life is not possible at all (trust, justice). Hence there is a conscience that is in agreement through wide circles, a social conscience, and each individual owes it reverence. But this conscience, too, has come about under many special conditions. And every civilized man has the right and duty, if supported by his own conscience,

to reject the verdict of the social conscience in cases of contradiction, and to become a "martyr to his convictions."

In itself conscience has no religious character. And a man can be conscientious without religion. But where religion is present at all, the conscience, along with the ideal of life, must be determined by religion. The conscience that judges by religious ideals can, it is true, be other than the conscience that judges by moral standards; it can even contradict it, and as a higher divine court vote it down. For "religious duty" is felt at first as a ritual and ceremonial one, and so is indifferent to moral duty. But with normal development the will of God becomes more and more the "willing of the good" (Col. 2, 16; Gal. 4, 9) and all good becomes the "will of the divinity." The only goal can be, that the voice of conscience in its unity be felt to be God's voice (*συνείδησις θεοῦ*), and that at the same time its verdict become simply that of the pure moral ideal. Thus the devout Greek felt in a disapproving conscience the accusing voice of the Erinyes. And the penitent in the Old Testament says, "Against thee only have I sinned" (Ps. 51, 4).

8. From religion springs of itself neither a science of the world (nature, history) nor of God as such (metaphysics), but a conviction of the significance of God for our own personal position in the world. Hence the relation of religion and science seems in theory very simple. But in fact the case is other. For (1) religion in any individual is always evoked by instruction or by historical tradition. It is true that man does not become really religious until he is personally touched by the self-revealing God. But he comes in contact with the revelation of God in already developed religions, only in so far as it has already become

crystallized in the community in the shape of tradition and religious doctrine. And the more spiritual, grand, and historically significant a religion is, the more powerful will this factor show itself, and with it will come the danger of being satisfied, under the influence of rational or creedal intellectualism, with a *fides humana.* (2) The highest, absolutely incognizable reality and power, postulated by science and revealing itself in every phenomenon, is, in fact, in itself nothing else than what religion postulates. Hence arises a relation between metaphysics and religion that can easily lead to a counterfeit of religion intended to serve as a stop-gap in our knowledge of the world. (3) Man as a reasoning being must make his religious convictions, too, objects of intellectual investigation and find a place for them in the circle of the sciences. Here the representative power of the imagination, influenced by the view of nature and history which it finds all about it, even though only a poetically scientific one, will mould religious feeling into pictures and ideas (myth). The science of nature and history, however, must also make that natural and historical region out of which impressions of revelation proceed, an object of its investigation. And it must subject the views of the life of nature which underlie religious ideas to criticism. Hence with the changes of scientific opinions religious conceptions themselves must change or else lose their convincing force. Hence it is obvious from the start that only that form of religion can be permanent in which religious faith has made itself independent of such changes by distinguishing its own sphere clearly from the ideas associated with it. Where that is not possible a conflict between religion and knowledge must be inevitable at a definite stage of

culture. To avoid it, (1) the science of religion (theology) must be clearly conscious of its dependence on the development of all knowledge. It is impossible to investigate historically one division of history by methods and laws different from those used in the other divisions, or to try to interpret the laws of nature in certain cases differently than in all others. It must (2) hold clearly and definitely to the uniqueness of its own object. It has to investigate from the scientific point of view the impressions of the divine which touch man in nature and history, which free him from the world, and guarantee to him the true worth of his personality (blessedness). In the great difficulty of doing both consistently lies the crux of present theology. Revelation seems to many inseparably bound up with the scientific view of the history in which it appeared, and religious conviction with the opinions held, at the time of the revelation, concerning the processes and the structure of nature. But this does not seem the case to any one who rightly understands the nature of faith and of knowledge.

Faith is religious conviction, *i.e.* the conviction, based on religious experience, of the divine significance of things for us. Knowledge is the conviction, based on the experience of the senses and the laws of thought, of the reality and the unity of things.[1] Faith is true only for him who is impressed by the divine meaning of things and will let himself be impressed by it (*velle credere*); knowledge is true for every normal man. Nature and history are never

[1] From separate acts of knowledge up to science. All the more perfect, the more that will and feeling are excluded in passing judgment. Both kinds of conviction are subjective, but both include the certainty that there is a reality corresponding to them.

objects of faith in their worldly nature and actuality, but as bearers of a divine revelation. Even the highest mediators of revelation can never, as individual phenomena of history and in regard to the external course of their fortunes, be objects of faith, but only in so far as God reveals himself by working upon us through them (divinity of Christ). And the views of nature and history which were held to be self-evident in the age of revelation (and hence also by the human agents of it) have no more significance for faith than have learned views of antiquity in general. Hence, too, faith can never, merely because it is convinced of the content of divine revelation in a narrative, make, of its own motion, the demand that it must be held to be unerringly transmitted from the point of view of history, if the science of history should raise objections to it. A religion whose theology should actually contradict the position taken by science would condemn itself (paganism). The inmost essence of faith is trust in the voice of God, which comes to us in the impressions of the phenomenal world. What can be known does not need to be believed. What needs to be believed cannot be known. So long as we think ourselves able to apprehend objects of knowledge by faith, or to search the realm of faith by knowledge, a consistent culture is impossible. The necessary result is either the disbelief which, even for the personal, practical judging of the world, accepts only science or its substitutes, or else the superstition which tries to assign the decision to faith even in the sphere of knowledge. It makes all science impossible because it judges natural events and historical narratives in ways contrary to the laws of science, and confuses God's working with worldly happenings, God with the world. Under the

influence of such presuppositions the faith of the educated man becomes "uncertain knowledge" (opinion), and religion poor popular philosophy. The true goal is the perfect scientific apprehension of the world which is, for faith, also the perfect revelation of God.

9. Where a real feeling of God revealing himself to the soul is present we have the substance of religion, even though its external manifestations are not yet developed. Hence mysticism is the most tolerable form of one-sidedness in religion. Not, to be sure, in its naturalistic form, which has not been uncommon even in the Christian church, especially of the Orient, since the age of Neoplatonism, for this confuses an æsthetic with a religious process (experiencing God in ecstasy); but in the form which it has always exhibited in its sounder manifestations. Where religion is determined by a one-sided predominance of the factor of will (moralism), we are justified in inferring at least an unconscious life of religious feeling. But there is always present a religious "poverty of blood." And moralism threatens the life of religion as soon as mere acts of ritual are to satisfy the will of the divinity; or as soon as it is thought possible to express the religious life in external "works" and not in the disposition of soul. The most ruinous one-sidedness in religion is intellectualism (orthodoxy, rationalism). For firm views in the sphere of religion are very possible without real experience of the religious process, as soon as traditional dogmas, the faith of others, and philosophical doctrines gain theoretic assent by virtue of their authority (*fides humana, sacrificium intellectus*).

# PART II: POSTULATES OF THE RELIGIOUS VIEW OF THE WORLD

## 5. *The Living Personal God*

1. Religious apologetics must renounce alliance with those who put the mood of admiring reverence before the order, beauty, and unity in nature and art in the place of the consciousness of God, or allege it to be the same. Assuredly the God on whom the devout man knows himself to be absolutely dependent cannot be a personality in the sense of an individuality of the phenomenal world, and one might therefore be disposed to regard the word "personality" as not applicable to him at all (Rückert). Has not the pantheistic tendency been due chiefly to the fact that "the cup of personality seemed too small for the opulence of the world?" But that which this word alone expresses distinctly to us, viz. consciousness and freedom, we cannot exclude from our conception of God without making the religious mood itself illusory; that is, we cannot dispense with the mood itself. Pantheism in every form, although it contains that remnant of religious feeling which is usually left in the transition from decayed popular religions to esoteric wisdom, is the formula for a mood akin to religion, but neither logically tenable nor consistent with real religion.[1] It demands of the thinker

[1] H. Spencer, v. Hartmann. Strauss: "In the order of the universe and in its tendency to advance we recognize that which in human life we call reasonable and good. The universe becomes for us the source of the reasonable and good. It is not founded by a supreme reason, but on a supreme reason.

a feat such as only the power of undisciplined fancy is capable of. It is compelled to conceive of essence and manifestation, of cause and effect, as one, and to look on the unconscious as "purposeful" (v. Hartmann); whereas unconsciously working purpose is always the result of a process, never its beginning, and the conception of worth in general has significance only in and through personality as such. It is compelled to conceive of ideas and laws without a thinking subject or a consciousness capable of framing abstractions; which corresponds to the lyric mood or the feeling roused by the enjoyment of a work of music, but abolishes logical thought. And practically pantheism demands of a thinking and willing being absolute and inner dependence on the unconscious; if it does not actually put sympathy with a "divine" that is seeking deliverance in the place of religion. And yet in the presence of the unconscious the good man would have to feel himself to be something higher, and even if it crushed him irresistibly from the point of view of his external life, hold fast, like Prometheus, to the consciousness of his greatness.

All this quite aside from the fact, that if a personal God is denied, the order, beauty, and unity of the world would be only the continuous creation of man's own spirit.[1] Form, color, sound, that is, all by which we

It is at the same time essence and manifestation, cause and effect. We demand loyalty to the universe, as the pious man of the old school does to his God" (gnosis, fantastic mythology).

[1] Schleiermacher finds the question in dispute between pantheism and theism indifferent, as is comprehensible in view of his conception of religion. But as soon as the longing for self-assertion on the part of the reasoning personality is included in religion, religious feeling implies the knowledge of a reasonable will that is master of the world. More detailed theological knowledge is here, of course, for the moment a matter of indifference.

distinguish the world from a chaos of flying atoms, exist only in the souls of conscious beings, through their senses and for their feeling. If the "world" is not the creation of a personal God, then conscious "spirits" create it new every moment out of chaos. The stormy thoughts of J. G. Fichte in his first period of development are much more "reasonable" than the alleged clarity of the ordinary deniers of the personality of God. But let us emphasize rather another point. Instead of making us free from the world and assuring us of the worth of our personality, this "religion of pantheism" would surrender us absolutely to the mechanism of the world as worthless and transitory phenomena. Resignation or pessimism would take the place of the faith that overcomes the world. The æsthetic pleasure in the world as a "work of art" fails him who is being crushed by the wheels of its perfect mechanism and who is unable to put himself outside the world as a disinterested spectator. Pantheism does away with true religion, even though it can beget temporarily, at a certain stage of culture and development, moods which have a kinship with religious elevation above the world and with the feeling of freedom founded on it. Metaphysics takes an attitude of indifference to the question concerning the "personality of the absolute." Practical religion, on the other hand, is conditioned by it in its most essential life. For religion stands and falls with the qualitative distinction of nature and personality, and the "creed" of pantheism identifies the two.

2. The opinion which, since Spinoza, has governed wide circles of educated men, that God's personality is a self-contradictory conception (because "absolute" and "personal" are mutually exclusive terms), is right only in this:

that personality as applied to God cannot, as with us, imply a form of spiritual being to which the limitations of the non-ego attach; and that the Bible presents God's personality in the fashion of man's, for the reason that any other kind of presentation is excluded in popular and concrete language. But theological thought is not tied to the symbolic conceptions of popular piety. And the conception of personality framed by science excludes the quantitative conception of the absolute as "undetermined" (Spinoza). It is incompatible with the language which makes the absolute the "indefinite" (mathematics) or the "abstract universal" (metaphysics). "Empty space" can certainly not be personal. But with the qualitative conception of the absolute as that which is independent and complete in itself, personality can perfectly well be combined. For it negatives only its determination by something other than itself (limitation, dependence), not self-determination. The personalities that spring from the world can, to be sure, attain the consciousness of their personality only in the presence of a "non-ego." But even they become truly personal only by the "non-ego" becoming for them more and more the consciousness of the freedom of the ego. If personality did not exist in us as a potency, we could not become conscious of it by contact with the world. Hence the world does not make us personal, but only makes us conscious of our personality. And man becomes the more personal, the less he is determined by the external world, the more he conquers space and time in thought and the moral life, the more perfectly that which has touched him from without becomes the free and independent content of his inner life. The perfect spiritual man would be one completely personal and yet

not needing any longer the reaction of the world at all. Such a state cannot, it is true, be pictured by us, but is, nevertheless, conceivable.

Thus God could *attain* personal from impersonal being only by contact with the world. But as one who bears the world potentially in himself, he can have *been* personal in himself from all eternity. He cannot be conceived of as *a* personality alongside of others, but can be conceived as *the* personality which includes all other personalities in conscious freedom. In order to free the thought of God from the limitations involved in the personality of phenomenal man, we need not renounce the idea of personality (which expresses precisely the quality of our being which is above the world), but we must conceive of the process of "becoming" and the "non-personal" background of personality as absent. We do not pass from imperfect to perfect phenomena by omitting in thought that in which their relative perfection consists, but by turning our eyes away from the limitations of this perfection. The God of religion must therefore be conceived of, not as non-personal, but as the perfect personality, over against which man is only a non-personal being becoming personal.[1] And the thought of the personal God makes human culture and morality a slavishly heteronomous one (v. Hartmann) only if God is conceived of as a personality alongside of ours, not as the absolute personality in which all others rest. For then our reason becomes a revelation of the divine, our conscience God's voice. In obedience to God we become free.

[1] The doctrine of the Trinity is the Christian attempt to make the personality of God comprehensible without dependence on the world (Logos, ideal world).

With a childish conception of the personality of God, hope of reward and slavish fear may disfigure morality, but not with the Christian view, even if it is childlike and without scientific clearness. For the spiritual and moral conception of God and the faith in God as our Father, as well as the impression of the person of Jesus, suffice to counteract all danger. On the other hand, it is precisely pantheism that can never be just to the absolute worth of the moral task. If the personal in the world becomes an evanescent phenomenal form, if it furnishes to man neither permanent aims nor values valid in themselves, morality loses its categorical character, and man's struggle for civilization becomes more or less "love's labor lost;" "all is vanity." Hence religion and morality will, with good conscience, hold fast to the postulate of the living personal God. But science must declare itself wholly incompetent in the dispute between pantheism and theism. For it starts with the presupposition of the phenomenal world, and has no right to pass judgment on the ultimate conditions of its existence. Whether the system of nature, whose laws it investigates, is born of chance or of a divine creative will, whether an immanent unconscious system of law rules in it or a conscious supernatural wisdom, are questions simply outside the sphere where science is valid. And the perfect system of law in the world, is not in contradiction with that freedom of the personal God, from which proceed reason, liberty, and order.

### 6. *Revelation*

1. Although religion is produced by a psychological process, nevertheless it can be evoked only by God; that is, it is impossible without a revelation of God, if it is not to

become a mere illusion of human wishes or be transformed into metaphysics. And God cannot be the living God without being revealed in some effect; that is, without something above the world making itself known in the phenomenal world. The fact of religion in itself bears witness to God's working uninterruptedly in the life of man. "He has not left himself without a witness" (Rom. 1, 19 f.; Acts 14, 17). He discloses himself in the impulse to religion in the soul that cannot be extinguished by sin, and in an eternal almighty exercise of power in nature and history (*revelatio generalis*). Even in the most debased religions this revelation bears witness to itself as a training for the kingdom of God. Only on the basis of it is true religion historically intelligible and no longer an incomprehensible and isolated marvel. But every historical religion presupposes a special historical divine revelation which determines the character of the piety it nourishes (*revelatio specialis*). He only is devout in the Christian sense who lets himself be determined in his personal life by the historical revelation of God which he finds in Jesus. Natural religion has always existed only as a remnant of historical religions which have degenerated into popular metaphysics, and has won a hearing only where a religion has ceased to exist.

2. Hence religion can be defended only by justifying the fact of revelation; Christianity, only by justifying the Biblical history of revelation. But it is a question only of the actual revelation on which religion (or Christianity) rests; not of the defence of everything that has attached itself at any time, in the shape of historical traditions or intellectual opinions, to the belief in this revelation. That can easily be left to historical and scientific criticism.

Its formal defence entangles theology in an uncalled-for and hopeless struggle with the development of true science.

3. Revelation, as the source of religion, cannot be conceived of as a miraculous communication of metaphysical, moral, or theological truths, which justifies its divine source by appearing in a form that excludes a natural origin (miracle, prophecy).[1] This conception of revelation, for which Supernaturalism and Rationalism have fought, and which attempts at mediation have not improved,[2] is neither intelligible nor tenable. It would compel Christians to maintain the perfect infallibility of everything contained in the Bible, at least of all the statements in it having to do with morals and religion, and would make at bottom a real history of revelation impossible. It would have to base the assurance of faith on the historical certainty of the marvellous stories reported, and on the authenticity and uncorrupted transmission of the books of the Bible (*fides humana, historica*). And it would be simply useless for the purpose for which it is required. For religion springs from a sense of the divine life, not from theoretic knowledge; and in order to overcome the obstacles

[1] For Protestant Christians revelation becomes, on such an assumption, practically identical with its Biblical record, although the two are theoretically always distinguished. For a doctrine always comes to the consciousness of those living later only as "tradition," oral or written.

[2] Supernatural Rationalism (miraculous revelation of truths of the reason) and rationalistic Supernaturalism (divine revelations which can be gauged by reason). On the basis of these presumptions, only that thoroughgoing Rationalism for which Moses and Jesus, Zoroaster and Buddha, Socrates and Plato, are spiritual heroes in the evolution of reason, and that real Supernaturalism which thinks of mysteries which are unattainable to fallen human reason and which God makes known by miracle, while all other religions contain human falsehoods, are logically consistent.

to religion that have their ground in sin, there is needed the rousing of right feelings, not the communication of a higher knowledge.

This scholastic conception of revelation contradicts (1) history, which shows us in religions of very different worth a common content which cannot be explained by an original historical revelation.[1] It contradicts (2) psychological law. An actual speech of God is inconceivable. Only in extremely few cases could we assume ecstasies, theophanies, and angelic messengers, even according to traditional ideas. Hence the birth of new theoretic knowledge in the soul, even in the religious sphere, could be conceived of only under the conditions under which such knowledge arises in general, that is, by experience and by thought. And even if we should assume that God could find a means to impress such communications on the agents, the preparation would manifestly be lacking for appropriating them, and it would be wholly impossible for them to distinguish such communications from the knowledge which they had received from others or won by the activities of their own reason. They could not gain conviction by purely religious ways. Hence the fact that such knowledge was revealed would at most disclose itself inwardly, by its being in its nature "secrets" which transcended human thought. But the few "mysteries" of this sort in Christianity are, as a matter of fact, what they are

[1] The contents of the first chapters of Genesis are so closely connected with the Chaldean myths that we should have to think, with the church fathers, of a borrowing from the Bible by the pagan sages, or, with Gladstone and Ebrard, of an (absolutely arbitrarily assumed) original tradition out of the age before the dispersal of mankind, in order to maintain the supernaturalistic conception of revelation. Both will seem equally unthinkable to any one who has an unprejudiced historical judgment.

only through their later theological development (Trinity, Christology); whereas their original content has a genuinely supernatural character, to be sure, but in its logical form by no means goes beyond the human knowledge of the time, *e.g.* the philosophic (Logos). And the external proof of the supernatural character of a revelation adduced from miracles and prophecies would compel us to base religious certainty on an historical verdict that would necessarily always be called in question anew by scientific criticism (Lessing against Goetze). But, with growing culture, even the devout man must become more and more sceptical toward the accounts of miraculous events. While the uneducated, even in times of high scientific culture, could remain undisturbed in his belief, the man of learning would have to accept a painful uncertainty in the heart of his religious life, or else suppress it by force at the expense of his scientific conscience.[1] Christianity, whose sacred writings (in distinction, *e.g.*, from the Koran or from the Vedas) offer themselves frankly as historical products of human effort, furnishing unambiguous evidence of development and of contradictions, and which contain so little of mysterious metaphysical wisdom, would least of all offer means for the defence of such a conception of revelation.

4. The revelation which religious apologetics has to defend can be conceived of only as an act of God, by which he evokes in the souls of men the consciousness of himself as the one who influences their life in the world and lends

[1] In such a conflict, faith would, of course, show itself stronger than the scientific impulse. But "piety would walk with barbarism, learning with unbelief" (Schleiermacher to Lücke), and the moral culture of the race would sicken of an incurable wound. Knowledge does not turn back. We can avail nothing against truth.

it power to rise above the world to its goal. It can be a question only of a trust in the self-revealing divinity and its aims and an absolute devotion to it being genuinely begotten in the soul. Neither, however, is accomplished by philosophic or scientific doctrine.

Scientific knowledge of nature and history can neither increase nor diminish the religious impression. The *μικροί* are the virtuosos of religion. He who conceives of the sun as revolving around the earth, and takes Heracles for an historical figure like Charlemagne, is not the less, or less genuinely, devout on that account than the greatest historian or naturalist. Hence the communication of such knowledge would not be revelation for the purposes of religion, but a miraculous substitute for scientific toil. And since religion has to do, not with God as an object of knowledge, but with his effect on the salvation of men, it is not, in real revelation, a question of promoting metaphysical knowledge (*σοφία τοῦ κόσμου*). As determining our life in the world, God can reveal himself only in "saving manifestations," *i.e.* in facts of the inner and outer life which bear irresistible witness to the soul of a divine goal of life. Facts in history and in the life of the soul gain the significance of revelations when they disclose the religious relation between God and man with fresh and compelling force (Lipsius). For the religiously receptive soul such a "manifestation" of God has, of course, a direct effect as "inspiration" in the religious sense, *i.e.* as providing a new view of God, of the world, and of man. But strictly God reveals himself in facts (history). Something hitherto shut up in the secrecy of the divine life enters the life of humanity, to evoke in it a new attitude toward God and toward its own goal. What is revealed must previously have been

"mystery" (*ἀποκαλύπτειν*). But it is made known in the revelation (*φαναροῦν*), and so ceases to be a real mystery.[1] The content of revelation is always "salvation." Without the special religious receptivity of the soul (prophetic quality) external facts would, it is true, not be able to evoke the religious impression. But revelation cannot evoke through them doctrine, but only enthusiasm. And even where, as an historical fact, a body of doctrines and of forms of ritual has proceeded from such agents, they propagate religion only in case they are able to reproduce in some degree in the souls of their fellows the religious experience which made them prophets. The value of a religion depends on the completeness and significance of the facts of its revelation and on the purity and strength of the religious feeling in the agents of the revelation.

5. We can speak of revelation in a general sense wherever, in nature and history, in human fortunes and spiritual experiences, the impression of the divine in the world, which the mass of men does not feel, approves itself powerful in receptive souls. It was in this sense that Hamann, Herder, Jacobi, and Schleiermacher (*Reden über die Religion*) spoke of revelation. The mysteries and terrors of nature, her lavish blessings and her menacing dangers, hours of joy, distress, and rescue, crises in the lives of nations, wonderfully moving experiences in the inner and outer life of the individual, carry such revelations with them. Nature becomes a temple of God, history the "holy place" in it, the life of the soul its "holy of holies." And in a humanity not determined by the world (sinless), this revelation would suffice to evoke true religion. Every human being would be his own prophet. But the soul

[1] It will not remain "unintelligible."

governed by fleshly impulses does not feel these impressions at all, or feels them dimly and for the most part only in the strange and the terrible, in ecstasy and dream.[1] The obscure echo of such a "revelation of God in nature and history," which is audible in all ages, like stray notes of a tune, explains the element of truth in natural religions. It is not, as has been naïvely thought, the persistence of a more or less dimmed and forgotten primeval revelation made to the earliest races of mankind, but the light of God, broken into various colors and variously obscured, illuminating the world. There is no such thing as an absolutely false religion. But a revelation looking to the salvation of the moral personality was not possible on such assumptions. This could become effective in sinful humanity only historically (*revelatio specialis*). Special saving acts of God in nature and history that foreshadowed the kingdom of God, evoked in the souls of men, whose religious endowments were equal to it, the impression of the real will of God toward men and the world with overwhelming force; and this made them interpreters of God to their fellows, founders of religions, and channels of religious enthusiasm (*revelatio mediata*). This revelation in the narrower sense presupposes (1) men of religious genius, for whom religion could be a profession. For in all higher life, personalities endowed with genius are the sources of life for the circles dependent on them. (2) It demands acts of God, which form a history of the evolution of the kingdom of God, whether they occur in the national life, in nature, or in the life of the individual, and whether they are expe-

[1] *Prodigia*, etc. Hence the disposition to find in the "unnatural" the mark of revelation. The "doubling" of one's own life in dream has perhaps often worked here as motive.

rienced with clear consciousness or under conditions of intensified feeling (in ecstasy, visions). Such agents of revelation are, of course, miraculous, as is also the history in which God has revealed himself to them, and through them to man. They cannot be explained from the laws and forces of the causal sequence that excludes all purpose as such, as far as these are accessible to us. For the unbeliever they are strange products of the power that governs things, — a power incomprehensible to him, too, in the last analysis. For the believer they are miracles of God. But in themselves they involve no contradiction of the continuity of law in nature. Such continuity offers, as we know, no obstacle to genius of incomprehensible splendor proceeding, in every intellectual sphere, from environments that afford no explanation of it; nor to nations and individuals having experiences that are decisive for their whole development, though there is no cause for them accessible to human knowledge. The highest example that can be conceived in this realm is a human personality which, with its whole nature and experience, becomes the full and clear expression of God's will to men. It is, then, for those who accept it, itself the historical revelation of God (λόγος σὰρξ γενόμενος), subject and object of the religion whose agent it is.

6. Even where true revelation is present, the perfect religion cannot exist from the beginning, but must come into being in history. In the spiritual history of mankind those who achieve the task attain the goal only by standing on the shoulders of their predecessors, and by reaping the fruit of their toil and their sufferings, of their errors and limitations. Until the time was fulfilled, the perfect revelation would not have found a soul that could

receive it, and a prophet of the highest truth no community to propagate it. Only a genuinely historical revelation in a religious race (people of God) could give birth to the highest religion. Else the divine light could have flashed out only for a moment, with no human community to be enlightened and warmed. And when such a history has accomplished itself, a race has bestowed the highest gift possible on humanity, even though, as race, it perish in the process, like the oyster in giving birth to the pearl. The agents of revelation must understand and utter the new religious life in the fashion of thought and in the speech of their time and stage of culture, and cannot aim to give theoretic instruction, but only to exert practical influence. They have, to be sure, the advantage over others of having the true view of God and the world, one based on religious conviction; but not a more perfect theory of the world and of God. In their "doctrine" they deliver, not the revelation as such, but their understanding of the revelation, an understanding conditioned by their culture and personality. A religious community arises when a group of men lets itself be inwardly moved by what the founders of religion have experienced as revelation, that is, when it shares their spirit. The actual existence of the revelation, can, of course, not be proved scientifically. It can make itself known only by the fact that men are moved by a common religious spirit. And even then it will be certain only to those who feel this spirit in themselves (faith). But no scientific knowledge or principles can compel us to deny such a revelation as impossible. And whoever believes in it will be compelled thereby to no distrust of real science.

### 7. *Miracle and Mystery in Revelation*

1. Faith in the real existence of a revelation of God does not depend, as has already been shown, on the historical certainty of the miracles reported in connection with it, nor does it compel us to accept any special theological or philosophical view concerning miracles. And no devout Christian will in our age expect to be able to prove to the non-Christian the truth of the Christian revelation by pointing to the miracles and prophecies narrated in the Bible, as early theology has frankly done. Even the resurrection of Christ and its significance for the Christian religion are no exception. He who fancies that he can convince a sceptic of the resurrection, as an empirical fact of history, on the basis of existing documents, has no clear conception either of the nature of scientific certainty, or of the real situation of existing tradition. It is not accidental nor indifferent that the risen Christ revealed himself only to those who believed in him or who struggled against belief in him, like Paul. The principles of historical study have so changed, that a narrative of deeds and words which cannot be explained by the laws of nature, cannot now be used as proof of the immediate divine dignity of the incident in question and its tradition, but is regarded as a ground for doubting the whole tradition. We believe, not because of, but in spite of, the miracle. But the fact of Christian belief in revelation being interwoven with the possibility and reality of miracles compels apologetics to take this question under consideration and to make it clear. And from the ordinary point of view it seems self-evident, that if God reveals himself in deeds, these deeds must stand out unmistakably from the

range of ordinary events by virtue of their supernatural nature. "Wonder is faith's dearest child."

2. Revelation, as an act of God, must be supernatural; and as the disclosing of divine thoughts and purposes, it must be above reason, if nature and reason are understood in the empirical sense. And what is felt in the hearts of men as a new divine life is the absolutely inexplicable, the mystery. Thus the Christian revelation carries the conviction with it of being to the ordinary conception of reason a "folly," even an "offence." And the processes which go on in the souls of privileged personalities must always have the character of a mystery. *Individuum est ineffabile.* The purpose as such is "supernatural"; the divine purpose is entirely outside of the course of nature. And faith grasps, not the tangible reality, but something invisible that comes to expression in it. He who robs religion of miracle and mystery dilutes it into morality and popular metaphysics. Hence without miracle and mystery in the real religious sense of the words, no revelation of God is conceivable. But this is by no means saying that every possible conception of miracle and mystery, even if they proceed from a thoroughly irreligious view of the world, would have to be justified by faith in revelation. The interest of religion in miracle depends on two convictions. First, that the divine personality can be limited or checked in the realization of its ends and in its revelation by no conditions inhering in the world. Secondly, that God, if he reveals himself, will make his revelation, for those who are willing to open their minds to it, clearly and unmistakably distinguishable from all that aimless nature brings forth; that is, will express his purposeful divine will unmistakably in the

facts of revelation. But the first conviction has in itself nothing to do with the question whether God realizes his ends as lord of a world governed by laws, or by action outside of these laws. And the second remains unaltered, whether the distinguishing characteristic of the facts of revelation lie in their religious and moral significance or in the inexplicability of their external form. Not faith, but the difference in scientific culture and view of the world, will be ultimately decisive of such questions. And we must not let ourselves be led astray by seeing that incomparable heroes of piety have, in ages lacking a scientific view of the world, understood their faith in miracles to imply necessarily the rejection of the reign of law in the world.

The purely rationalistic and hence irreligious view of the world can look on the supernatural only as unnatural, the superrational only as irrational, the inexplicable only as a violation of law, since it knows no other nature, reason, and order than those to be known empirically. When it speaks of miracles, it can think only of events contrary to nature, which are distinguished from other events simply by their contradiction of the laws of nature (*contra naturam*), not by the supernatural content and purpose which find expression in them. From this point of view two positions are possible that are wont to be maintained with equal fanaticism. Men deny miracles because they are moved more powerfully by the scientific view of the world than by religious impressions.[1] They declare it inconceivable that a divine act, by contradicting the laws of the world, should make void the rules of empirical phenomena,

[1] Even when they are only echoing the empty catchwords of Rationalism, that is, putting faith in authority over against faith in authority.

and hold it far more probable in each individual case, that historical tradition, even under the most favorable conditions, has been corrupted, than that events which contradict the laws of nature have really happened. Or else they accept miracles because the force of religious conviction is the more powerful. Then they conceive of God's act in miracle as one essentially akin with the working of natural causes, but overcoming them by an arbitrary act of omnipotence.[1] The normal course of the world seems to them a compromise; miracle, a conflict. And their very denial of the absolute validity of the order of nature gives them a pleasurable consciousness of the power of their own religious life over against the "stormy petrel, reason" or "unbelieving science." And they like to call the assumptions of the latter irreligious, just as their opponents, under the influence of intellectual fanaticism, see in belief in miracles fanaticism or an evil purpose.

3. If faith were really bound up with this conception of miracle, at a certain stage of scientific culture a schism would occur in every civilized race. The educated classes would have to turn away incredulously from revelation and religion, or else would have, with uncertainty of soul, to refuse to the convictions that determine without exception their thought and actions elsewhere admission to this hallowed sphere. Of such unhappy discord and such crippling uncertainty even such resolute Christians as B. Niebuhr have left moving confessions. The devout man who thinks scientifically could not survive this contest. For the laws that hold for the knowledge of

[1] So of mystery, as something akin to rational knowledge, but transcending the laws of the reason; of "prophecy," as a knowledge contradictory to the laws of the human mind.

nature and history are either simply an illusion, or they admit no exception in the sphere of external phenomena. What we call laws of nature are nothing else than the way in which the causal connection of things is apprehended by us, a way approved by continually recurring experience and by ever repeated experiments (explanations of the real in nature). Without the assumption of this causal connection, not only all science, but also all practical action in the world and on the world, would be impossible. All measurement and weighing, all calculation and planning, every scheme and every undertaking of man, would, without this presupposition, be an adventurous folly. No thinking man doubts that the laws of this sequence are not yet even remotely known to man, that perhaps they can never be known to man with man's senses except in a very small degree. But the existence of law, and the impossibility of an external phenomenon that contradicts it, form the tacit assumption of all our thought and action. It would, to be sure, be rash to assert, that out of the conditions and factors known to us that result must always proceed that has proceeded from them according to experience hitherto. New forces, unknown to us, might intervene which, by changing the conditions, would also change the result. But the subjection of things to law would then find expression just as much as where the usual result followed.

It is true that piety, as such, knows nothing of phenomenal conditions that could limit God's will. And it looks, for its part, only at the acting personal God, and does not inquire into the system of nature in which a fact of revelation is realized. But the order of the world is, for the devout, the forms established by God for his activity,

by the violation of which he would capriciously destroy his own sacred order. And piety sees in all phenomena the free creative expression of a purposeful divine will. But as soon as the first naïve conception is outgrown, it ceases to feel in them the necessity of a miracle "contrary to nature." For the devout man, familiar with scientific thought, God's will works, not alongside of the world in the world's fashion, but in the world in a fashion above it. Neither a conflict of divine and phenomenal activities, nor an individual phenomenon apart from phenomenal conditions, is conceivable in the world. Eternity cannot come into conflict with time, omnipresence with space, nor spirit with the phenomenal world; nor does piety need a miracle in which the divine will should suspend the order of the world it has established, and produce an individual phenomenon in a fashion above the world and yet akin to the world. Spirit does not work like nature. It has no resemblance at all to the causal system of the phenomenal world. It may guide the world to its goal by creative and purposeful methods, just as it has fixed its goal for it. But it cannot come into collision with it. Nature and miracle cannot be opposites, because they do not move on the same plane.[1]

Hence the scholastic conception of miracle would make belief in revelation impossible or uncertain, at least for cultivated men, and leave the full joy in believing only to the unthinking. But it is not the conception of miracle that is really connected with faith. Faith sees miracles

[1] Especially shortsighted is the basing of belief in the miraculous *contra naturam* on the experience of the miracle of the New Birth, which, "supernatural" and "mysterious" as it certainly is, is wrought entirely in accordance with the laws of spiritual life.

everywhere where it sees God's revelation unmistakable and mighty in events. It does not ask whether this phenomenon has also a natural side or not. And faith's conception of miracle is the only one known to Holy Scripture, as to all vital piety of antiquity.[1] The devout of the Bible lived in the undoubted assurance that there can be no worldly limitations to God's will. And since they never entertained the idea of a system of natural law ordained by God, but regarded every individual natural phenomenon with naïve piety as an act of the personal God, they tell with perfect naïveté stories which in the mouth of an educated man of our time would certainly presuppose a miracle *contra naturam*. But they themselves do not think of assuming a conflict between God and the order of nature, for the latter they do not know at all. They know, of course, of ordinances which God has set inviolably for the forces of nature in relation to one another (Jer. 33, 20, 25. Ps. 104, 9; 148, 6. Job 38, 10), but not of a universal system and its laws. And they talk of miracles, even where we see only familiar natural phenomena, whenever these arouse in them the impression of divine activity with special force.[2] Hence not the violation of the order of nature, but the impression of a divine purposeful activity, is for them the decisive element in the miraculous. They naturally call only such events miracles as reveal God's power by their splendor and grandeur.[3] But what really constitutes an act a miracle, according to their conception, is not its contradiction of natural laws, of which

[1] Cf. *Alttestamentliche Theologie*, ch. 29.

[2] *E.g.* Ps. 96, 3; 98, 1; 107, 8; 126, 3.

[3] *Noraah, gedolah, mofet, pele*, δυνάμεις, τέρατα. Even significant names and personalities are signs and wonders to the people, if they reveal God's thoughts (Is. 7, 14; 8, 18).

they do not think at all, but its significance as a powerful and unambiguous witness of God's will in his plan of salvation.[1] The scholastic conception of miracle is not a child of religion, but a product of false metaphysics. It subtracts from the creative wisdom and foreknowledge of God what it aims to assign to his power (arbitrary caprice) in the world. And the narratives of Holy Scripture would bear witness to him only if we assumed, not the vital conception of miracle and the complete indifference to a scientific knowledge of the world which characterize piety, but the reflections and scruples of modern science. We should be bound by a mechanical theory of inspiration to hold all statements of the sacred writers infallible, in the sense which they would bear now in the mouth of educated men of our own day, and all their narratives authentic as measured by the standard of our scientific criticism; whereas the writers themselves report the most tremendous as well as the most commonplace things with perfect naïveté as acts of an almighty God, and do not think at all of a system of nature.

4. Piety would have an interest in making miracle inconsistent with nature only if this were the sole sure mark of the divine character of a revelation. But such is by no means the case, true though it be that faith always sees in an act of revelation only God's free activity, and does not question at all concerning its place in the system of nature. Those who received the revelation did not need miracles in the scholastic sense at all, to be assured that what they experienced was really revelation. For this the inner conviction that God spoke to them in acts was enough, without asking whether these acts presupposed or suspended

[1] Old Testament, *σημεῖον*.

the order of nature. And without this religious conviction, even a miracle *contra naturam* could not have given them the necessary certainty. For they themselves held miraculous activities of evil powers as possible (Deut. 13, 1–3; Matt. 24, 24). And how could they have distinguished them empirically from the divine ones? How could they have distinguished what was really "contrary to nature" from what was merely incomprehensible to them, or experiences of the supersensual world from mere subjective processes? The element in revelation that was supernatural and superrational in the divine sense could approve itself to them, in the last analysis, only by its content, by the wealth of divine purpose, hidden from and contradictory to natural thought, which took the form of a higher wisdom in their souls. And only their own consciences could assure them of the divine character of the revelation, as these bowed, with or without assent of the will, beneath the voice of the master who was addressing them. It is certain that the moving and extraordinary character of what they experienced often strengthened them greatly in their task. And prophets have unquestionably been little inclined to distinguish critically between the subjective and the objective. But in themselves ecstasy and vision could just as well be illusion as reality. And events which seemed to be miracles could proceed from the realm of the evil as well as of the good. Only the religious assurance in their hearts could really convince the prophets.

5. And the later adherents of a revealed religion can just as little expect or gain from miracles *contra naturam* the assurance that the revelation in which their religion has its origin is truly divine. All religions adorn the his-

tory of their revelation with miracles. The incompatibility of the events they relate with the order of nature is common to all. Even the Christian religion, when it is a question of monstrous contradiction of nature, by no means carries off the palm, *e.g.* in comparison with the Indian religions. And the tendency to take such tales for embellishments and additions will be essentially the same among all who have the historical sense in the presence of religious documents, and will be an increasing one. Only when belief in the divine truth of a revelation is already present can we meet the marvellous tales associated with it with the assumption that the external course of its history can be distinguished from other history by distinct traces of divine activity. Nor is the devout man interested in the scientific question concerning the relation of the divine activity in miracle to the system of nature. He only asks whether God's activity, with its purposes for him, impresses itself powerfully on his soul as a fact. And he knows nothing of events in which God's purposes are not at work, or of a natural law which could interpose as an obstacle to God's activity and aims.

But the believer will also not conceal from himself, even if miracles seem certain to him, the fact that his assumption can have no validity for those who have not had the same religious experience. And the miraculous narratives of the Bible, in their variety and naïveté, cannot be grouped under any one of the heads under which a modern theology of compromise has tried to put them. The reflection that God can by his creative act call into being something external to the world, which then becomes a part of the system of the world and its laws (Rothe), will never explain the throng of prodigies and miracles of healing of

the Bible story, or seem tenable to him for whom the world is the infinite realm of spatial and material being. And even the thought, so just in itself, that the empirical world known to us is, nevertheless, not the whole world, and that its laws cannot as yet explain everything (Lange, Krauss), will not suffice. For aside from the fact that it simply surrenders the conception of miracle *contra naturam*, this point of view might, it is true, explain a new heaven and a new earth and their becoming visible amid the conditions of the present, but would never explain events like the standing still of the sun or the changing of water into wine. Moreover, from this point of view we should expect a more and more perfect dawning of higher laws, not their sporadic appearance in a far distant past and in connection with personalities that (as, for instance, Elisha) play a part only in the periphery of revelation.

6. The miracle with which religious faith has to do, to-day as in the times of Biblical history, is no mere story out of the past, but something living and present. Faith sees in the world, not a mechanism in which dead laws reign, but the continuous revelation of God's will for the weal of the church and its members. It believes that no worldly power and no independent law of nature can hinder God from realizing omnipotently his gracious ends. It does not know a God fettered by the laws of nature, who breaks his chain here or there, and then, for thousands of years, abdicates his rule in favor of a soulless system of causes. And when the devout man feels himself guided and determined in his own life by God's gracious will, he reveres God's miracle without asking for the natural conditions of his experiences, and without the

least interest in the question whether God, in order to work for him, has checked and interrupted the course of nature, or has created something new, in which the natural factors have no share. He bows in gratitude before God's omnipotence and would find it intolerable to be compelled to set any bounds to his trust in it. Of a possible contradiction between his religious experience and the laws of true science, however, he knows of himself nothing. For him the scientific verdict on events has no significance at all. The faith in miracles of naïve and vital piety stands beside the artificial theory concerning miracles of a reflective age that in general passes judgment from the world's point of view, like a good conscience beside a bad one that has been artificially appeased.

7. A dispute between faith and science could arise only through the historical verdict on the miracles narrated in the Bible, which to our fashion of thought really do contradict in part the order of nature, little as their narrators knew it. Now, unless apologetics is committed to a definite theory of inspiration, we can by no means recognize the obligation to take up arms for the historical trustworthiness of all the miraculous narratives of Scripture, or to make the credibility of the Christian revelation depend on it. The Biblical agents of revelation are themselves far from doing this. Even Jesus, certain though it is that his miraculous powers must have reënforced his conviction of his calling, refused to prove his divine mission by a miracle of the sort demanded by the opinion ruling among his people, and rather hid than proclaimed his miracles of healing. And for miraculous narratives out of ancient times and circles that were not capable of scientific criticism, the claim cannot possibly be made that

they be received without doubt or criticism. Highly endowed religious natures are precisely the ones which rarely have the gift of calm historical observation. And a modification of narratives on the lips of the pious in the direction of the miraculous, is always more probable, even under the most favorable conditions of transmission, than the occurrence of events that really contradict the laws of nature. The miracle of revelation, however, viz. that God through the historical Jesus enters into intercourse with the hearts of men, condemning and approving, has simply nothing to do with the historicity of the external marvels related of Jesus, or with the question of what relation they bear to the course of nature and its laws.

8. Hence it cannot be the task of apologetics to defend miracles *contra naturam* as a presupposition of revelation, especially of the Christian. It understands that our age, in distinction from that of antiquity, is so strongly penetrated by the scientific view of the course of nature that hardly an educated man among us would let himself be convinced, even if he were an eye-witness, that he had experienced a miracle and not something that he merely could not understand at the time. And the narratives of devout folk with no aptitude for science cannot impose on us the duty of looking on the literal historicity of the marvels reported by them as an essential part of Christian faith, willing though we may be to bow our spirits to the enthusiasm and piety of the narrators. But the Christian apologete will, of course, believe the revelation of God in Jesus to be miraculous in the religious sense of the word. And it will be to him a scientific satisfaction to make clear to himself, even in details, the relation of the religious faith in miracles to the scientific view of the world. His

faith, of course, by no means depends on this attempt and its success or failure. Nor will his scientific conviction of the reign of law be shaken if he has to leave a part of the facts unexplained.

Jesus recognized with joy his power to perform miraculous acts as a witness of God to his mission, and looked on the disregard of them as a sign of his opponents' hardness of heart. His assumption of the rôle of Christ is, in his age and his race, psychologically inexplicable without the consciousness of such powers. His disciples, too, speak of miracles of their own wrought in his strength.[1] And without the fact of the resurrection of Jesus, the origin of the church cannot be understood. Hence, although we are far from wishing to prove the truth of Christianity by the credibility of the miraculous narratives of the Bible, and willingly grant that only when the great spiritual miracle of the personality of Jesus has won the heart will the disposition arise to adopt, in the history that leads up to him and bears witness to him, other standards than those we use elsewhere, nevertheless, we cannot evade the task of trying to comprehend also the miraculous element in his history. But this can be amply done without our resorting to the conception of miracle as a suspension of the system of natural law; provided only we refuse to recognize the claims of modern culture (which is not scientific, but sceptical) to understand the world as a whole from the law of causation and its mechanism.

9. We have the daily experience that processes of nature play a marked rôle in the development of the inner life of human beings, although the two spheres have in themselves no inward connection. And this neither the

[1] Rom. 15, 18 f. 2 Cor. 12, 12. Heb. 2, 4.

believing nor the unbelieving view of the world can explain. The purely scientific view of the world will content itself with proving, or assuming, for every factor involved in either, the necessary conditions of a physical and psychological sort. Their coincidence it must look on as chance (purposeless), while it of course flatly denies chance in the sense of an event without adequate conditions. Faith will have no interest in the conditions of the two processes; but their coincidence it will feel to be purposed, and interpret it by the will of God, which guides both spheres as one, according to eternal thoughts.[1] If such a coincidence has decisive significance for the religious and moral development of the individual, and is so felt by him, he experiences for himself a miracle, *i.e.* a leading in which God reveals himself unmistakably to him as an active force. Every devout man will experience such "miracles" in his own person or in those around him, — in unexpected rescue and help, in moving experiences, in strange turns of fortune which initiate in his soul critical changes. And he believes in such miracles and prays in this faith. If he happen to be an agent of revelation, and thus has a determining influence on religion, his experience is a miracle, not merely for himself, but also for the members of the religious community founded by him. To conceive of the possibility of such miracles being limited by natural law, or to look for the conditions of their occurrence in an order of nature conceived of as other than God's will, is impossible for piety. It would itself perish at the instant in which it made such an admission. And every one who

[1] *Harmonia præstabilita*, although not in the sense of Leibnitz. We think, not of a divine will preceding the world in time, but of an eternal divine will realized in time.

is certain of being an agent of revelation must also have the assurance in his soul that such a coincidence cannot fail him, if he really desire it for the spiritual necessities of his mission (Holy Spirit). The assurance that God "ever hears," that it is not presumptuous to promise and expect a sign, "though it be deep as hell and high as heaven," belongs to the prophetic calling (Is. 7, Matt. 11, John 11). But piety has, on the other hand, not the least interest in maintaining that in such cases the divine will is wrought entirely apart from the aid of the laws of nature, or is contrary to them. And he who has not the assurance of being an agent of divine revelation will feel it presumption to count on such signs. He will experience them in secret, in his heart, but will not proclaim them "in the market-place."

The case is the same with the prayer of petition of the devout man. He does not think of the "natural" possibility or impossibility of what he asks for, but only of God's will. He does not doubt that this will can grant everything. And he can lift himself, with the faith that can move mountains, to the certainty of obtaining all, if he is spiritually assured of its being the will of God that he ask. But he does not presuppose anything inconsistent with his accepting natural laws. He is only sure that these are, without exception, the instruments of God's will.

10. The system of nature is everywhere so arranged that the free purposeful activity of personalities can exhibit itself as a factor in it, not as something contrary to it or interrupting it. And the capacity of men to change by their action the existing conditions of nature, extends from the most insignificant to the most important. It shows itself just as much when a man raises a stone from the

ground for a definite purpose, as when the skill of nations pierces mountains and drains seas and rivers. And it includes the power of influencing the physical and mental life of others by physical and psychical forces. This power is very different with different men. It rises, even within our sphere of observation, to phenomena which defy all explanation.[1] Where unusual power of will and of conviction is present, there exists also almost always a special mastery over souls and over the mysterious world of nervous life in susceptible human beings.[2] Founders of religions are not conceivable without such power. Even the sceptical view of the world has neither right nor ground to deny that such power may exist, in individuals of uncommon excitability and vigor of emotional life, to a degree beyond the ordinary, though science is able to give no explanation. It will then talk of unique gifts and powers, and try to investigate their conditions. But the devout view of the world, when it notes such powers in connection with religious movements, will see in them gifts of God's grace (*δυνάμεις*, *χαρίσματα*). It will not doubt that God can grant them in the degree which corresponds to his will to reveal himself. It will never wholly fail to find them active where creative religious personalities are involved. Even to-day there is no lack, under conditions of religious excitement, of such astonishing powers, and Roman Catholic legend is in this respect by no means simple "fiction." But when they appear in men who are agents of revelation, when these cure a variety of diseases by the force of their

[1] Hypnotism, suggestion, dominant personalities. That this is also the region of illusion and deceit cannot prevent us from recognizing its indubitable phenomena, even though we are often unable to understand them scientifically.

[2] That Jesus demanded "faith" as the condition of the exercise of his powers points in this direction.

religious personality or penetrate into the inmost life of others, faith will see miraculous powers which God has given them as witness for his revelation and as an aid in their mission.[1] And in this region piety will not be able to grant that the power of God to lend such gifts can be thought of as limited by natural conditions. It rejoices to meet traces of divinity more striking and distinct than usual. But it will take no interest in conceiving of such powers as exempt from the control of natural law. Hence it can for its part calmly leave the assumption of the irreligious view of the world undisputed, that in this region, too, laws doubtless exist, even though they escape human knowledge.[2]

11. Life itself is, at bottom, a riddle and a miracle, and the conditions and limits of its evolution and higher development are hidden from science, which passes judgment only on the evolution of life under the laws of nature and must always assume life itself as already existing. And even sceptical science assumes a boundless capacity for development in the life of nature (evolution). The religious view of the world sees instead boundless capacities of progress hidden in God's creative will. It believes in God's creative power, which can summon from within the world new conditions of life, that play their part without man's being able to observe them or to determine their limits, and produce new results in the great permanent system of the evolution of things under law. For it all higher life is a miracle, animals and plants in comparison

[1] Faith must not forget that such powers can also arise from the energy of a wicked will, that is, cannot prove by themselves a real revelation of God (Deut. 13. Matt. 24). Night side of nature.

[2] To a man of the stone age the telephone and electric telegraph would doubtless have been unnatural and uncanny mysteries.

with stones, man in comparison with animals (*creatio continua*). Hence it ascribes to God the power of realizing also "what no eye hath seen." It believes in the resurrection body, in the new heaven and new earth, when these are promised it as God's revealed will. It knows no limits or conditions to such activity, such as might exist in a world independent of God. For it the world from which we get sense experience is neither the whole world nor the highest development of things. It understands Lotze's remark, that "poetry is reality; prose sees only a small section of an elliptical path," and Jean Paul's saying, that "miracles on earth are nature in heaven." And it can base on Darwin's discoveries flights of thought bolder than the miracle-loving fancies of naïve faith. But believing as it does in a God of wisdom, it has no right to doubt that miracle is also the revelation of higher ordinances and laws now hidden from us; and that the final explanation of the evolution of the world must be, not a violation, but a creative development, of the system of things.

Such considerations will be adapted to appease the Christian concerning the nature of the miraculous, in so far as this is really involved in the growth of his religion; and to give him the assurance that renunciation of his scientific conscience is as little demanded of him as is a breach with the conviction, inalienably established for our civilization, that an honest knowledge of reality has inevitably to take into account the law of cause and effect. But they have neither the aim of making faith in miracles scientifically accessible (it is in its essence renunciation of the effort to understand certain phenomena scientifically), nor of taking up arms for the historical trustworthiness of the miraculous stories of the Bible individually. The

science of history will have to judge these severally by its laws of probability. Piety protests only against judgment being passed from the point of view of dogmatic and sceptical naturalism, instead of from that of science.

12. Alongside of miracle *contra naturam* the older apologetics emphasized prophecy, *i.e.* knowledge of the future contrary to the rules of human knowledge, in order to prove from it the divinity of Christian revelation. This conception of prophecy (for which the name of "soothsaying" (magic) would be really fitter) was doubtless not distinguished among the Jews from the really religious conception of prophecy. But it has no essential connection with faith in revelation. For the latter sheds, by means of impressions of the divine will, light on our judgment concerning the divine meaning of the world, — has, that is, in itself nothing at all to do with the communication of knowledge concerning the external phenomena of future things. And he who should try to judge Biblical revelation impartially by the standard of such soothsaying would, on the one hand, have to overcome psychological difficulties of the most serious sort. For from our modern point of view the alleged knowledge of something future that cannot be understood as inwardly necessary, is either an illusion or self-deception (as the case may be); or it leads to those night sides of the soul's life which in the interest of religion itself we must carefully distinguish from it. And a divine communication of such things to men would be conceivable only under a most superficial view of the process of revelation, a view which would drag God down into the circle of activities of sense personalities. And, on the other hand, we should hardly be able

to deny that the majority of prophecies, when judged from this point of view, have not been, and could not be, fulfilled. The pictures of the glory of Israel which form the core of the prophecies, *e.g.* the royal figure of the Son of David, the Parousia in the age of the Apostles, the destruction of cities, as Damascus, the conversion of the great commercial city of Tyre, and a hundred other important elements of the prophetic picture of the future, had not come to pass when the "humble and long-suffering" king of the kingdom of God appeared in the Roman Empire and incorporated his church for long centuries in the *pax romana*. And the fiction of a future fulfilment of such features is not only scientifically inconceivable and untenable, but it presupposes something absolutely impossible. With the disappearance of the commonwealth of Israel in Canaan, with the end of the existence of the adjacent nations over which the people of God were to reign and with which it was to fight, with the fall of Babylon, Nineveh, Tyre, etc., which has come about in a very different way than the prophets conceived, with the rise of Islam, the conditions without which the Old Testament picture of the end of things is simply impossible or becomes a pale shadow, have utterly vanished. Moreover, for the prophets themselves the visions in which they saw judgment and glorification were not parts of prophecy, but features of a religious view of the world conceived by fancy and presented with free poetic power. On the other hand, prophecy in the religious sense of the word is a very important element of the apologetics of Christianity. The assurance concerning the divine purpose of history which follows from revelation must, where the purposes of God are not yet realized, become prophecy, *i.e.* religious

certainty as to what God will do, as to what he rejects and what in his eyes is capable of life; a certainty which can never be explained by intelligent reflection or by empirical knowledge of worldly things. Where such a practical religious certainty is lacking or shows itself mistaken as to its religious centre, no true revelation can exist. Hence it is a peculiarly profitable task for practical apologetics to show that the prophetic hope which unfolds itself more and more vitally in the Old Testament is logically related to that which is spiritually realized in Christianity, even where that hope is only presentiment and shadow; and how, in the light of Christian history, the mysteries and misunderstandings of the Old Testament hope become spiritual and clear. The thought of the kingdom of God and of sonship in God, the hope of the new dispensation of the Holy Ghost, the belief in the Son of David reigning in divine glory, filled by God's spirit, the figure of the suffering servant of God, who is the atonement for the people, the marvellous prefiguring of the fulfilment in the typical figures of the history of Israel, — all this argues for the truth of Biblical revelation without presupposing in any way in the prophets a kind of knowledge that contradicts the laws of spiritual life. And what was "soothsaying" falls away of itself from this prophecy. A proof of revelation that would hold also for unbelievers such prophecy can, to be sure, furnish as little as can miracle rightly understood. The unbeliever could be convinced only by such soothsayings concerning accidental things as find no explanation in reason; indeed, hardly by these, since he could fall back on the mysteries of morbid spiritual conditions for which our science has as yet found no explanation. At any rate apologetics would be

unable to adduce such proof from the prophecies of the Old Testament as interpreted by science.

### 8. *Inspiration*

1. To defend miracles and prophecy in the fashion of the older apologetic could be deemed the task of Christianity only if faith in the infallibility of the revelation, with which our historical religion stands and falls, included also the assumption of an inspiration of the books containing the revelation in the sense of the older theory. Revelation and inspiration, *i.e.* the being filled with inward religious certainty by the spirit of God, are correlative ideas. The agent of revelation speaks as such the word of God, in the spirit of God. He does not proclaim results of his own thinking or of his own sense experience. The revelations of God that he "sees" he can of course receive only by virtue of his having the spiritual capacity. But by receiving them his soul is filled with new life and new certainty (inspired). But this actual inspiration can produce only such effects as are consistent with the nature of revelation. It can, therefore, evoke neither an infallible scientific knowledge of the world nor a perfect philosophic theory of God, but only rouse the right spiritual comprehension of the will of God manifesting itself in the world and moulding it into God's kingdom. Inspiration in the religious sense is the being filled with religious certainty, that is, illumination and enthusiasm; whereas the supernatural communication of infallible knowledge would be an unintelligible miracle inconsistent with religion and revelation. The men of God speak as interpreters of God, but not as masters of science or as great philosophers or as infallible reporters of past events.

2. Where the living word of agents of revelation is transformed into literature, the character of inspiration will be transferred to this, and will distinguish it from all other literature, making it authoritative in the sphere of religion and the object of the highest reverence. It cannot fail that the community will come, more and more, to regard such books, even in their external form, as the infallible word of God, as soon as the living revelation has ceased. Thus not only the books of the Bible, but also the Vedas, Avesta, Tripitaka, Kings, and Koran, have won in their several sects the position of infallible books of miraculous origin. But religious books cannot possibly be inspired in another sense than the living agents of revelation themselves. It is, of course, true that men of God, in communicating in writing what they have learned from God, are upborne more exclusively by the power of their higher life than in moments of ordinary intercourse with others, or in communications of minor importance. Their writing will be "inspired" in the same sense in which their speech is inspired in hours of official activity, of solemn bearing of testimony. But no more so. Belief in revelation can compel or justify no one in ascribing to the agents of revelation when writing capacities which it has no claim to assume in them when preaching. Their writings will be primarily only monuments and documents of revelation and its history, not the revelation itself; and the truth of a revealed religion cannot possibly be proved from the inspiration of its sacred writings, but must be believed before this inspiration can be granted. Every religion, of course, holds its sacred books to be "inspired." And the Indian religions, like Islam, emphasize this characteristic of their canon much more vigorously than does

Christianity. To inspire the adherents of another religion, or the irreligious, by the method of scientific proof, with a really irresistible conviction that the Christian documents, in distinction from others, are "really" inspired, is an undertaking which, in the present state of the question, an expert would hardly undertake. For the believing Christian it will doubtless be edifying and strengthening to think of the venerable age of these sacred books, of the stream of blessings that has proceeded from them, of the lofty moral purity and beauty that speak in them and guarantee the sincerity of their authors, of the wonderful history to which they bear witness, of their preservation through all the dangers of the times, of the content of truth in the prophecies, and of a hundred other things. But for the non-Christian this would not beget even that valueless thing, a *fides historica.* When he meets the miraculous in these books, the memory of other traditions of antiquity will inspire doubt in him. If he cannot help seeing in them much that is grand and beautiful, parallels will occur to him from other spheres. Our evangelical doctrine rightly lays every weight on the *testimonium Sp. S. internum* by which Holy Scripture produces its own belief (*αὐτόπιστος*); that is, it realizes that these books can be sacred books only for him who is religiously conquered and won by the God who speaks in them to man. But this is simply surrendering the old proof of revelation from the character of its documents (Lessing).

3. The devout man can never come into a position that is inconsistent with the claims of true science and culture through his faith in the inspiration (to him self-evident) of the sacred books of his religion. For this faith demands, from the point of view of its origin and its

content, neither the recognition of the infallible authority of these books in any sphere of science or culture, nor is it inconsistent with an unprejudiced historical examination of their literary form and of what is narrated in them. It demands only that they be looked on as the decisive documents for that revelation of God that gives our religion its character and its significance. For this definitively religious verdict they are the canon. And even "unbelieving" science can raise no objections to this view of the sacred writings. On the other hand, the opinion that such sacred books must be considered as the miraculously given norm for all the knowledge contained in them concerning God and the world, would not only stand, as a fact, in the sharpest contradiction with reality, but would, merely as opinion, challenge the irreconcilable hostility of all genuine and conscientious science. A science which, from religious reverence, let itself be restrained from examining the status of a literature, or which renounced investigation and its independent judgment wherever judgments have been once pronounced by men of a distant past in any sphere of knowledge of nature or history, would no longer be a science in which a conscientious man of our age could feel himself intellectually justified in taking part. But the interests of the piety that accepts a revelation demand nothing of the sort, and, above all, such a theory of inspiration is nowhere favored by the self-witness of the Biblical writers. Not only did the writers of the Old Covenant nowhere think of a miraculous divine origin of their writings, but also Jesus' apostles speak frankly of their own views and of facts concerning which their memory is uncertain (1 Cor. 1, 15; 7, 25). They are writing for the needs of the moment, for practical reasons, and have the

unimportant interests of their own persons in their eye (2 Tim. 4, 13). And the historical writings of the New Testament nowhere appeal to a divinely effected infallibility, but, like all honest history, to the careful use of accessible sources (Luke 1, 1 ff.). The conception of the inspiration of the books of the Bible held by the early church is the child of an age as yet untouched by science in our sense of the word; an age that had the record of the bygone revelation only in its literature and that felt the need of obtaining for the allegorical interpretation which was to read new thoughts into the old letter a foundation dictated by God himself. It is with right now abandoned in sound Christian theology. Piety can maintain the infallibility of the records of revelation only by granting to science the right, on its side, to make these records, as historical documents, the subject of a logical and unprejudiced criticism. They are for piety of incomparable sanctity, the permanent, unique, and definitive record of the revelation of God fulfilled in Christ, being born of the spirit which this revelation has brought into the world. But they are not a supernaturally wrought "miracle," but a literature born of religious history.

# PART III: THE REASONABLENESS OF THE RELIGIOUS VIEW OF THE WORLD

## 9. *The Necessity of Faith* (*Duty of Belief*)

1. The fact of religion is, of course, in itself no scientific proof of the objective truth of the religious view of the world. Even if it is inseparably connected with the mental life of man, it might be simply one of the limitations attaching to finite personality and its knowledge, and its presuppositions might be subjective illusions. The devout man has, it is true, in his piety itself the assurance that it is not so, and this assurance is for him inferior in strength to no sensuous or scientific certainty. But he feels precisely in this personal religious assurance of his, that a "scientific" proof, based on non-religious foundations, of the reality of the world of faith could necessarily never be successful. The revelation of God that has mastered his conscience, the impression of the person of Jesus on his heart, are in fact the basis of his conviction, not any considerations of the reason. He must be conscious of the limitations of the competency of apologetics. He will not fail to see that a great part of the peculiar power and joy of religion depends on the fact that a scientific proof of its truth is impossible. Were it not so, the man of normal capacity, even without the participation of the conscience and the will, could and must be made "pious" just as well as taught to count. Scientific knowledge of the real existence of God would make impiety simple madness (Nagel).

But he can assert that what he has in his piety can be replaced by no other spiritual possession of humanity; that is, that with the disappearance of "faith" an essential part of human nobility would be lost, and that a comprehension of the world and of our own life is impossible without the religious presupposition.

2. Faith's conception of the world can never be replaced or rendered superfluous by any progress of science or of culture. The thought is simply impossible that knowledge could ever take the place of faith in any higher spiritual development. For only faith makes possible a consistent comprehension of the world, one in which there is place for a true estimate of our own personal being, a being qualitatively different from nature. Mere theoretic knowledge has not, in itself, either the right or the wish to go beyond the causal connection of individual things in the empirical world. If science does this, however, and cherishes the confidence that the world must be in itself a unit and correspond to the judgments of worth of our practical reason, it speaks, whether it knows it or not, on the ground of an act of faith. So all effective philosophy is based, at bottom, on faith, not on knowledge. What has been, from Plato down to Fichte and Hegel, called "knowledge" is after all nothing else than a powerful conviction, born of the spiritual life of man, which is elevated to a "scientific" knowledge. Nay, knowledge itself does not become a consistent self-assured "science" until it is controlled by convictions which belong, not to it, but to faith. The unity and the structure of things can never be "known" in the sense in which science uses the word. Deduction is excluded, since it would assume the very thing that is to be proved. In-

duction, in view of the spatial and temporal limitations of the sense experience possible to us, leads no farther than to the certainty of the causal connection between a considerable number of phenomena and the probability that it is universal. Only because our own reason demands the unity of things, that is, only on the ground of a belief that rests on postulates of our inner life, do we assume as self-evident facts the "unity" of things and the law of cause and effect. Hence existing science would be impossible if all cognition but that of "knowledge" were renounced. A scepticism which denies the possibility of a purely subjective apprehension, would not in itself be more irrational than religious scepticism. Ourselves, however, together with the known facts of our spiritual life, we simply cannot understand without faith. For in the system of nature there is place neither for freedom nor for rational self-consciousness.

3. And with the loss of faith the most effective power for morality would also be lost. A law of duty can be deduced from reason and from the needs of society; for instance, from the point of view of the progress of mankind or of the common weal. But the inner compulsion to obey it, even when its demands permanently contradict clearly recognized selfish interests, would prove very dubious apart from belief in the world of freedom and the good. Worldly shrewdness or mere legality, at best a dull and unsatisfying fulfilment of duty (*justitia civilis*, obedience to the state), would take the place of really moral conduct. Non-religious ethics lives by virtue of that religious view of the world which it denies. It is like the flower severed from its stalk, which goes on blooming for a while. Noble-minded disciples of naturalism are "para-

sites" of a believing society and would die out without it (Balfour). We must believe, in order to lead a truly moral life (Leibnitz, Nagel). Ages of national progress are always ages of faith (Goethe). It is true that effort for the good of all could be deduced even from the impulse to seek one's own happiness (Bentham, Mill, Utilitarianism); for social life would be impossible without some recognition of such ends, and would have to give way to the mere struggle for existence. We can grant to the modern non-religious ethical systems that, inasmuch as a personal satisfaction is possible only through an harmonious attitude to the social environment and the prosperity of the community, an intelligent egoism (eudæmonism) involves far-reaching motives for conduct looking to the prosperity of others (altruism); and also that the struggle for real happiness (as the Epicureans recognized) can be crowned with success, in the last analysis, only by the controlling of the sensual impulses by the reason. But such considerations have no force when passion impels in the other direction. For mere "reflections" cannot stand against the living force of the will (Rom. 7). The morality which would be left would no longer be morality as the Christian understands it, but calculation, lacking perfect devotion, enthusiasm and love, lacking sanctification, self-conquest. Without the belief in a divine goal, realized by omnipotence for the weal of all and of absolute validity, ethics would not beget the power to sacrifice our own love of pleasure or the interests of our collective personalities, when necessary, to the common weal. The necessity of self-sacrifice, in cases of difficult moral decision, will never be roused as a practical conviction by the mere consideration of the

advantage to human society. That takes place only when special impulses, inseparably bound up with the life of the individual (like love of family, of country, community of interests), are involved; that is, only for special spheres and tasks. Only faith in the omnipotent might of the good and in the absolute character of moral duty can control our total conduct in this direction. For the unbeliever, man in his decisions must necessarily be, in the last analysis, only a special case under natural law.

Hence the majority of philosophers have always felt that true morality was inseparably bound up with "faith," even though they put "metaphysical" faith in the place of religious (v. Hartmann). Where egoism is the final motive, there is no more real "morality" than in the slavish obedience to authority begotten by reward and punishment. Without faith, even Nietzsche's anti-Christian ethics is unintelligible. For the conviction that the strong will, as the one capable of higher development, is in itself the good will, and that hence the strong will has the right and the duty to impose itself as master on the weak will (*Herrenmoral*, *Übermenschen*), while for the weak will the task is set to surrender and to "fit itself in bounds," rests, after all, also on a faith for which natural science offers, to be sure, some presumptions, but which can be shown to be as little scientific as the Christian. Real naturalism can look on the phenomenon of morality only as an individual and transitory one of little significance, by which nature, under certain conditions, promotes the "preservation of the species," as she does, under other conditions, by instinct or by the love of pleasure. It can allege no valid reason why ethical motives, as such, should stand higher than physical ones, or why they

should claim absolute validity (Balfour). As "a brief episode in the life of an insignificant planet," human morality would lose utterly the character of something with an absolute value.

4. For this loss æsthetic satisfaction in nature and art could never compensate.[1] Æsthetic culture can, to be sure, soften rudeness of manners and lend an already existing morality the charm of beauty. But it cannot offer a guarantee against the worst moral degeneration. Hardness and corruption of heart do not yield to æsthetic impressions, for these do not work upon the will directly. Ages like that of the Renaissance have been conspicuous for æsthetic creation and enjoyment; men like Nero and the Borgias have been virtuosos of æsthetic feeling. It is true that real artistic creation thrives only on the soil of moral greatness, while one-sided æsthetic enjoyment has a morally enervating effect and cannot steel the will. Rome's virile vigor was unstrung by the artificial pursuit of Greek art. And never yet has a high development of art brought nations permanently to a higher moral development or kept them from decay. The indulgence of elevated feelings unconnected with the moral will is, in and for itself, enervating. Hatred of the "coarse" is not hatred of the "bad." The highest moral effects of art rest on its religious content, *e.g.* in tragedy. And for the really elevating effects of genuine art, only a relatively small number of (aristocratic) natures are ever receptive. To point to æsthetic culture is to mock at the poor and miserable, to whom art-loving Hellas was indifferent. And for the great mass pleasure in art means in reality

[1] "He who has science and art has religion" (Goethe). Cf. Strauss, *Der alte und der neue Glaube.*

an hypocritical imitation, accompanied by *ennui*, of the fashionable taste for art of the few, the intellectual aristocrats. The search for æsthetic substitutes and the deification of heroes of art show the feeling of emptiness which the disappearance of religion leaves behind. It can evoke only a feeling of deep pity when men great in art are put, with all the tricks of deliberate rhetoric, in the place which belongs to those of revelation (Goethe, Wagner); or when the effort is made to conceal the dearth of individual religious feeling behind enthusiasm for Bach's oratorios or for artistic liturgies.

5. Without religion, therefore, man would have to renounce the attempt to understand the world as a unit and to maintain himself in the mechanism of the world as a permanent end. He would lose enthusiasm, assurance of victory, and the consciousness of the permanent success of his moral toil, and at most would be able to console himself for the misery of the loss by the adornments of science and art, if he happened to be one of the fortunate ones. For the common mob, whom the cultivated man could at most pity, the brutal demand for enjoyment and power would probably take the place of religion. We should not let ourselves be lulled into security by false comparisons with earlier times. The proletariat of the ancient world consisted of slaves, who could only try to break their chains by fierce revolt that had no prospect of success, not of sharers of political power. And they were believing. However childish and superstitious their religion was, it forbade the attempt at revolt against the general order of things. The ancient world has known no unbelieving masses of poor having a share of civil rights. Hence no one can seriously doubt that

with religion a most valuable element would vanish from the life of mankind. But must not the educated man of our time, if he is a conscientious and honest man, abandon religion, nevertheless, even though he counts "the devout and childlike" happy? On the contrary, the right understanding of what knowledge and faith are proves the duty of faith.

6. Only those things that are, mediately or immediately, accessible to sense perception are objects of knowledge, in the scientific sense of the word. To understand by the laws of thought reality, as perceived by the senses or known from the stored-up experience of others, is knowledge. Hence nature as understood by mathematics, history as understood by philosophy, constitute the sphere of science. An absolutely certain knowledge exists only in mathematics and logic. For here it is a question of conditions that are not imposed from without, but are set by the thinking mind itself, and therefore can, on analysis, always be understood by it. Physical science offers a high degree of certainty, insomuch as nature can be made the object of continually repeated experiment. But to all human traditions only probability, possibility, and failure of knowledge attach, as soon as what has once been is no longer present to us immediately in its effects, in documents or results. In the sphere of knowledge doubt is a conscientious duty whenever it is not irrational. But faith is the letting our view of the world be determined by the fact that we, as rational and free personalities, bear a relation to the world as a whole, live in a world of freedom that is hidden from the senses, and know ourselves included in a teleological scheme of things that does not exist for logic and mathematics (judgments of worth).

In faith there are no degrees of certainty. Doubt is felt as a moral defect (misfortune or guilt). For it springs from lack of receptivity for the value of the moral world. Where the same objects come under consideration for faith and for knowledge, they are for science a part of history or of natural science, which know no such thing as faith; for faith they are revelations of God to the inner life of man, that is, are judged, not from the point of view of science, but by their supersensual worth and meaning. Hence to renounce faith is not to give up an uncertain knowledge in favor of a certain and clear one, but to reject all possibility of conviction in a sphere where we cannot know. It means the resolve to refuse to let oneself be determined, in one's view of the world and life, by the postulates of one's own rational moral life, because these postulates do not admit of scientific proof. If this were a question only of the renunciation of a consistent theoretic view of the world, we could not speak of such a renunciation being contrary to duty. For only shortsightedness and lack of clearness can doubt, that if faith be really taken away our knowledge must be limited to the subjective perception of a narrow circle of individual phenomena, and all comprehension of the riddle of the world and life be regarded as impossible. The phenomenal world exists only for consciousness. And all science presupposes it as a datum. And in fact our knowledge itself never comes about without the help of our self-postulating personality. "It is at bottom an act of the will, to accept knowledge as valid" (Lessing). "The will holds the primacy in self-consciousness" (Schopenhauer). "The whole man makes the choice" (Nagel). But it is not our duty to understand the world as a

whole and the riddle of life. And the fact that our knowledge is always determined somehow by the will might be a defect in us which we ought to counteract and which could perhaps be eliminated in more highly developed stages of humanity. But we dare not renounce faith, because in doing so we should have to renounce also our personal dignity, our moral nobility, and the absoluteness of duty. Schiller is right when he says in Kant's spirit: "Man is robbed of all worth when he ceases to believe in these three things." We must believe in order to retain our human dignity, which no honorable man dare renounce.

7. That faith carries with it necessarily a subjective element, that it cannot come about without active participation of the will, and is not accessible to scientific proof, cannot place it on a lower plane than knowledge. On the contrary, we can see that the most valuable thing in us, the sole unlimited good (Kant), the free and righteous will, would be impossible if the facts of faith could impose themselves on the senses and the reason in the fashion of facts of knowledge. For then we should have only the choice between a mad revolt against the awful majesty of the good, or the doing of it by an inevitable physical necessity. Egoism would become the final motive in man as in brutes. We should be children or else perfectly made machines (Nagel). We are to give our hearts to God, not sell them to him. True morality is possible just because the world of the good is accessible only to faith, not to knowledge. The incognito of Christ is a grace (Nagel). Pascal has laid emphasis on the fact that it is precisely the "improbabilities" inseparable from faith's view of the world, that constitute the conditions of free-

dom for morality. This is the small element of truth in the *credo quia absurdum*. Divine truths have value for the inner life only because they must reach the intellect through the heart.

## 10. *Materialism and Pessimism*

1. Materialism is the attempt to comprehend the world logically without faith.[1] Disregarding Kant's theory of knowledge and ignoring the fact that for our actual experience there are only efficient forces, not atoms that possess and beget forces, it attempts, in the first place, to sternly exclude the idea of purpose, and to explain the world as the necessary result of the mechanical working of the law of causality. Darwin's theory of evolution by the struggle for existence and by selection, has just now given this attempt greater confidence and a more favorable reception on the part of the general public than before; since it explains what used to seem created for a purpose by the fact that the relatively better equipped have, for this reason, the greater probability of persistence and propagation, and that by heredity the special characteristics are confirmed to which this advantage was due. In the second place, it tries to deduce from atoms (*i.e.* the smallest subdivisions of matter equipped with force), and from their combination and the chemical and physical processes resulting therefrom, all the phenomena of the world, including the so-called spiritual ones, without a spiritual cause; and exults in disburdening the life of the individual soul from considerations of a spiritual world of aims and duties (Lucretius). If thoughts are secretions of the

[1] Democritus, Empedocles, the Epicureans (Lucretius), Offray de la Mettrie, Holbach, Moleschott, Büchner, Vogt. Cf. Du Bois-Reymond, Lange.

brain, and the determination of conscience by "a world lying behind the visible one" is recognized as an illusion, then "the pale cast of thought" ceases to disfigure the "native hue of resolution" (*Hamlet*).

2. This view of the world is doubtless right for a wide region, and the obstinate persistence in the naïve old idealism is a poor, because deceitful, friend of religion. The older "imponderables" have, like "vital force," been transformed into manifestations of material forces governed by law. And physical science owes its great success primarily to the consistency with which it has rejected all inquiry about ends, and recognized only causes and effects in a material world under law. But as a view that claims to understand the world as a whole, materialism is simply lack of thought. Voltaire wrote: "One must have lost all common sense to suppose that the mere movement of matter is adequate to produce feeling and thinking beings." So Pascal: "There is nothing so unintelligible as the assertion that matter knows itself." It is the fundamental error of so many half-educated men to elevate the idea of evolution (that can rightfully be applied as a heuristic principle to all empirical investigations) under the name of "evolutionism," into a principle under which to view the world, whether it be done in materialistic or idealistic fashion (Reischle). Such evolutionism is at any rate the direct opposite of Christianity, which is entirely compatible with the idea of evolution if properly treated.

Aside from the fact that an atom endowed with forces is as much a mystery as the world with all its phenomena, the fact of consciousness in the world of higher animal life is utterly unintelligible from the standpoint of materialism.

And this is unaffected by the fact that, in the lowest stages of animal existence, a communal life can be seen where a whole is made up of organisms which have no individual consciousnesses and yet can exist if removed from the whole. For even here the fact of individual *feeling* remains. It is a question of associations which, it is true, mark the transition from plant life, but are still associations of feeling beings. And the more highly developed life is, the more completely do such conditions recede behind the clearer and clearer consciousness of the individuals. Least of all can the personal moral and spiritual consciousness of man be explained as simply the result of mechanical processes. Says Lange: "Between man as object of empirical investigation and man knowing himself as subject, an eternal gulf is fixed." The motion of what does not feel cannot produce feeling. So Lange: "The atomic theory is no more able to-day than in Democritus' time to explain even the simplest feeling of sound, light, warmth, or taste." So Lotze: "Between the highest combination of the inorganic elements which we know and the first dawn of feeling, the gulf always remains the same." The feeling subject is never explained by mechanical processes, however complex. The unity of consciousness can never be the result of the working together of many parts. An organism can be understood from the materialistic point of view, but not a subject. The bridge between organic and inorganic life, between natural phenomena and spiritual activities, can never be built on materialistic lines. The material atom as "substance" is by no means the main thing, nor is force merely subsidiary, the "accident." What we actually know by experience are invariably only forces.

Manifestations of force can, however, proceed only from what is living. And where we now find inorganic existence, the organic (plant and animal life) often appears to have been the earlier form. Hence, in order to explain the world, materialism must regard as illusion, or else leave unexplained, the very thing that is the sole sure content of our immediate and certain knowledge. Whoever does not think, with Berkeley and Lotze, of "non-physical" atoms, that is, does not deny materialism at its centre, cannot make atoms explain the world of which we are a part. Nay, even the external processes by which life produces an organism can be referred to the accidental collision of independent groups of atoms only by a stupendous effort of the fancy. Lotze has rightly pointed out the irrationality of a theory which tries to explain from the "accidental" aggregation and arrangement of unconscious atoms the fact that, in one and the same body and as the condition of its existence, the organs which see, seize, crush, and digest the necessary food work in unison. And an honest survey of actual existence will always derive the like impression from such processes as those of sight, propagation, etc.; true though it doubtless is, that the existing perfection of physical functions is the result of a long evolution under very complex conditions, and that what the layman simply admires (*e.g.* the human eye) shows to the investigation of science failures of adaptation that at least exclude the idea that the thing, as it exists now, is the perfect expression of an absolute act of omniscience unhampered by conditions. The serious study of nature rejects materialism as mere dogma.[1] It is not with-

[1] Copernicus, Newton, Kepler, Haller, Herschel, Pascal, Cuvier. So Liebig: "Man as a thinking being is not the product of his senses, but the achievements of his senses are products of the intelligent will in man."

out interest to note how the materialistic conception of the world begets in more profound minds the inevitable necessity of supplementing it with religious conceptions which do not follow from it at all. In Comte's Positivism all the assumptions are purely materialistic. It knows only a view of the world based on the assured knowledge of the exact sciences, starting with mathematics and ending with biology and sociology. Everything is the physically necessary result of the complicated system of physical, chemical, and psychological functions into which the atoms have organized themselves. But then "humanity," as the highest outcome of this process, is to be the object of a cult of the future which shall aim at "keeping alive the true idea of humanity and the practice of human love." And without some such ideal to which man can devote himself with his whole heart he will not be able to live. Naturalism, however, can explain neither "humanity" nor the "idea of humanity" nor "human love." It is the shadowy reflection of the supersensual world of faith, bred by an idealizing fancy (A. Lange); just as, at bottom, materialism itself is to be referred, not to science, but to a "religious" impulse turned to polemic use.

3. Pessimism is no conscious enemy of religion. Nay, in Buddhism it has even taken the form of religion; and its modern representatives, however decidedly they may aim to transcend Christianity, suggest nevertheless something of the herald of a religion of the future in the fashion of their doctrine. This is true even of Schopenhauer, and still more so of writers like E. von Hartmann or Taubert. They love to contrast the pessimistic mood with the optimistic, as the really "religious" one, because it makes satisfaction in the phenomenal world impossible

("euthanasia of morality"). But if logically carried out, pessimism in fact excludes religion. If existence, including the spiritual and moral life, deserves to be negatived, then the world reveals to us as its ultimate secret a power on which we dare not be inwardly absolutely dependent, which cannot be the object of religion (God), and which is utterly unable to guarantee us our spiritual and moral personality in the world. That mood of pity at the sight of an All-One miserably tied to "existence" of which is born the resolve, by negation of the "will to live," to lead this One to the goal of liberation from the misery of existence, is in reality the complete opposite of the religious feeling that yearns, by surrender to the supersensual, to preserve to the spiritual personality its right to permanence in the phenomenal world. And this is true even where pessimism makes an ephemeral alliance with practical optimism, as in v. Hartmann. It may in that case transcend the doctrine of the wretchedness of existence and Schopenhauer's quietism, by setting as the task of the pessimist, individually and collectively (a task having for its object the universal and definitive negation of life), the promoting with might and main the spiritual progress of mankind, by which alone the really decisive last step becomes possible. Hence pessimism may recognize it as a duty to secure to humanity the largest possible amount of wisdom, power, and development, and may see in misery itself the source of the impulse to development, and in the illusion of happiness a spur to progress. It may take up with Buddhistic thought in a weakened and modernized form, or look for a new religion of monistic pessimism. But as a view of the world it is at root "irreligious" and could not fail to destroy religious life. For it makes impossible

that relation to God in which lies the essence of all religion.

4. Pessimism, in so far as it is a judgment on a definite part of the evolution of the world and our own life, is, to be sure, both irrefutable and inseparably bound up with the fundamental mood of every higher religion. Our inborn instinct toward perfection and happiness demands it in view of our own moral defects and the ills of our life on earth. The rejection of the "world," of the "flesh," and of our own goodness, as well as the dissatisfaction in perishable things, are the primary elements of Christianity. Pessimism can be the ally of Christianity, in so far as it tears off the mask of hypocritical satisfaction from the fleshly and unbelieving view of the world. And like John and Paul, like Augustine and Pascal and Innocent III, so Rousseau and Kant are pessimists in this sense. In the presence of the external world as it exists at present, optimism is certainly irreligious, and a view of the world based on it (Wolff, Leibnitz, Paulsen) shallow. The attempt to justify from the point of view of "happiness" an optimistic verdict on empirical life (*e.g.* Jürgen Bona Meyer) can never attain its goal, because "happiness" is purely subjective; because every satisfaction is felt much less vividly than the corresponding pain and often is nothing more than the cessation of discomfort; because the progress of civilization manifestly increases the disproportion between pleasure and pain by necessarily increasing the susceptibility to pain and the dissatisfaction at the sight of the greater "happiness" of others; and because the existence of the "happy," even if these were in the majority, is no consolation to the "unhappy." An unprejudiced glance into prisons, hospitals, madhouses, — into the misery of

innocent and guilty want in its thousand forms, — is sufficient to disprove this shallow optimism. And the impulse to preserve life does not witness to any excess of pleasure, for it is partly innate instinct, partly fear of vague possible ills.

5. Apologetics rejects pessimism, not because its verdict on the amount of earthly happiness can be disproved, but because the gauging the value of life by the amount of pleasurable feeling is intrinsically false and immoral. Not in conditions and experiences, but in achievements and aims, not from life's physical, but from its moral, content, must personality learn the significance of its life. Pleasure, as such, is no standard at all by which to gauge the worth of life. It can only be distinguished in degree, not in kind. Measured by it, the life of a savage would be preferable to that of a Socrates, and the life of many brutes more valuable in content than human life. Life, and with it the world in its significance for us, — and that is the sole question,[1] — gets its real significance from the inherent possibility it offers for the development and activities of the moral personality. The true estimate of conscience and personality makes pessimism untenable. The world is good as soon as it becomes for us material for morality. For one who surrenders himself to the world and seeks satisfaction in it, it is evil, even if it offers a distinct excess of pleasure. And not only by the satisfactory solution of the moral problem, but merely by making us capable of addressing ourselves to it with confidence of success, the world becomes for us good. Hence even the "pleasure" of a good conscience is by no means the

[1] The measure of the value which the world and life have for the unreasoning brute is inaccessible to us, and the task can never be set man to judge of this worth.

decisive thing. The perception of the duty of playing a rôle by thought and action in the realm of truth and morals, and the becoming receptive to beauty, order, and right, must in themselves make life seem valuable to man. He who seeks first the kingdom of God is an optimist and knows that pain and pleasure serve for his good (Rom. 8, 28. Matt. 6, 33). And religion will guarantee him, not sense satisfaction, but the permanence and the goal of his moral personality in the world. It does not presuppose at all that the world, as phenomenon, is arranged for the sense satisfaction of the individual. On the contrary, in that case the world would not rouse the sense of the need of religious satisfaction. Just because the world offers an unfavorable balance in the pleasure and pain account, it keeps the highest good from harm (Rauwenhoff). The world's failure to satisfy is the last bond that still binds the irreligious man to God (Pascal). Religion demands only that the world include the moral ends of man, and that it be adapted to waken religion in him. Then it must pronounce the world "good." Pessimism is a valuable ally of religion inasmuch as it uncovers the hypocrisy of satisfaction in the world without religion. But, like materialism, it judges the world by standards of the phenomenal life of sense, without regard to its spiritual and moral quality and without the sense of the absolute worth of the morally good. But it judges, not on the basis of an alleged science, but on the basis of moods and feelings. Optimism is a moral duty.

### 11. *The Proofs for the Existence of God*

1. The theology of the present has, with right, grown accustomed to look with strong misgiving on the tradi-

tional arguments for the existence of God. The assurance of Christian faith rests in fact on the impression of the personality of Jesus and of the life proceeding from it, not on the arguments of reason for the existence of God. It has God because it has Jesus. And in general, God cannot be an object of knowledge, but only of faith, and hence cannot be proved to every thinking man in the fashion of the exact sciences. This must, from the start, seem to exclude the possibility of arriving at a certainty of God's existence by the mere consideration of the existence or the adaptation to purpose of the world, apart from the "spiritual" processes in human personality, that is, on the basis of a scientific knowledge of the world. Every proof of the existence of God that argues from effect to cause is necessarily defective, since we do not know the totality of results and hence cannot draw a sound induction. And a purpose in the world can never be so established that its resolution into a result of the law of causality would be absolutely impossible. Since it is obvious that very much of what seems to us purposed can be explained from the coincidence of existing causes, our limited experience of the things of the phenomenal world must recognize such a causal sequence as at least conceivable, even when we do not perceive it. Hence such proofs can never answer their purpose, except in a very limited way. The naïve confidence of "natural theology," of being able by exact method to prove God in his distinction from the world, that is, as the God of religion, will to-day only draw a smile from the man of scientific training. But this by no means excludes the fact that even a scientific interest in the world leads, in one way or another, to that point of view which is reached in the case of religion from the needs

of the spiritual personality. To be certain of the existence of God is, at bottom, to recognize the religious view of the world as necessary. Now it does not satisfy the demand for certainty that the psychological fact of religion can be shown to be a universal one, inevitable to mankind at a certain stage (Schleiermacher). This is, it is true, of great significance for our question. But it could also be interpreted as a mere subjective illusion arising from our wishes or from the nature of human consciousness; an illusion dissipated by reason and from which man must free himself, as from other subjective fancies. Piety demands an assurance of God that is as certain as the fact of our personal existence. But from the nature of religion this is possible only if the fact of our own personal spiritual life, as one qualitatively distinguished from the life of nature, be taken into account in the survey of the world, and ourselves and the world regarded as one whole.[1] He who will do neither cannot possibly be scientifically convinced of the existence of God. Thoroughgoing scepticism is irrefutable on its own ground. But it condemns itself, inasmuch as it draws its conclusions on the assumption of the trustworthiness of thought, that is, of the reality of the spiritual life in man.

Hence all the so-called proofs for the existence of God can be convincing only if we include the spiritual life of man as unique, and do not let ourselves be disconcerted by the refusal of scepticism to recognize this factor, but on the contrary simply assume reason and conscience as the

[1] "The Christian view of the world holds, not for man as a limited part of nature, but for man as moral person" (Herrmann). And metaphysics as such (ontology), being neutral as to the distinction of nature and spirit, must be different from any religious view of the world (A. Ritschl).

most certain of experiences. But under these limitations it is of no small value to the educated believer to make clear to himself that it is not merely our moral duty to believe in God, but that also, for a real comprehension of the world in which we as personalities find ourselves, no other than the religious view of the world is adequate; and that hence it not only does not contradict science but in fact completes and crowns it. Therefore we shall not be able to evade the task of examining the real significance and bearings of those "proofs of the existence of God" which from the first have played an important rôle in Christian apologetics as a continuation of philosophic efforts. We begin with the arguments which, as has been pointed out above, cannot by themselves attain their purpose. Their real significance lies essentially in the recognition of the fact that the religious view of the world is not only not in contradiction to the scientific (double truth), but furnishes the simplest and most satisfying answer to the riddle with which all science necessarily stops.

2. It is from the world, without regard to the fact of the spiritual life in man, that the cosmological and the teleological arguments infer the existence of God. Both are borrowed from pre-Christian piety and keep recurring through the whole history of Christianity.[1] The cosmological argument proceeds, according to the law of Efficient Cause, from conditioned (*contingentes*) phenomena and causes, which always in turn presuppose a cause, to an unconditioned final Cause which, being such, cannot be phenomenal and must necessarily exist. Since nothing can come from nothing, since neither a circle always furnishing its own conditions nor an infinity of interlocking

[1] The cosmological argument since Aristotle, the teleological since Socrates.

finite causes is conceivable, the conclusion is drawn that our thought can stop only with the assumption of an Absolute. For anything that was not absolute would have to be conceived as at some time "non-existent." The argument is in itself irrefutable, but suffers from the defect that it tries to extend the law of causality, under which we know the phenomenal world, to a region which is expressly distinguished qualitatively from our phenomenal world. To our thought, inseparably bound up as it is with the law of causality, the right must be denied of making assertions concerning a Being that is to be thought of as exempt from precisely this law. Concerning the impossibility of a cycle of finite causes and effects we can, for the same reason, not pass any decisive judgment. But even if the argument as such were recognized, it would never lead to what religion calls God, but only to a supersensual substance and force that can be just as well conceived of as working in the world, as transcendent and apart from the world. Now the argument can, it is true, be improved by pointing out that the actual interaction of finite things would be unintelligible apart from an ultimate reality common to them, influencing them and effective in them; inasmuch as a mere "law" could neither exist nor have power over things, and inasmuch as we cannot conceive how one finite could produce change in, and be in turn acted upon by, another finite[1] (Leibnitz, Lotze). But it follows from this that a rational consistent comprehension of the phenomenal world is im-

[1] The isolated elements serve to constitute the world only in case they carry with them their necessary relation to all others and are themselves also determined by such relation. The whole is just as much presupposed in each individual part, as is each part as a constituting element of the whole (Siegwart).

possible without the assumption of a supersensual ultimate reality. But it is neither proven that this ultimate reality must be the God of religion, nor that we are competent of or pledged to a rational comprehension of the world. A simple stopping with the fact of the world unfolding itself in accordance with law, such as positivism aims at, cannot be characterized as "dereliction of duty," and a spiritual power realizing itself in all phenomenal existence need not be God. That the God of religion is the simplest solution of the riddle of existence and that the devout man therefore has in his consciousness of God also a satisfactory comprehension of the world, is plain (Rom. 1, 20). But for the unbeliever God cannot be convincingly proved in this way. Metaphysics leads at last only to the limits of the phenomenal world and to the conclusion that something different from the phenomenal world must be beyond these limits. But such notions of limits are necessarily negative. They can tell us nothing concerning what lies positively at the bottom of the riddle. Religion, on the other hand, seeks in its God, not the "supersensual," the "absolute" (*primum ens necessarium*), but that which is turned toward us, with which we can enter into relation. The two are connected only by the common idea of the "non-phenomenal." For the idea with which the scientific explanation of the world seeks to sum itself up, the name of "God" should not be used, as Aristotle does (Kant). The *actus purus* can beget neither worship, nor faith in providence. It is more like fate. And absolute being is nothing else than the idea of the world (A. Ritschl). The Absolute, apart from all quality, is not the God in which religion is interested.

3. The teleological argument, by comparing the or-

ganization of nature to the products of human skill which presuppose an artificer, infers that the wealth of purposeful phenomena that appears in this world points to a supreme purposing reason, in which the conception of the world has (logically) preceded the world itself. This argument has impressed itself early on simple piety[1] and really leads, if it is accepted, to a God who, as purposing personal creator and guide of the world, has significance for religion. It would be, of course, by itself invalid if the world's adaption to purpose has to be denied, not merely in the sense of pessimism, but in general as an illusion bred by our purposing reason from the results of the law of causality; a view of nature which excluding the wonder-worker, purpose, has been held from Lucretius to Strauss. Even if the result of the world were a miscarriage from the point of view of "happiness," the purposefulness of the world would remain untouched, if judged by other standards. But it would vanish if what seems purposeful to us from the point of view of our reason be explained by heredity and development under the influence of that struggle for existence which allows the more favorably equipped individuals to maintain and propagate themselves; if organs and creatures be conceived of as formed in the course of uncounted æons by need and by the influence of the external world; so that light has produced the eye, the stress of life thought, etc.

It is obvious that this view is fully justified for a very wide range of organic life. The naïve teleological view, which looked on things and creatures as purposely arranged for the physical well-being of man, must be

[1] Ps. 19; 97; 104. Job 12, 7; 37 ff. Acts 14, 17. Rom. 1, 19 ff. Preaching will always keep it within proper bounds.

definitely abandoned. And in many cases "adaptation to purpose" can in fact be shown to be the result of evolution and struggle. But the attempt from such factors to understand the total phenomenal world is nevertheless as yet only a vast hypothesis that demands a higher measure of faith than all the miracles of religion. Although it now starts from below instead of from above, and has a scientific, not a speculative, basis, it exhibits at bottom the same naïve confidence which Hegel showed when he thought himself able to explain the world by the logical process. At the bottom of both procedures lies the need of our reason to reduce by its own laws the variety of existence to its simplest terms. Hence we can understand how for D. Strauss, for instance, the transition from logical idealism to the theory of evolution has been accomplished without the consciousness of a breach. A transition from chemical to physiological, from physiological to psychological, processes is nowhere known. The habitable earth is scarcely so old that the thousands of years which are recognized by zoölogy and paleontology should have no weight in the matter. And these sciences assert what is here mainly involved, namely, that living creatures and organisms have long existed. The actual results of natural selection are vanishingly small and are always exposed to the danger of relapse. There is continual need of the boldest hypotheses to explain how such relapse could be prevented; and in the presence of the immense actual interval between the stages of animal life, the small results of attempts to breed specific variations that shall be permanent seem at present almost to challenge mockery; especially since anatomical structure is hardly included in such changes at all. That the

various stages that evolution has gone through show us first only very primitive forms of life, and only later the higher forms of the mammals, is indisputable.[1] But nowhere have there as yet been found really convincing transition stages from primitive forms to higher ones. The species that in earlier formations correspond to those known to us to-day are, to be sure, more gigantic and to our eyes more fantastic than the latter, but in no way essentially divergent from them or less perfect. They demanded conditions that proved inconsistent with the evolution of life on earth. But they are in themselves just as perfect as our fauna. And for our purpose the question need not be raised whether perchance such transitions have been wrought within the higher ranges of animal life; whether, for example, man is immediately connected with definite species of animals, or whether he has existed on earth for three hundred thousand years instead of six thousand. A scientific refutation of teleology could be attempted only if all life on earth could be shown to be the result of purposeless causes.

But even if we were willing to accept the hypothesis, the beginnings of life, were these merely the primary green cell, would be just as hard to explain without a purposeful creative activity as are the present countless species when thought of as originally different. The miracle would only be pushed farther back. Nothing passes of itself from inorganic to organic. And an intelligence unconsciously

[1] In the oldest mountains no fossils have been found as yet. These begin in the so-called transition period (including the coal period) in the shape of shellfish, crabs, insects, fish, reptiles. The Trias formation is the first to show the great amphibia and saurians, the Tertiary period the huge mammals. Man and the ape have as yet been shown only in the present stage of the earth, which belongs to the diluvial and alluvial age.

working toward a purpose (instinct) is, to be sure, intelligible as a result of creation or of evolution, but not as an original presupposition. If we deny the "Logos" in the world, there is nothing left for its starting-point but "chance." And to explain order by chance is to proclaim the bankruptcy of thought. It is true that science, as such, has not the task of finding purpose in the world, and of course in the phenomenal world there is no purpose without mechanism. But a consistent view of the world that excludes the idea of purpose must be regarded as inconceivable *per se*. "Out of a heap of chance letters comes no Iliad." The infinitely complex conditions under which nutrition, growth, and propagation of the living being proceed and their mutually conditioned union in one physical whole, cannot possibly have arisen as the result of isolated aimless causes. And "how is the law of causality to produce thought, feeling, and moral will? How do a thousand notes result in one tune?" The denial of purpose in the world mistakes for spirit what is only the apparatus of spirit.

Yet even this argument does not fully accomplish what it is meant to do. In the devout man it doubtless reënforces his piety. But it ceases to be valid if one simply falls back on the standpoint of positivist scepticism, which refuses to pass judgment where cognition, under the law of causality, stops. A retreat can be made to the fact that, in reality, what seems purposed is not seldom the result of purposeless causes. And the great number of empirical failures of adaptation would keep suggesting doubt of God, and eventually permit the postulating of a "God" that religion cannot acknowledge. The unprejudiced investigation of nature has forever done away with

the fair dream of sentimentality of the "perfect" world. There are so many incomprehensible and yet inevitable cruelties and miseries in the world, so many germs perish undeveloped, so many glorious "possibilities" go to wreck on the iron laws of nature, so many nobler creatures are overwhelmed by the brute force of less worthy ones, — that "nature," however certainly it proclaims the glory of God as a whole, only too often serves as an accusation against him in detail. On the ground of the bare "view of the world," one might arrive at the assumption of conflicting deities forced into common action by an iron law, or at dualism, or at a God who has only partial control of the world (Mill). The God that religion demands is not found even by the teleological view of the world, certain though it is that the undeniable adaptations in the world are best and most simply explained by belief in an omniscient Creator, and that the human spirit, in setting aims for itself, will always feel itself driven anew to recognize a purpose at the basis of the world.

4. The arguments for the existence of God do not gain really convincing power until the fact of the qualitative distinction between the processes of nature and the life of the human spirit is recognized and taken into account, viz. in the facts of thought, of religion, and of morality. The ontological argument, based on the fact of thought, and carried on from the suggestion of the ancient philosophers by the church fathers, by Anselm, and by Descartes in various forms, has won new recognition in the school of Hegel. Its older forms, at any rate, rest on unmistakably false inferences. Augustine starts from the assumption that our thought, since it presupposes being and life, but is not already involved in them, must be something higher

than they. But there is something higher than thought itself, namely, the truth (number, wisdom) that all thinkers seek, that is, recognize as standing above their thought. Hence, either truth itself is the "highest," that is, God, or else whatever is higher still must be God. In any case, the existence of God is proved. But Augustine's conclusion in this form would carry conviction only if a reality was ascribed to ideas in Plato's sense. The truth which reveals itself (in mathematics and in philosophy) as the highest law of thought, can also be conceived as a law involved in our thinking, of which we are conscious only as an abstraction from that thought. Anselm maintained that our thought of God as the absolute highest demands his reality, since a thing that might be non-existent is less perfect than what is necessarily existent; that is, cannot really be the absolute highest. But existence is no mere quality that, added to the idea of a thing, would make it perfect. Anselm is right only in saying that God, if he exists, can exist only as the absolutely perfect, and that by the devout man, to whom the idea of God in general is an assured element of his spiritual life, God will of course be regarded as real, not as a mere idea. But the idea of the perfect primarily presupposes only that it stands higher than other ideas, as Gaunilo has rightly objected. Since Kant this objection will hardly be longer disputed. Cartesius bases his argument on the assertion that the idea of the *ens summe perfectum* could not originate in our minds. The fact of thought is, according to him, the one certain fact, even for absolute scepticism. In it is necessarily implied that the mind attains to the idea of perfect being. And this cannot, like other ideas, be a fictitious one (merely subjective). For whatever necessarily gives

rise to an idea must hold the content of that idea as reality in itself. Naught comes of naught. But the "perfect" is not in our minds. Hence the idea of it can be begotten in us only by the perfect itself. Hence God must exist. But the objection will be raised that the idea of the perfect, although positive in itself, could nevertheless be very well gained as the necessary result of our own thought, as an abstraction from its limitations. An element of truth lies, to be sure, in all these arguments, and both Augustine and Cartesius not seldom came very near finding it. The right to infer the existence of God does not lie, to be sure, in the idea of perfect being that exists in us, but in the fact of our thought itself, in which we always start from the conviction of the truth of the conclusions of the reason, that is, assume that being and thought are in the last analysis identical. But this would be folly unless an Infinite, ruling the world of nature and manifesting itself in our reason, really existed. In feeling ourselves compelled, as reasoning beings, to think of logical laws as governing the world, we assume the existence of God as the reason that governs the world. Our habit of thinking and framing ideals would be an illusion if a "universal reason" corresponding to ours did not rule omnipotent in the phenomenal world. Its denial would drive us, even in thought, to a logical scepticism. The world is intelligible to us only because it is not merely a "world," but a revelation of mind.[1] "God is truth in us" (Leibnitz). Whoever surrenders the "rationality" of things must also surrender the comprehension of his own rationality. "In all finite minds the idea of truth is contained *a priori* as an

[1] Herder: "The 'is' between subject and predicate is my demonstration of God."

original thought arising from the nature of the mind itself" (Harms). We are as certain of God as of our own thought. But, of course, the fact of thought constitutes a convincing proof of the existence of God only on the assumption that the necessity is recognized in general of comprehending the world in thought. And this world-controlling "rationality" is, of course, by no means the God of religion, since it can be conceived of as immanent.

5. The cosmological argument gains convincing force for the devout man from the fact of religion itself, in which we, on the one hand, feel ourselves relatively free over against the world, and, on the other, feel ourselves and the world as absolutely dependent. This fact can be shown psychologically to be true of all mankind, as Schleiermacher has pointed out. Man cannot make clear and interpret to himself the alternate relation of dependence and freedom which the world forces upon him as soon as he has outgrown the first confusions of his childish self-consciousness, without becoming inwardly aware of the relation in which he, as part of the world, as a "creature," stands, along with the whole world, to what is felt by him as the non-phenomenal unity of the contradictions of the empirical world. Historically this experience is confirmed by the universality of religion. The appeal to the *consensus gentium* as to the existence of a godhead is, like Tertullian's much misunderstood *anima per totum naturaliter christiana*, in fact nothing else than the testimony of experience to the fact that religion is an inevitable phenomenon in every healthy human soul that is not crippled by vice or by excess of culture. The appeal to the "longing" of the soul for God, to its unrest until it has found him, is rooted in the same cycle of thought. But certain

though it is that such longing is a prophecy of religion, it is nevertheless of doubtful wisdom to build on wishes, even the apparently most inevitable and best grounded, the proof for the reality of the thing wished for. We shall do better to stop with the fact of religion as a universal human phenomenon. The conviction of something above the world, to which we can and must absolutely surrender ourselves, is part of a normal human life. The existence of God is thus proved practically from our inner consciousness of our relativity, instead of by the metaphysical argument from the sufficient basis of the world. It is true that the scope of this argument can be denied, if it is claimed that a satisfactory inner life can be led without the religious feeling, or if religion is regarded only as an illusion, inevitable at certain stages of human development, but not the less baseless on that account. The *consensus gentium*, which can at best never be certainly proved, can be easily met by pointing to the cultured atheists of all ages. In that case, to be sure, the attempt must be abandoned to feel oneself other than a personal being helplessly entangled in the mechanism of the world, — which is to renounce happiness.

6. The teleological argument gains convincing force from the fact of morality (moral proof). It is true that the recognition of the absolute validity of the moral law can scarcely establish logically the postulate of practical reason, that happiness must correspond to virtue, *i.e.* that moral law must have its basis in a God who rules the world. For the complete and relentless exclusion of all thought of happiness in morality can be insisted on, and the control of the world by the good be taken in the sense of Fichte's idealism. But whoever feels himself abso-

lutely bound to act morally, even at the price of the sacrifice of all egoistic worldly interests, must also be convinced that the law of the good is the highest goal in the world. He must therefore believe in freedom and in a creator and ruler of the world who has moral aims. For there is no such thing as laws which establish themselves.[1] This argument is sound. But it makes belief in God a moral duty, not the result of a theoretic demonstration. The appeal to the variety of moral ideals and to the fact that their historical evolution can be indubitably established, can as little invalidate this argument as can the fact of "irreligious" morality in men. Although morality may be, in its temporary content, the result of complex historical processes and exhibit the most questionable and imperfect forms, and far though we may be from the naïve notion that man brings with him at birth ready-made (innate) moral ideas, as far as this argument is concerned it is only a question of the fact of absolute subjection to clearly recognized duty. It ceases to be valid only for him who looks on his moral activity simply as part of the causal law, and empties consciousness of duty of meaning, by regarding even moral aims as egoistic, as serving the worldly advantage of the individual or the clan (eudæmonism). Such a man acts, however, against his conscience and denies what is inwardly most certain, viz. the absolute supremacy of the morally good. For moral scepticism, which means the slaying of the con-

[1] Kant has frequently suggested this form of the argument, although he has carried out his own proof in an unsatisfactory form. That to him "the starry sky above us and the moral law within us" are the things most worthy of man's reverence, gives him the right to be regarded as one of the witnesses for religion, remote though he is from the position of Christian faith as a whole.

science, there wait, to be sure, "superstitions" of every sort, and to these it falls an easy prey; but there is for it no real religious faith. Christianity appeals to it as little as does any other higher religion. And there is no object in trying to prove to it the existence of God or in asking of its confessors that they accept religion on the *argumentum a tutiori* (because it is never harmful and may be useful). Only by this apathy of conscience being destroyed from within can the soil be prepared for religion. And "irreligious" morality is in truth a self-deception. It is the surviving remnant of a morality based on religion. Every man who believes absolutely in moral duty has "an altar to the unknown God" in his heart. For the world of causal law cannot establish the certainty of moral duty. This is intelligible only if there is in the phenomenal world something higher, something non-phenomenal, that evokes it.

Hence the firmest foundation for the certainty of religion will lie here. Whoever recognizes moral duty must also include in his view of the world a law that subordinates nature to spirit, — must, that is, believe in God. For a moral order of the world without a spirit as its foundation is a contradiction in itself. He who denies God must also deny morality in the true sense of the word. A wish and a felt need do not guarantee the reality of what is wished for. But a duty guarantees, to every one that recognizes it morally, the reality of a will of which it is the expression. The fact that in a world of causal law personal beings subject their lives to the good, and sacrifice them to it, is the best proof for the existence of God. For otherwise such conduct would have to be regarded as a mad variety of egoistic shrewd-

ness, or be laughed at as foolish fanaticism. But even the "irreligious" will not venture to do either in their hearts, when they gaze on the great moral heroes and martyrs of the good. Such conduct is intelligible only if, amid a phenomenal world that in itself is utterly indifferent to morality, we believe in a purpose directed toward the good (kingdom of God). Therefore this argument carries complete conviction only to him who has surrendered himself absolutely to the good. And for the Christian there stands, in place of every other form of this argument, the fact of the life of Jesus and his cross, wherein the world-conquering and world-controlling power of the good reveals itself immediately as a reality to every soul that does not will to exclude it. Hence the Christian will not need the roundabout path of the universal consciousness of duty in order to come to a belief in God. But he will understand from his own experience that this path is the right one.

7. Hence the belief in God cannot be cast in a theoretical form that shall appeal to every rational being. But it is just as certain as is our inner life, in distinction from the life of nature. Although the riddle of the world finds its rational solution only in religious faith, every one who knows the true nature of thought, who feels himself relatively free over against the world and yet at the same time absolutely dependent along with it, and who recognizes the absolute claim of moral duty, must believe in a reason absolutely ruling the world and revealed as the power of the good. God is not more certain to us than is the unique nature of our own thought, feeling, and willing, that is, than our personal self-consciousness; but he is just as certain. He who denies him must

also renounce true rationality, happiness, and morality. Hence at bottom God himself bears witness to his existence in the spiritual life of man (*testimonium Spiritus Sancti internum*). The devout man, the sage, and the moral man are the living proofs of the existence of God. For the Christian, Jesus is the sum and crown of this proof, as the perfectly devout man (Son of God), as the revealer of the meaning of the world (Logos), and as the victor over the world by his death on the cross. Jesus is for us the *apologia* of religion.

# BOOK II

## *PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.—RELIGION IN ITS HISTORICAL PHENOMENA*

## PART I: NATURE RELIGIONS

### 12. *The Primitive Nature Religions*

1. In the following pages there is no attempt to solve the problem of the history of religion; this, on the contrary, as far as its results are obvious, is assumed. In the present stage of knowledge, this task, in spite of the worthy attempts to do it justice, like those, for instance, of Tiele and Chantepie de la Saussaye, must still be pronounced insoluble for a single scholar, or at any rate would lie entirely beyond the capacity of the present writer. Moreover, the criticism of the historical religions, among which Christianity takes its place, has nothing at all to do with the historical knowledge of all the various forms of religion. The numberless nature religions (which have special interest for the historian just because of their variety) all represent the same stage of man's religious development, so that it is enough for us to point out their common character in their more important traits. And even in the case of religions unique in kind, we are concerned only with their original religious type, not at all with their later ecclesiastical development, the form of their cult, or the vast variety of

their myths and dogmas. From the standpoint of apologetics, Brahminism and Buddhism, for instance, must be approached from different sides; while history will, of course, present them only in the closest connection.

But it is only historically that a view can be got into the nature of actual human religion. Religion has never existed alongside of the various positive religions, but only as "truth" within them; while they are, on their side, the "actuality" of religion. And even Christianity can primarily claim to be nothing more than an individual religion, conditioned and limited by time and place, one which must be studied as part of a whole.

2. An historical insight into the birth of religion is denied us, and the historical evidence does not justify us in asserting that the simplest and most primitive forms of religion are everywhere the oldest. The empirical school of the history of religion (Hume, Hegel), which assumes this on the analogy of other forms of spiritual development, can, it is true, claim its very great probability. But over against the idealistic school (Ebrard, Gladstone) and that of transition forms (Schelling, Max Müller), it cannot, at least at present, bring conclusive proof. For the degeneration of originally more perfect forms of religion is, in almost all civilized races, a common fact. Still, the philosophy of religion has the unquestionable right to begin with the survey of the most primitive forms. In these the special religious experiences of leading spirits never form the decisive element, but natural conditions and racial temperament. Theological interests are wholly lacking. The difference between the assumption of the existence of an infinity of divinities and the cult of a special tribal divinity is not yet felt in its religious

bearings. It is simply a question of usages and practices. The special type of piety is determined, not by æsthetic or philosophic considerations, but by the need of the clan to put itself into communication with its divinity in order to further its special interests. The private interests of the individual fall, therefore, rather within the sphere of superstition than of "popular religion," which always addresses itself to the needs of the whole clan. A mythology proper arises only with the awakening of higher spiritual interests. Until that point is reached, it is a question of a varied mass of isolated fancies which make religion tangible. From the religious point of view all these religions have at bottom the same worth and character, and they admit of a simply boundless number of different details. From constantly changing needs and terrors in the presence of the menacing and beneficent manifestations of the forces of nature, conceived as living, springs the variety of forms of cult and of religious conceptions.

3. Races wholly without religion seem never to have existed nor to exist to-day. Even the lowest races in Africa, America, Australia, have magicians, ritual dances, dread of spirits and the dead, rude forms of sacrifice, and customs like taboo; even though their distrust and their stupidity have made it impossible to obtain answers from them to questions addressed to them from the point of view of Christianity. Even Lubbock, while denying the existence of religion among many tribes, reports at the same time customs that can have sprung only from religion. We must lay aside the habit of limiting the word "religion" to the sphere that seems of religious value to the Christian.

4. In using the name "fetich worship"[1] to describe a mere worship of physical objects that cannot be called real religion, the fact has been overlooked that the same sort of worship, with its characteristic signs, has existed in relatively advanced religions. Even the Romans of the age of the Cæsars have broken the statues of deities that had failed to furnish aid in great calamities; and the rabble in southern Roman Catholic countries treats in the same way the statues of saints that have been appealed to in vain, *e.g.* those of St. Florian, of Januarius, of Peter. And the Palladium or the black stone of the Great Goddess that Rome had fetched in the war with Hannibal, can as little be distinguished in kind from fetiches as can the live beasts in the highly developed Egyptian religion in its popular form; or the Baetylia of the Semites from Lebanon to Arabia; or the statues of stone or wood (*ξόανα*) of the Greeks, that moved, wept, sweat, were anointed. And we forget that, after all, not the physical objects themselves, but the "spirits" that dwelt in them, or that were imprisoned in them by man, are the object of worship, while the things themselves, as such, are entirely indifferent, changing, and numberless. The cross and the pictures of the Virgin of missions become fetiches just as do chronometers, compasses, and flags of sailors, or the horse that Cortez left behind in Honduras, or the Nuremberg clock in the shape of a bear among the Ostiaks. But ordinarily an object suffices that has caught the eye or accidentally touched the hand, a skin, a block of wood, a stone, a horn, etc. Whoever is most "pious" has the most such fetiches. Later they begin to be rude

[1] The word is one introduced by Europeans in condemnation of the lower pagan cults, *factitius*, *feitiço*. De Brosses, 1760.

works of art, strangely carved pieces of wood, etc. At bottom they are not essentially different from amulets, talismans, and images. Moreover, we know no fetich religion without a belief in ruling deities. Even the black men of Australia know a "spirit of the waters," the Polynesians a lord of the sky, the negroes of Borneo a creator of the earth, the American Indians a manitou; and in Africa the sky and the sun are always conceived of in some way as "highest." But practical piety does not direct itself toward these "distant" and "harmless" powers, but to the near and dreaded ones. Between fetichism and the religion of the "elemental spirits of nature" in general, a qualitative distinction cannot be made. For all "spirits of nature" are thought of as existing in stones, trees, rivers, springs, mountains, as somehow attached to these or revealed in them. All ancient cult symbols are originally "houses of the divinity," and are more or less identified with it. Especially constant among all races living with nature and linked to animals by fear or hope of gain, is the directing of religion to special varieties of beasts (totemism). The individual animals are then treated with a certain pious awe, even though they are hunted and slain, as, for instance, bears among the Siberians, elephants among the Kaffirs, or leopards, tigers, crocodiles, wolves, in Africa. Many varieties of beasts are even made inviolate by this "religion," as, for instance, the sacred animals in the different parts of Egypt. The serpent, the demonic beast, has enjoyed the greatest and most widespread worship, not only among the Ashantees and in Dahomey, but even among the Greeks, where it was the incarnation of the "genius" or of the healing divinity. Among the Aryans in a some-

what advanced stage of culture the domestic animals are specially sacred (cow).

5. The primitive nature religions have evidently been much the same among the most various races at a certain stage of civilization. Only later historical developments have brought out distinctly the differences in paganism. With higher culture, beginning with agriculture, they are inconsistent, and have, therefore, maintained themselves in their original rudeness only among hunting and fishing peoples. But they doubtless play a more or less distinct rôle in the religions of more highly developed races. With creed or doctrine they have nothing to do, but with fixed usages and practices. Not the salvation of the individual, but the prosperity of the tribe (*familia*, *gens*, *natio*), is what is sought by devotion to the divinity. The latter bears a distinct analogy to the "soul" of the individual, leading a double life in dreams and freeing itself at death from its body, yet corresponding to the body as if it were the ghostly double of the living man. For these facts Erwin Rohde's researches in his *Psyche* offer exhaustive proof.[1] In the same way the functions of the life of nature, on which the prosperity of the tribe depends, appear as the activities of spirits immanent in natural objects. Between man, beast, plant, stone, spring, etc., the distinction seems only relative. Whether the family cult of ancestors and the dead, centring around the graves of ancestors lying in the family estate, has actually been the sole beginning of this whole system of belief, must be regarded as very dubious; although it is plain that in the most various tribes the cult of ancestors has been the real soul of popular religion, even during high stages of culture. Still less

[1] Cf. also Tylor, Lippert, Oort, Schwally, Spencer, C. Grüneisen.

probable is it that the worship of brutes (totemism) can be held to be the all-explaining source of this cult of the spirits of nature. On the contrary, the transference of human consciousness to the forces of nature must have had various starting-points. "Animism" by itself is, of course, not religion, but a sort of primitive fancy that lies at the roots of religion, and that frequently appears in union with the idea that the spirits of nature can be compelled to appear to men (spiritism). These spirits are then often conceived of as taking up their abode, temporarily or permanently, in a (symbolic) living or lifeless object, — in animals, amulets, images, "fetiches." All this appears to man in the lowest stage of civilization as self-evident, and maintains itself with incredible tenacity in higher stages in the "superstition" of the masses.

6. The religious feeling toward these "deities" is neither love nor admiration, but at bottom "fear," mingled with trust in the help which is expected from them, partly on account of their natural relation to the tribe, partly on account of the control that can be gained over them by magic. Between good and bad, harmful and helpful, spirits no fundamental distinction is made, though kindly disposed allies are distinguished from angry foes. And the same power can include both. The heat of the sun ripens fruit, but it also scorches the soil. The thunderstorm is beneficent, but it carries the lightning stroke with it. The stream brings prosperity, but it devastates the land with flood. The spirits of ancestors are, it is true, appealed to also for help, but a dread is felt of them, and protection is sought, by burial rites and sacred formulas, against their revenge and their uncanny activities (werewolves). But the great gods ruling the whole of nature,

that in a certain sense stand above all party, have little significance for the living cult. They leave the feelings cold, like a primitive metaphysics. Magic and sacred formulas that protect from the anger of the gods or assure their aid are the innermost "mystery" of religion. Sacrifice, in its highest form, is communion of the community with the divinity; in it the two become one by the rite of partaking of a common food. With the moral life of the soul religion has, as yet, no connection. It is true, however, that reverence for the gods and fear of their vengeance serve the moral interests of the clan. Probably almost all the social customs that exist in our society have some sort of religious origin. Certain spots become "holy" (taboo), and so protect from vengeance and robbery. Ordeals and oaths lay the foundation for a primitive conception of law. The house and marriage have almost never been left without dedication to the spirits that protect the family and assure its continuance. And with self-denial in the service of the gods begins a moral discipline. In fastings and castigations man practises the subjection of sensual inclinations to higher motives. The dedication of the youth with pain and abstinence steels courage. The cult of ancestors rouses piety. But the ends that religion is to serve are, nevertheless, in themselves purely sensuous, and the activities resulting from it are an arbitrary ritual, that can almost never be interpreted from the point of view of moral purpose. Special usages in respect to food, arising from certain natural objects being held sacred or from superstitious notions; choice of days; avoidance of particular places as sharing in the "sanctity" of the god and dangerous; definite sacred dress; sacrifices with prescribed

ritual; magic spells whose effectiveness depends on their literal use, and a hundred other things, do not belong, in and for themselves, to the sphere of morality. Nay, they are apt, if excessive value is laid upon them on religious grounds, to distort the feeling for the moral. The anger of the gods is ascribed to offences against natural customs or superstitious usages, not to actual sin. The priest is an uncanny sorcerer. Not in his religious or moral elevation, but in his magic spells, his ecstatic ravings, his sacred dress, lies his power over the divinity, in which alone the community is interested. Hence the real nature of religion does not come here to any clear expression.

7. A stage of religion such as has been characterized above has been found everywhere among the savage races of Australia, America, Africa, and the South Sea; although in one place the worship of the dead, in another totemism, in a third the simple ascription of souls to natural objects, plays the more prominent rôle; and although, in many cases, the thought of a "spirit" ruling the world, especially the sky, is visible in the background. Among the fishing and hunting races of northern Asia it is still often preserved beneath the surface of Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity. It must have long governed all the dwellers in the steppes of the interior of Asia (Turanians), but even there it is partly transformed into higher forms (China, Japan, Finns), partly supplanted by culture religions. In really absolute purity it no longer exists anywhere among historically living races, but all the more in its after-effects in higher forms of religion. Worship of the dead, magic (Shamanism) with artificial technique and ecstasies, amulets, spells, sacred animals, stones, trees, springs, mountains, transformations of men into animals,

superstitious fear of ghosts, and many other traits show that even in the religions of the classic civilized races such a substratum has lived on, and has probably played a far greater rôle in popular belief and local cults than the systematic, developed mythology and theosophy of poets and priests. Nay, a keen eye can trace the vestiges of this stage in the present form of popular Christianity in Europe.

8. In America the religion characteristic of this stage was on the point of passing in two places into the stage of culture religion when the native civilization was destroyed by the Europeans, viz. among the Aztecs and Toltecs in the Mexican highlands, and among the Peruvians of the plateau of the Andes. In both places a plane was reached which reminds us of the Assyrian and Egyptian religions, and perhaps opened the way to something higher, if the accounts of the conditions are not colored by Christian ideas. The Aztecs worshipped chiefly the man-eating war-god, Huitzilopochtli, the Toltecs the gentle god of the blessings of nature and of civilization, Quetzalcohuatl (Winged Snake), from whose return the renewal of the golden age was expected. And King Netzahualcoyotl (1400) is said to have conceived a religion of the one true God, creator of the world, without idol or bloody sacrifices. Beautiful prayers, full of penitent feeling and lofty ethics, have been handed down to us by (*e.g.*) Sahagún. A sort of baptism and confession existed. Legends of the flood and a cosmogony are mentioned. Alongside of this, to be sure, frightful human sacrifices and the mystic partaking of the blood-drenched symbol of the war-god were in vogue in the temple-palaces of Mexico. The socialistic theocracy that the "children of the sun" (Incas)

had erected in Peru was, according to Garcilasso de la Vega, also founded on a very highly developed nature religion. Legends of the creation and the flood, confession, temple virgins, beautiful hymns, the conception of civic duty and labor as service of the god, stood alongside of a fierce cult with human sacrifices. The Inca Tupac Yupanqui (1440) aimed at the cult of a spiritual deity by whom the "sun" was governed and guided and who needed no external rites. But for the religion of humanity these efforts have had no significance.

### 13. *Ancient Semitic Paganism*

1. The pastoral tribes that have inhabited the pastures and deserts of northern Arabia, the Sinai peninsula, and the valley of the Euphrates, and in part made themselves masters later in civilized lands, — the Israelites, Arameans, Edomites, Moabites, and Assyrians, — show in their religion almost all the traits of the primitive paganism described above, but with a special quality and a capacity for development that give them a place of their own in the history of religion. Our knowledge of them by inference from later culture religions is supplemented by Arabian paganism, which has remained most faithful to the original type. Through the labors of Wellhausen and Robertson Smith, the essential character of these religions has been made intelligible to us.

2. The divinities of the Semites show their original character as deities of a primitive nature religion distinctly enough in their association with natural objects, chiefly sacred stones, springs, trees, mountains. Sinai and the sacred stone of Bethel correspond exactly to the rocks in which the Arabian divinities, especially Al-Lât

and Manât, were worshipped, or to the Kaaba stone. The springs of Kadesh and Beersheba were sacred, like those of the Syrian and Arabian deserts. The gods of the Semites are primarily, as in all primitive paganism, very numerous, and can be increased at pleasure, according to the local cults and the needs of individual tribes. But in the numerous local gods the same divine activity was, after all, felt at bottom. Hence they could be exchanged, and the worshipper could turn from one to another without thinking of a real religious change. With this pagan tendency Israel had to struggle down to the time of the Exile. Along with it went, for instance among the Arabians, the conception of "divine beings" that enjoyed no tribal cult and as "demons" (Jinns) lived only in the fancy of the people. Of a monotheism in the higher religious sense there was no trace, and just as little of any theological interest in the throng of deities. The Arabians, Assyrians, and Arameans have adopted the artificial multiplicity of divinities of the civilized races among which they lived without any feeling of inconsistency. The Edomites, Moabites, and Ammonites have not felt themselves to be monotheists in the presence of the polytheism of their neighbors. And the religious history of Israel becomes unintelligible, if a conscious theoretic monotheism is thought of as its starting-point.

But among all these races, the character of the deities as nature divinities — chiefly connected with the manifestations of light in the sun and in tempests — was entirely cast in the shade by their relation to the life of the tribe and to its territory. The god to whom worship was addressed was the Baal (lord) of the fruitful soil, or the lord and king of the tribe. The tribal community was con-

ceived of as united with him in a very realistic fashion. The blood of the tribe was of inviolable sanctity, and was conceived of as closely linked to the life of the divinity. Hence in the common partaking of blood, or in similar rites of communion, the community of the tribe with its god was continually strengthened, and in case it seemed obscured, restored. This was probably the significance of the ritual sacrifice proper among the Semites, in which the blood of a domestic animal, as one closely connected with the human community, was viewed as a sacred cement to strengthen the unity of the tribe and its union with its god. Sacrifice was not originally offered to the divinity by fire. Among the Arabians the simple offering to the god by smearing the sacred "stone" or the "pillar" with blood and by the ritual partaking of the flesh of the victim has always remained in vogue. The offering of the "odor" by "fire" presupposes a higher conception of heavenly deities. Bloodless sacrifices were probably originally only tributes to the deity as "lord of the fruitful soil," and served to maintain the sacred places and the cult. Hence this religion certainly tended toward henotheism, without any theological monotheistic conception playing any part in it. And many elements were lacking that among other savage races counteracted the tendency toward henotheism. The Semites had goddesses, it is true, as they had gods. But however popular these might be in the cult, as for example Al-Lât, Manât, Al-Uzza among the Arabians, still they never have the character of the great mother-goddess of nature, who stands alongside of the generating sky-god and so necessarily transforms the religion into polytheism proper. The speech of the Semites, in which all nouns

are closely and unmistakably linked with verb stems, made it difficult to individualize the divinities, and to attach to the names of deities definite distinguishing conceptions. The most usual names of deities marked only the relationship of the god, as lord and ruler, to the community or to the land (Baal, El, Moloch, Adonis, etc.). The monotonous patriarchal life of the shepherd on the steppes, under the impression of few and mighty natural phenomena, did not favor the richer development of myth. The low plane of culture nowhere offered in poetry or art the opportunity to stamp the individual figures of the gods, as living and different, on the fancy of the people. Moreover, the worship of ancestors seems to have influenced these religions much less strongly than it did the Aryan. On the other hand, the element leading to henotheism among these tribes, was brought out with special force. The religious life of the individual was wholly lost in the consciousness of membership of the tribe, even more so than was generally the case at this stage of culture. The right to participate in the sacred rites belonged by birth only to him who had in him the sacred blood of the clan. The proselyte gained it only artificially by a legal ceremony (גֵּר). And we have no right to doubt that all these conceptions have originally been very realistic and spontaneous.

3. In the belief in the deity as lord and king of a people lies naturally also the impulse to ascribe to him a moral significance. It is true that in the legal conceptions of these races the deity remains an irresponsible autocrat. But he represents, nevertheless, by inner necessity, the great interests of the common moral life of the people. Hence the more the clan becomes a real people,

the more ethical must its religion become. The more, too, must the impulse toward real monotheism increase. For, with the strengthening of the national consciousness, the exclusive worship of the national deity must grow. And an aggressive tendency must develop, to try to gain for him the lordship over other deities. But at first every tribe was bound to its own god, without passing judgment on the existence and the significance of the gods of neighboring tribes. The religious mood corresponded to that of a people toward its sovereign. Its fundamental character was absolute devotion, mingled with fear of the god's dark will and of his wrath. The accursed and criminals were rooted out (driven out) lest the community incur the divine anger. And the readiness for self-accusation and for the sacrifice of what was dearest, even of one's own child, in order to avert divine anger, is a universal characteristic of these religions. But with this could very easily be combined enthusiasm for the god and confidence in his good will in normal times. The deity remains inscrutable and with no limits of law to confine him. But he has, nevertheless, naturally a benevolent interest in his community. The conception of him as the lord and that of him as the father of his children at first run into one another with no feeling of essential difference. With fear of the anger of the terrible and the "holy" one alternates, with no transition link, the proud trust in the people's "righteousness," that is, the conviction of being what the god demands. The fanaticism that impels to religious war with other tribes for the honor of one's own god, in order to destroy and drive out "his enemies," is a natural fruit of this religion. And whoever goes over to a tribe goes over also to its god. "Thy people my people, thy God my

God," is the natural expression of piety in these tribes (Ruth 1, 16). Here lie the roots of monotheism, of universal religion, of prophecy, and of the belief in the self-revelation of God. Only as religion can they have a sound growth. The impulse of thought toward the conception of the highest as a unity never actually attains to the monotheism of religion, but only to the pantheism of priestly cults or the philosophical idea of the absolute.

4. In its content Semitic paganism originally presented by no means a high stage of religious development. It has supplied strong and valuable incentives neither to morality nor to culture. And it has put actual obstacles in the way of theological and philosophical thought. The tribal lord of these religions demanded obedience, humility, and exact fulfilment of the requirements that he had made known. To reflect on him, or to try to fathom the rules by which he acted, seemed a violation of religious reverence. The races that have remained at this religious stage have not been able to attain to a higher spiritual life. Only a higher stage of culture, in which the rude life of the tribe became a really national life for which morality was an important consideration, and a stage of spiritual development that recognized in the inner life of the soul and in its attitude to the idea of the good something higher than lay in the prosperity of the tribe, could open higher paths. This, however, demanded higher manifestations of the divinity than primitive paganism expected, viz. revelation and prophecy. On the other hand, in the absolute devotion to the will of the divinity as the tribal lord, in the absence of a definite mythology and of a female divinity, and in the belief in the living intercourse of God with his

people, lay, at any rate in form, the conditions for a more perfect religion.

### 14. *The Paganism of the Indo-Europeans*

1. The religion to which the variously developed culture religions of the so-called Aryan or Indo-European races — races akin in speech and mythology — go back, shows the characteristic traits of primitive paganism distinctly enough. Magic, ghosts of all sorts, demons in the shape of animals, sacred stones and symbols, preserve distinctly enough the remnants of the original and universal human superstition. Above all, the cult of the ancestors of the family and the tribe has maintained itself here, with a vitality and tenacity that we find nowhere else, as the basis of local popular piety, even where the more highly developed theology which conceived of the dead as banished to their own world of shades without any community with the living (Homer), was at bottom incompatible with it. Sacrifices to the dead, the sanctity of graves, the consecration of the hearthfire, the passing of the wife at marriage from the cult of the paternal house to that of her husband, the duty of the son to pay honors to his deceased father and to his ancestors, the basing of the city and the rights of the citizens on the worship of ancestors,[1] etc., exhibit unmistakably this type of piety. Even the gods of light that later occupy the foreground appear in different shape and dwell in the womb of mother earth, thus keeping in memory the figures of the ancestral deities beneath the earth. These great gods of nature, however, have not had primarily the most significance for the cult. The vast mass of natural phenomena

[1] Erwin Rohde, Fustel de Coulanges.

was unquestioningly ascribed to divine spirits that appear as often distinct from, as they do alternating with, or passing into, one another.

2. But a basis of piety of this sort gave these races a stronger sense than the other uncivilized races had of the beneficent powers of light and life that rule and determine the life of man. And among them the gods have developed into more amiable figures, bound up more closely and beneficently with the interests of men, than among their neighbors. The great struggle in nature between Life-light-spring and Death-night-winter is with them interwoven with the moral fortunes of man. The revolution of the sun, the regaining of the golden treasures of light in spring, and the grand exhibition of the storm in which spring warmth conquers the deadly spell of winter, form the thrilling starting-points, filled with genuine poetry, for a rich and beautiful development of myth. The bright sky was evidently the centre of religious contemplation. To the children of the harsh highlands, light was not a scorching flame, but the source of life and joy. The piety of the people even takes part in the struggle of light with darkness, and aids it with its prayers. The good man feels that he is a participant in the fight against death and disorder. In his worship he tries to reënforce the power of the beneficent deity, and to increase the divine anger against the destructive powers, by the intoxicating libation. In his moral life he feels himself a combatant against the world-destroying forces of night and confusion (piety, fidelity). And the gods walk, fight, suffer, and rejoice with men. Poetry links the figures of the gods and their doings to charming tales, and makes of them beings of a vivacious personal quality. And philosophy

seeks by thought to fathom the riddle of the world of which the forces of nature are revelations. Thus ethics, poetry, and philosophy have their strongest roots in this religion. But for simple, complete devotion to duty, and for the supremacy of the religious life, there is here no place, — least of all for religious monotheism. What seems to point in this direction (Max Müller) is at bottom the philosophic impulse to grasp the unity of the world, or the effort to win a unitary starting-point for thought, that is, is a scientific or philosophical tendency. The cult, of course, always sees in the single God to whom a ritual act is addressed "the divinity," and the sacrificial prayers very often sound monotheistic. But that does not prevent the devout man on other occasions from extolling another deity just as much. The gods in this religion are primarily individual figures akin to man, of a moral, though a very primitively moral, character. Thus the figures of the gods are easily blended with heroic legend and transformed into heroic figures with heroic fortunes. But it has been impossible for these races to stamp their gods consistently with the idea of the "good," even as far as this was then known. For the character of natural forces which attached ineradicably to the gods, with their caprice, their unbridled desires, and their passionate irresponsible rule, thwarted every attempt to mould them into really ideal moral figures (dissonances).

3. The great gods of the Aryans are the gods of light, that, represented as "fathers" [1] in the style of ancestral religion, rule the bright sky. Their beneficent activity and their conflicts are embodied in the imaginings of a pastoral people to whom the domestic animals are the

[1] *Pitar*, πατήρ, *pater* (*dyaus*, *dies*).

natural symbols of the beneficent (cow). The sacramental blessing of these religions is the life-giving moisture whose granting or denial determines the fertility of the earth. It is often symbolized[1] as an inspiring, soul-elevating draught, and then forms the crown of the cult. The powers hostile to life keep it prisoner; the gods of life set it free. The captive "virgins" are freed by heroes. The nourishment-bringing "cows" (clouds) are untied. The storm-god, armed with lightning and hammer (thunderbolt, Indra's club), dashes in pieces the huge monsters that represent the destructive reign of winter. He is the Scandinavian slayer of the Giants, the Vritahân, the victor over the Titans (Zeus, Indra, Thor). Man feels himself related to the gods. The divine spark lives in him too. His ancestors are of the same race as the fathers of the gods. The mysterious centre of the cult is the kindling and preservation of the sacred fire in house and city. The fallen heroes are with the great gods. Now they appear riding the storm with the storm-god, as Odin's (Indra's) army; again feasting in the castle of the gods (Valhalla), or in the heavenly fields beneath the ocean of the sky (Frau Holle). They may return in new form to earth. Out of the Fountain of Youth the "souls" pass into new-born bodies to new life. The forces of nature become forces of historical life and of culture. They appear as representatives of time and of fate, Parcæ and Norns (Urdhr, Verdhandi, Skuld), as lords of the battle-field (Walkyries), as guardians of the eternal rights of human ordinances concerning family and law (Erinyes), or as representatives of love and of inspiration (Graces, Muses).

[1] *Soma*, nectar, mead, milk, honey. Dionysus. Only through this food do the gods become immortal.

But also all growth and life in nature, in bush and tree, in mountain and wood, in river and spring, is embodied in personal forms. In the great festivals at the two equinoxes are seen the coming to life and the death of the god of light. The cult is independent of priestly castes and of theology. The father of the family is the natural representative of the ancestral cult. The chieftain fulfils himself, or through his servants, the ritual acts by which the divinities of the city or land receive their dues. The cult knows, of course, also elements of penance and the search for reconciliation. But in general it is without any specially marked penitential character, — happy and full of life.

4. The most distinct memory of this stage of religion is probably preserved in the oldest parts of the Rig-Veda, far removed though these hymns are from the actual beginnings of Aryan piety. It sounds distinctly through the theology, epic, legends, and customs of the European races.[1] Of these races the Latin-Sabine has perhaps kept, amid Hellenic-Roman culture, the original religious character most faithfully, in accordance with the native tendency of these tribes toward order, tradition, and conduct, and away from imagination. In the *genii* and the *junones* of the men and the women appears the conception of the divine that fills all life; in the *manes* and *penates*, in the ancestral festivals and halls, in the *indigetes* and *semones*, the memory of the ancestral cult, with special distinctness. The divinities are spread through the world as *dii superi* (*genitales*), *medioxumi*, *aquatiles* (depths of the earth). In the *generaliter confuse invocare* of the divinities and in the enormous number of the divinities (*numina*), really known

[1] Homer, *Nibelungen*, *Shah Nâhmeh*, *Ramayana*.

to almost no one,[1] appears the original indifference to the distinction between the individual deities; and in the cult of the sacred fire, in the solemnities of marriage, in the *mundus* (cave of spirits) of the cities, in the painstaking protection of the rights of each divinity, and in the traditional ritual formulas, the relation of religion to the events and interests of the house and the city is shown in all its strength. The *rex sacrorum*, the pontifices and augurs, show the political character of the piety. Figures like the *larvæ* and *lemures* recall the worship of the dead. So also in the popular piety of northern Germany and in the local cults of Greece the religion of the Edda or of Homer is not to be assumed, but a simple unsystematized worship of life-giving and life-preserving spirits, connected with the worship of ancestors and memories of the home.

[1] Nigidius Figulus and Terentius Varro.

## PART II: CULTURE RELIGIONS

### 15. *The Hamitic Priestly Religions*

1. No race of importance has remained stationary at the stage of primitive paganism, although all the religions of the civilized races preserve vividly the memory of this stage. During it religion cannot attain at all its real development. The divine figures that spring from the life of nature and are indissolubly bound up with it can neither secure nor satisfy man's moral personality over against the world. Hence, wherever the human spirit has reached a higher development, it tries to find in the divinity something standing above the life of nature. But where impressions of the supernatural on the souls of especially qualified men do not exist (revelation, prophets), the development of religious thought cannot transcend nature as such; it must stop where the spiritual life of man, as known by experience, finds its limits. Religion can be developed by the lore and science of the priests into pantheism, by the creative power of poetry into ethical polytheism, by the power of political ideas into a state religion; but what its inmost essence urges it to seek cannot be found here. Only God himself can beget real religion. Only religious genius can give it life.

2. In the lands of ancient civilization, Mesopotamia and Egypt, two religions developed from the mingling of different races and civilizations; religions very different in external form, but akin in many details, above all in the

fact that priestcraft had created from the old local gods a cycle of divinities that were seen in the great processes of nature, especially in the revolution of the heavenly bodies, and that were looked on as revelations of the one divine power ruling in nature. Monotheism, as religion understands it, was remote from both, but their development urged them toward a philosophical monotheism of a pantheistic character. These two religions have naturally, in view of the lively intercourse between the realms on the Nile and the Euphrates, often modified one another and have had a common influence on the civilization of western Asia.

3. The religion that developed, first in the ancient priestly cities of southern Mesopotamia[1] and then chiefly in Babylon, probably owed its chief content, not to Semitic immigrants, but to the earlier inhabitants of the land, in whose tongue and script its oldest documents are couched. Still, the Semites contributed their own religious ideas to this older religion. This religion, therefore, is to be defined as "Hamitic," *i.e.* as arising, not from purely Semitic elements, but from a mixture of the Semitic with a foreign southern civilization. The local cults of the various cities and provinces, with their magic formulas and sacred emblems, were, of course, never fully absorbed by it, nor made impossible by the exclusive worship of one great god. The merging of the old gods into one whole of which they are the separate manifestations, never had, in general, any significance for the religious life of the people, but only formed part of the culture of the priestly class. The ethical element, al-

[1] Telloh, Eridu (Eâ), Agade, Urûk (Sin). Then Uru (Sin and Ishtar). Babylon (Mardûk, Nebo).

though of course not lacking, recedes in this priestly code behind a philosophy of nature.

4. The unity of the life of nature is resolved into three groups of deities (Anu-Anatum, Bel-Belit, Ea-Oannes-Damkina), and is represented by the cult of the seven planets (Ninib = Saturn, Nabu = Mercury, Nergal = Mars, Mardûk = Jupiter, Ishtar = Venus,[1] Sin = Moon, Shamash = Sun), under whose names the old local deities of the great national shrines were still reverenced. The temple towers, rising in seven stages, were dedicated to the cult of these stars. In the relationship of Samdan-Ninib-Tammuz and Ishtar (the hero who is shorn of his strength and the woman who becomes a cruel tyrant), in the death of the god in self-kindled flames, in the Sacæan festival and in the ritual prostitutions, the transformations of the life of nature are reflected in the cult. The great goddess of nature, the symbol of the reproductive powers of the universe, Ishtar-Semiramis (Dido, Omphale), is the real religious centre of the cult. She destroys the reproductive life of nature with which she was connected, when it has reached its culmination,[2] and unites herself with the new deity that has sprung from her, the spouse of his mother. The mystery of sex, the exchange of sex and its dress, the rule and the fiery death of the god (Sacæan festival), here constitute the "mystery" of the cult. In its cosmogony the world springs from the great chaotic universal mother, who "cuts in pieces" Bel, who in his son Mardûk attains a new and

[1] As morning star, the wild slayer of men (Agade, Arbela); as evening star, the sensuous goddess of nature (Urûk, Nineveh).

[2] Samdan-Ninus-Sardanapalus. The lion-slayer, who finally grows effeminate and dies in his own flame (Heracles).

victorious manifestation. In the struggle with the chaotic and destructive power of the universe, Tiâmat (symbolized as a dragon), the timid gods are saved by the young god of light, Mardûk, to whom they give the weapons of the lightning, whom they acknowledge as king, and who as "lord" takes his father Bel's place and slays the dragon. Thus the world of light is born out of a chaotic world of monsters incapable of life. Man has in him Bel's blood, which the Elohim have mixed with earth. In the legend of the great flood, according to which the darling of the gods, Khasis-Adra (Noah and Enoch in one), is saved in a ship and transferred without dying to the abodes of the Elohim, and in the journey of the goddess of life into the land of the dead and her return to the upper world, ancient Semitic elements show themselves that in part passed into Israel's religion. The "descent to Hades" of the mourning goddess is, of course, originally the decline of the vigor of the year, and her return, effected by the gods of light, the rebirth of nature. The bloom and the decay of vegetation are brought into connection with the lower world. The "awakening of the dead" has reference primarily to the gods of the sun and of spring, and takes place by means of the "water of life" in the palace of the goddess of the dead. There dwell the "souls" in the house of eternity (Ishtar's descent to Hades). The religious hymns of the Babylonians and Assyrians recall not seldom the tone of the Biblical psalms,[1] and the conception of royalty as a manifesta-

[1] Hammurabi's inscription: "God, my creator, grasp my arm, strengthen the breath of my mouth, guide my hands, O Lord of Light." — Hymns: "In heaven who is sublime? Thou alone, thou art sublime. On earth who is sublime? Thou alone, thou art sublime. Thy awful command is proclaimed in heaven; the gods cast themselves down. Thy awful command is proclaimed

tion of the deity also recalls Old Testament thought. The ruler who in Babylon at the New Year grasps "Bel's" hand becomes the "son of Bel," the legitimate king. But the facts that the cult is dominated by the worship of the goddess of nature, by the orgiastic and immoral element inhering in this religion, and that the mechanism of nature and its necessity completely outweigh the moral elements, exclude all progress toward true religion. From the point of view of the philosophy of religion the question whether the religion of the northern Semites (Canaanites), especially the Phœnicians, was unique, or influenced by Babylonian and Egyptian elements, has no significance. As to its religious plane, it stood, at any rate, not above the Babylonian. Babylonian speech and culture ruled in Canaan before the Israelites moved in (Tell-el-Amarna letters). In Assyria,[1] Lydia, Armenia, Syria, the direct influence of Babylon can be definitely proved. The pyre of the god, the Sacæan festival, the mourning for the dead god, ritual prostitution, show everywhere the traces of Mesopotamian civilization.

5. The culture religion of the Egyptian priests of the sun arose, like the Chaldean, on the foundation of a

on earth; the genii kiss the ground. Thy awful command: 'Who will instruct me? Who will equal me?' Among the gods, thy brothers, thou hast not thy like." — Nebuchadnezzar's prayer: "To Mardûk, my Lord, I say: O eternal prince, lord of all creatures, for the king whom thou lovest, whom thou callest by name, dost thou watch. . . . I am a work of thy hands. According to thy goodness, God, which thou spreadest over all, . . . kindle in me the love of thy high majesty; let my heart be filled with awe of thy divinity. . . . Give me all that according to thy counsels is good for me." — "Lord, my transgressions are many, great are my sins." "How long wilt thou be angry? When wilt thou say: Peace to thy soul?" "I sigh like the dove, I am bowed like the reed. Tears are my meat."

[1] Ashur and Rammân take their place in the Babylonian pantheon.

very primitive and strongly totemistic popular religion, viz. from the local cults of the various Egyptian cities and provinces, and is, like the Chaldean, the outcome of a long historical development and of a mixture of different tribes. It never had vogue among the people. The latter, on the contrary, clung with tenacious affection to their local gods and their sacred animals; their religion appears, at the close of Egypt's independent history, not spiritualized, but fossilized and vulgarized. The peculiar conditions of the valley of the Nile and its marvellous fertility naturally play a dominant rôle in its myth. Khemi, the black earth, is the blessed land. Hapi, the Nile, to which zealous homage is paid, the counterpart of the river of heaven, is the life-giver to the land that it waters and nourishes, and to which it reveals the blessings of heaven. As early as the old empire, Memphis added to its cult of Phtah a universal Egyptian cult.[1] Much more marked is, in the middle empire (in Thebes and On), the progress toward a consistent ethical and religious development.[2] A theological phase proper, however, the religion had not reached, when, after the expulsion of the Hyksos, the dynasty of the Rameses and the succeeding ones (eighteenth to twenty-first) gave the new empire the character of a religious theocracy. For a time the powerful priests of Thebes wielded a real lordship after the fall of Khu-en-Aten, who, as it seems, tried by violence to transform religion in the direction of a henotheism of the sun-god (disk of the sun, eighteenth dynasty). In this

[1] Phtah is incarnate in the Apis-bull; his symbol is the scarabæus. Beside him stands Tum. Yet even then the cult of the gods of light flourished in On and Abydos.

[2] The labyrinth in Thebes was the meeting-place of all the Egyptian gods. Tum-Ra, the one self-created god, gave it its name.

period of development, under the influence of the priests, the local deities are almost entirely incorporated with Ra as the One, although each went on enjoying his cult at his shrine unchanged. The wealth of the great shrines grew immensely. In the steadily increasing worship of the dead the ancient cults of Ra and of Osiris were blended. The later changes of rulers and developments of cult favored an archaizing and hierarchical rigidity in religion.

6. Even the priestly religion of Thebes, Abydos, and On always presupposes the cults of a countless number of gods. It worships the sacred beasts with which the individual deities are closely connected, and ascribes the highest value to magic formulas and superstitious acts, to secret holy names and the worship of the dead. But still it developed unquestionably, on the foundation of the old nature myths, of worship of the dead, and of a view of nature that was growing scientific, higher theological ideas that were closely connected with the very advanced ethical ideals of the educated class. The individual gods became for the priests so many manifestations of the divinity that found its full expression in the god of light. In the myth of this deity was set forth both the fortunes of man and the transformations of nature. It is true that there lay something dualistic in the struggle of light with the destructive powers, but even the latter are at bottom included in the unity of the life of nature. Osiris and Set are brothers. Hence in prayers and panegyrics of the divinity there are very often phrases that sound monotheistic. Very often "the god" is addressed as the One, Sole, Only, out of whom millions proceed, the first of all things, who exists of himself. Acts are per-

formed in the "name of God." But this One, Divine, is at bottom, after all, nature itself, "the spouse of his mother, the mother of her father, the daughter of her son," that remains the same in all transformations, and is the One in all individual manifestations; who is what she is and whose veil no one lifts (Sais).

7. The basis in nature of this theology is the life of the Nile valley, especially the struggle of the fructifying forces of that region (which are also conceived of as deities of light) with the forces of heat that bring about the death of nature; these also appear as deities of foreign lands and of the salt sea that swallows up the Nile. But on this foundation is presented the struggle of good and evil and the death and victory over death of the human soul — which is one with the divine life. In the rising sun is embodied the omnipotence of the creating spirit that, in itself identical with primeval substance, by an act of will broke through the darkness of the primeval waters and called the world to life. This creating spirit is the same, whether he be worshipped as Amun or as Tum, Osiris-Horus, Phtah. These are all at bottom Ra (the light of the sun). So too in Isis-Hathor-Neith the same reproductive force of the universe appears in various cult forms. The other local gods are subordinated to these divinities proper, as servants, companions, or as brothers and sisters. Osiris is the great beneficent god who fructifies the earth, the son of sky and earth, identical with the sun. His spouse is the thousand-named Isis, the nature-mother. By day he roams, as "soul of Ra," this world; by night he becomes the god of the dead of Abydos "who dwells in the west." What appears as the history of each day is amplified into

a history of nature. When the heat destroys life, then Osiris is slain by his "brother," Set-Typhon.[1] He becomes the god of the dead. But Isis, who has sought him with lamentations, gives birth to the "avenger of his father," Horus, the newly rising sun, the new-born vigor of nature, in whom Osiris is renewed and who slays Set. All this was originally myth belonging purely to the realm of nature and attached to local cults (as in Byblos). But it is made a mysterious expression for the victory of human virtue and for the power of resurrection that conquers death. Horus, "the spouse of his mother," becomes the type of the man fighting for piety and justice. Isis with the Horus child is the first apotheosis of maternity. The Nile is thought of as the beneficent revelation of the great god, and identified with the ocean of the sky, out of which the gods rise. In the king the deity reveals himself as lord and lawgiver. The king is Ra; but as individual he sacrifices before his own image. Hence, not the individual is divine, but the office. The wearer of the sacred double crown of Upper and Lower Egypt represents to man the divine.

8. Souls are (like Osiris) not thought of as dying, but as going into the other world.[2] If they pass the tribunal

[1] Set is an ancient Egyptian god who is later identified with the Baal of the conquering Hyksos. He appears more and more as representative of the powers of ill. Astrologically the Osiris myth is interwoven with the season of the Dog Star. (Phœnix, 1461 years.) He appears as man in the tale of the two brothers, which in many details recalls the narratives of Genesis concerning Joseph in Egypt.

[2] In the oldest times the cult of the dead centred around Kâ, the persisting spectral shade that uses the mummy or statue of the deceased to prolong life and that needs food. In the Theban age the Ba is emphasized, *i.e.* the soul that fails to pass the judgment. At any rate a progress in the ethical sense has taken place here.

of the dead and escape the dangers of the other world, they become Osiris, that is, sharers in the nature of the one divinity. The dead then assume, like the deities, various animal forms and remain connected with the artificially preserved body. Those who do not pass the tribunal fall a prey to destruction. The *Book of the Dead*, preserved in many forms and very ancient in its substance, describes the dangers and trials of the journey in the other world and contains the magic formulas that offer deliverance and protection for this journey. Horus (Osiris) receives the soul as judge in the Hall of the Two Truths. Forty-two judges question it, each concerning one mortal sin. Thot writes the final verdict. The life beyond the grave receives in this religion the greatest attention. On its account the body is guarded from mutilation as a mummy. The great pile up pyramids to protect their graves. This interest in the other world has later taken a peculiar form in the cult of Serapis and strongly influenced ascetic mysticism and the hermits of early Christianity.

The ideal of morality in many ancient inscriptions reminds one of *Job* and the Old Testament *Proverbs*. Wrong and offence toward others, the overburdening of the laborer, slandering one's own servants, deceit, usury, false weights, appear as chief sins in the tribunal of the dead. The deceased boasts: "I have oppressed no one, let no one starve, nor made any weep." "I showed love to my father, reverence to my mother, and was just, to the joy of my brothers." "I have given bread to the hungry, water to the thirsty, clothes to the naked. I have received the rich and also the poor on the street. The gates were open to him coming from without." Yet there is no lack also of sceptical and eudæmonistic utterances. The skull

at feasts was to warn: "Enjoy thyself and remember that no one takes his treasures with him." The song of the "harper" urges to a light and sensual enjoyment of life, "for the day will come when thy voice will not be heard." Just because the cult and the popular religion were untouched by the loftier ideas of the esoterics, these ideas have played no part in the development of human religion. Still they had in them seeds of philosophy, asceticism, ethics, and science. But the deity who is at once the spirit and the body of the All could not become the living God of religion.

### 16. *The Philosophical Priestly Religion of the Hindoos*

1. The peculiar religious mood of the Indo-Germanic nature religions, their strong emphasis of the kinship of the human and the divine, and their joyful pride in man over against the life of nature, led, in the priestly circles of India, to a religion that, having passed from a naturalistic to an idealistic pantheism, views the world as an unhappy illusion and the life of the spirit as the only reality. The popular religion and the ritual hold, it is true, to a mildly fantastic worship of nature, but one very uniquely determined by ascetic and pessimistic ideas. As early as the later parts of the Vedas there appear, instead of the simple hymns of prayer and praise that enlivened the sacrificial worship of the gods of nature, gloomy thoughts on the real essence of the phenomenal world. The poets ask: "On what did He stand when He supported the world? Where are the highest places, where the deepest, where those in the middle, All-completer?" "Was He who supported the six mighty spaces, when still unborn, the One?" They say: "All beings long to

search for Him, far above this sky, this earth, even beyond the living gods. What first germ did the waters receive, in which the gods all appeared together? In the womb of the unborn lay the One, and all beings lay hidden there. Him who begot this ye will never know." "The gods themselves came into being later. Who knows whence this great creation sprang? . . . The highest seer who is in the highest heaven knows it, — or perhaps even he knows it not." They often conceive of the individual gods as identical with one another or as passing over into one another, as the case may be, so that a unitary divine life is assumed in all. "Wise poets represent the bird who is one, in their words, in many ways." "They speak of Mitra, Varuna, Agni; again he is the heavenly bird Garutman; what is one, the sages name in various ways; they speak of Yama, Agni, Matarisvân." "In the evening Agni becomes Varuna. He becomes Mitra when he rises in the morning. As Savitri he moves through the air. As Indra he gives warmth in the midst of the sky." The belief in the "souls" dwelling with the gods, in their return, and in the cycle of existences, was doubtless old among the people. Also the idea that man in worship strengthens and nourishes the gods. To this cult, above all, has a personification of the ritual procedure as the real power over the gods, attached itself. Agni, the hearthfire, the warder-off of harmful powers, who comes as lightning from the sky and, when "begotten" by the priest according to the old sacred ritual, returns as sacrificial flame to heaven, is the mediator between the godhead and man, the one who nourishes and makes possible the gods: "Let thy body grow, All-artist, thou who growest through sacrifice; sacrifice to thyself, to the sky and the

earth." Beside him stand as his attendants Soma, Apris, Bharata, Ila, Svaha, Vâk, that is, the elements of the sacrificial rite. These ritual powers appear as the begetters of the gods (the Mass). And this deification of the cult culminates in Brahma, in prayer in its aspect of power over the gods, whose agents are the Brahmins (increasers).

2. As long as the Aryans of India were a vigorous race of invaders fighting for existence, their religion, in spite of such elements, hardly passed the bounds of the ancient nature religion. The Indian heroes love battle, wealth, and enjoyment and pray for these. Neither the misery of existence nor gloomy reflections on sin and the consequences of guilt have dimmed their joy of life. Not till we come to the centuries in which the Upanishads and the Books of the Law[1] arose do we find the beginning of a really philosophical conception of religion. These show us the people divided into fixed castes. The Sudras, sprung from Brahma's foot (perhaps non-Aryan), are excluded from everything sacred, in contrast with the three "twice-born"[2] castes of Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaiçyas, that are born of Brahma's mouth, arm, and loins. These alone have the right, and also the duty, of being initiated by study and meditation into the true nature of piety. By far the highest of these are the Brahmins. They are, through prayer, the masters of the gods, the sole authorized teachers of the people, exalted far above kings and heroes. Their power lies in asceticism and knowledge of the Veda. The first part of their lives is a long period of stern study, in which they must make themselves masters

[1] Manu's; then Vishnu's, Vasishtha's, Apastamba's, Gautama's.

[2] The enduing with the sacred girdle at the end of their apprenticeship marks the second birth.

of the Veda. Their end, when they have seen the legal fulfilment of the ancestral cult assured by a son or grandson, is withdrawal into complete solitude and heroic asceticism, in which they meditate on the mystery of being and free themselves from the phenomenal world. They are freed from all civic burdens. All honors are open to them. By their favor the gods dwell in heaven. They preserve the world by their prayers. "There are two kinds of gods, the gods in heaven and the gods among men, namely the Brahmins learned in the Veda. The world is in the hands of the gods, the gods in the hands of prayer, prayer in the hands of the Brahmins. So the Brahmins are our gods" (Manu's Laws). The Vedas, from whose no longer understood texts the power of the Brahmins flows, are revered as increate, as Brahma's breath. And those learned in the Vedas and the Laws rule the people by the terrors of conscience. For every existence is the punishment or the reward of the preceding one. Man is the creature of his will. Every man brings with him, merely by his birth into a definite caste, his fate for this life as the result of his conduct in earlier existences. For evil deeds the man is born a mineral or vegetable; for evil words, a beast; for evil thoughts, a man of a lower caste. Lofty virtue can lead to birth as citizen of the heaven of the gods; grave crime, to birth as a creature in hell. By faithful fulfilment of duties and by undergoing the sufferings of his caste, man can, under the guidance of the wise, earn the right to mount upward in a succeeding existence. But as long as the "journey" lasts no one is at peace, no one is assured against sinking into the abyss of misery. The highest goal is not to be born again into this world, but to enter into Brahma.

Dreadful fates await even unconscious violations of law. Hence only the instructions and guidance of the learned Brahmins can save from misery. The Kshatriyas are the warriors and manage the state; the Vaiçyas care for agriculture and trade. The Sudras are born to servitude; only work of the hands beseems them. Any personal contact with them pollutes the highest caste. The great moral laws of veracity, purity, self-control, honesty, and abstinence from intoxicating beverages and from the killing of living creatures (except for hospitality and for sacrifice) hold for all. Along with this the legal books contain an immense mass of regulations concerning food and ritual, burial of the dead and purity, and of ancient prescriptions for the people (*e.g.* the prohibition against younger children marrying before the elder, etc.). The ideas of the old nature religion can often, it is true, be traced even in this developed form, as for instance in the exalted position of the head of a family, in the duty of ancestral worship, in the sanctity of the cow, in the expiatory virtue of planting trees and digging wells, in the ablutions and magic formulas by which guilt is atoned. But the old combative and joyous fashion of piety is changed into a gloomy and weary thing, and the old heroic gods are forgotten, though their names still are repeated mechanically at the altars. The piety of the people is immensely increased, but it renders them unhappy, weary, longing for nothingness. The heroism of the ancient race of conquerors has become a heroic renunciation of the world that shrinks from no sacrifice.

3. In the Upanishads (meditations of hermits) salvation from the evils of life is sought in meditation on the true nature of things, that is, in a spiritual sacrifice. The sage

understands that all creatures exist in God alone. By thus grasping the unity of existence, all illusion and all sorrow vanish. Even Indra says: "I am spirit, thou art spirit, all things are spirit. What I am, the worshipper is; and what he is, I am."

For religious philosophy, therefore, the minor gods, even when ancient, are only beings that, by contemplation and sacrifice, have earned a happier lot than men; that can, however, also sink down again, while man can rise above them. It is beyond these gods that religion seeks the true nature of things. By the way of ritual, through Agni-Brahmanaspati, the god of ritual and prayer, it arrives at the spirit of prayer, the truth of the word, Brahma. In thought it grasps, amid the phenomenal world, real being (the Self), Atma, whose symbol is the syllable Om. But Brahma is Atma. Spirit, Self, ether, light, are one. In the lotus flower of the heart sits Brahma-Atma. The world is the unfolding of the "Self." In measureless æons, in ever new "Kalpas" and new world-forms, the "Self" realizes itself creatively, and it is the law of piety and morality that supports the world. Vishnu, who is ever creating the world anew, is the personified power of religion itself. In Brahma lies the solution of the riddle of the world. The world is the development of Brahma; Brahma, the undeveloped world. In the world-egg lived, by his own power, Brahma, the ancestor of the universe. He has by thought, by willing to pass from unity to manifoldedness, brought forth the world. The farther it is removed from unity the worse is it. And the All, in its separation from the One, is unhappy and strives to get rid of the pain of existence by absorption in the Ego and in the One. He who understands the

true nature of things becomes free. Applied religious thought is what controls the world. But it is easy to see why neither the world-Brahma, nor the god-Brahma artificially personified from it, had any vitality in the popular cult.

4. Every man is the creature of his own will; no one can harm the Self; an iron law, that is at the same time the moral order of the world, forbids escape from the unhappy cycle of births. Whoever is born is sure to die; whoever dies, to be born again. But by grasping in mystic contemplation the unity of one's own being with the Self, one is delivered from the illusion of the world. Hence meditation on the Om (the essential nature of things) is the way of salvation. "When Indra did not understand the Self, the demons overcame him; when he learned it, he overcame them and won the primacy of the gods." The Self penetrates all things, as salt does sea-water. "Om is the bow, Self the arrow, Brahma the target. He who hits becomes one with Brahma." He who understands the Self and says "I am he," can no longer know desire. "When he is freed from every lust of his heart, the mortal enters immortal even here into the Brahma." But only on the basis of a firm resolve of the will and of a resolute, persistent asceticism is this contemplation possible. It does not succeed by the path of easy speculation. The feet on which the Upanishad stands are "penance, renunciation, sacrifice." The Self gives itself only to him who has turned from selfishness and desire. Such freedom from desire as is brought to full perfection in the life of the hermit is saving wisdom. This philosophy is, at bottom, the real content of Buddhism, and ought theoretically of itself to abolish the Vedas and the rights of the Brahmins.

But, in fact, it lets both exist, conceives of both as indispensable conditions of the process of redemption, and so has no popular power. The Buddhism that bursts these limits with prophetic genius, and reveals a Brahminism *κατὰ πνεῦμα* to the "poor in spirit," is the executor and heir of this philosophy.

5. The pantheistic mysticism of the Bhagavad-Gita, in which the incarnate Vishnu [1] reveals "monism," is the most pleasing poetic expression of this philosophy.[2] It has most life in the twenty Vishnu brotherhoods, whereas the Siva and Sakti cults have kept the orgiastic character of a perhaps non-Aryan nature religion (begetting and annihilation). The conception of Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva together, as Trimûrti, is of modern origin (1400 A.D.). In the various philosophical systems, however, that seek to interpret this religion, above all in the Vedanta [3] and Sankhya [4] philosophies, lie ideas that in oriental form have influenced to a certain extent the course of modern occidental philosophy down to Hegel, J. G. Fichte, Schopenhauer, and v. Hartmann.[5] An acosmic monism, with

[1] Krishna, Rama, Gopala. He has also entered on the poetic legacy of the Indra myth.

[2] "He who sees me everywhere and sees all in me, from him I never depart nor does he depart from me." "I myself am at once the source and the dissolution of the whole world. I am fragrance in the earth, and light in the fire, living in all living, renunciation in the renouncer. All this is good, to be sure, but I hold the wise man like myself." "The highest sacrifice am I myself here in the body, good mortal." "The soul is its own friend, the soul also its own enemy. The soul is the friend of the man who conquers himself through her. But by friendship with the unspiritual he becomes his own enemy." "Whoever will honor any god by faith, him I always reward with this constant faith." Ardshuna says: "I see all the gods in thy body, God; and a band of various beings, Brahma the Lord sitting in the lotus cup."

[3] Acosmic monism.

[4] Dualism of matter and spirit.

[5] In all, six orthodox schools.

its logical pessimistic view of phenomenal existence, stands before the mind in a consistent grandeur. But this philosophy lacks a God in whom man can understand and assert himself in his permanent personal significance in the world, a source of eternal life. And hence the recent attempts to develop a national religion on this soil, in place of Christianity, have no prospect of success. This appears in the course that the development of the Brahma-somaj (Society of God) has taken. Founded by Rammohan-Roy (1772–1833), on a conservative plan, with recognition of the Vedas and of caste, it seemed, under the leadership of Keschub Tsundra Sen (born 1838), to be casting off its Hindoo limitations and approaching Christianity. But in 1878 a schism arose, not without fault on the part of its head, so that now a new (Sadharana) Brahma-somaj stands over against the adherents of the old one. The attempts to give new life to the religion of India on a purely national basis have hitherto been confined to this small circle (Bahadur Ragkunâta Rao, Swami Vivekananda, Dajânanda Sarasvati).

## 17. *The Ethical Poetic Religions*

1. On the basis of the original character of the Aryan nature religions and their development among the Germanic peoples, poetry framed a conception that in many points rises above the plane of primitive religion. It is true that its monuments are very young, and perhaps influenced by elements other than nature religion. The religious life that found expression in the cult of this variety of paganism was certainly of a totally different sort. But even in the Edda the old naturalistic popular religion underlies the whole. The struggle of the storm-god of

the sky with the frost giants, the death of the spring sun on midsummer's day, the union of the gods of light with the daughters of the giants (*jötun*), the magic runes, the resurrection of light at Yuletide, the bright and dark elves, the White Women and Walkyries, the birth of the world from the body of the giant Ymir, sprung of ice and fire, the escape of Odin by magic runes from the bonds of chaos (World Ash Tree), the kinship of gods and men, into whom they have breathed soul, mind, and blood, — all this comes from the old nature religion. Even the figures of the gods are of the old type. Not only Loki, Odin's dark brother, but Odin himself, the storm-god, and Thor, the god of the lightning, have the traits of the fierce, passionate forces of a nature bound by no ethical law even as late as the poetry of the Edda.

2. But in Odin, the ideal prince, the wise poet and inventor of runes, in Thor, the type of the bold peasant with his humor and valor, and above all in the bright Balder, we meet ethical figures, judged by the standards of ancient Germanic morality; figures on which the Northman's tide of enthusiastic and admiring love could expend itself. And to the old nature myth of the death and resurrection of light in the changes of the seasons is linked the great tragedy of the end and the renewal of the world. Guilt is the key to the ruin of the gods. In their story is found the first breach of faith. The gods deceived the giant architect that built their castle. The thirst for gold drove them to unjust war with the Wanen. Abusing Gunnlöd's love, Odin stole the mead of inspiration. Gold and culture destroyed innocence. And with the gods fell their world. Faithlessness and disloyalty gain the upper hand in the "age of the axe," and doubt, laming the power of good,

gnaws at the life of the world. Hence an age of conflict. Gods and good men, representing in spite of their sin the principle of order, still fight the powers of evil, the accursed brood of Loki, the powers of the consuming flame and of the all-devouring sea (serpent of Midgard). But the struggle draws to a close. Tyr's right hand is already maimed, Freyr's sword lost, and the darling of the gods, the bright Balder, is sent to the realm of shades by the mistletoe arrow of his blind brother Hodr. Bound by the gods, Loki shakes the earth with an earthquake. The Midgard serpent seeks the land. The Sons of Fire of Muspelheim are ready to throw flames into the world. Eternal justice, reigning over men and gods, hurls the fallen world into purifying fire, fanned by the fierce forces of nature that destroy all life. The last great combat is fought, in which the gods and just men (the Einherjar) fall fighting against the powers of evil. But out of the conflagration of the world (Ragnarok) proceeds a new and transfigured one. The earth rises out of the sea, green and fair, and on it grain grows unsown. Odin appears again with Vali and Vidharr. Balder comes back reconciled to Hodr. Thor's sons, Modhi and Magni (Courage and Power), bring back his hammer. Men, hidden in the World-tree, live with the gods. "Lif and Lifthrasir, morning dew is all their food; with them begins a new race." Thus in this religion, as in the Persian, men feel themselves called on to stand by the gods of light and to be renewed with them after expiation of their guilt. And over the life of nature and its vanity rules a stern and holy law that hurries the stained world to its grave. This religion lifts men above the life and the death of nature. But still it has no real liberating power. The gods are,

it is true, inspiring ideals for the soul of the northern warrior. But they are not world-conquering powers of good. They are contingent, and are themselves involved in the transformations of nature. And the Last and Highest stands above and beyond them, as above men. Hence the fundamental condition for any genuine religion is lacking. Moreover, the whole development is at bottom artificial and has never practically overcome the old non-ethical rudeness of nature religion.

3. In a more perfect form and one of far greater significance for the spiritual history of the world, the poetic and philosophic powers of the Hellenic race created a cycle of religious types outside those local cults of popular religion that are for us of no significance; a cycle that, based on Homer and Hesiod and proclaimed by Pindar, Æschylus, and Sophocles as its prophets, took form in the statues of Phidias and Praxiteles, was spiritualized by the masters of thought beginning with Socrates and Plato, and that even to-day influences our civilization powerfully. Over the gods of the cults and the myths reigns an eternal order, the æsthetic and ethical law of harmony and of measure, before which the insolent forces of nature, the Titans, must sink into the realm of shades, and the arrogant races of Tantalus and Laius are brought to the bar. In Heracles the figure typical of human struggle for the good of the world is elevated to the ranks of the gods. In the mirror of poetry the local deities are gathered into one admirably composed group of gods, of which many pass into heroic legend as demigods and heroes. The divine is exhibited in their several figures, like light in the colors of the spectrum, as the law of a harmony and a beauty that are good in themselves. The stern ethical vigor of the

northern religion appears here, it is true, in a weakened form. But the chief figures of this group of deities, created by the most æsthetically gifted race of antiquity, are sublime and noble enough. Zeus, as Pindar and Sophocles sang him and as Phidias moulded him, the father of the world at whose side stand Themis and Metis, and who obeys the Moira from an inner necessity, and beside him Athene, Apollo, Asclepius, and the foam-born goddess of beauty, are the ruling figures of this fair world. The wisdom of Delphi proclaimed them the most effectually; the great festivals, above all that at Olympia, as the presentation and consecration of physical and mental vigor and beauty, were their noblest cult, in which the old character of worship of the dead was wholly forgotten. In Achilles and Odysseus poetry created the ideal man. The old nature spirits are transformed into Graces and Muses, or into guardians of morals and piety, as Erinyes and Eumenides. Sophocles refers to the "unwritten" ordinances of the gods. Pindar and Æschylus point out to human ὕβρις that the life of mortals is a dream, a smoke, a shade. And in countless forms is pictured the victory of noble harmony over the rude forces of nature. Hector, who "knows but one omen, to save his country," and Antigone, who declares that she lives "not to share hatred, but to share love," can vanish from the spiritual possessions of civilized man as little as can the figure of Prometheus, who for the sake of man bears the wrath of the gods, or the Dorian hero Heracles, who fights the fierce forces of evil, the happy hero who ascends among the gods. The tragic pictures of unrestrained passion — Niobe amid the fearful ruin of the happiness of which she has been too proud, the demonic Medea, the house of

Atreus, self-destroyed — have even to-day through their poetic veil true religious power. And the idealistic philosophy of Plato and the Stoics, although no mere child of this religion, shows what a power for evolving thought and faith slumbered in the intellectual world of the Greeks.

4. But the old nature deities of the Aryans were by themselves inadequate for the pure expression of the beautiful and good. The fierce lust and the rage of the forces of nature, transferred to figures conceived of as ethical and personal, falsified the picture of the good and fair and had a demoralizing effect on the fancy of the people. With the sublime figure of the father of the gods at whose frown Olympus trembled is blended the insatiable passion for love and enjoyment of primitive life. And the god of light, who drives the chaotic powers of night from which he is sprung back into their gloomy realm, becomes the rebellious son who hurls his father into Tartarus. The patient hero of virtue, Heracles, is still the nature deity, subject to unbridled desires and destroying rage. The goddess of beauty and charm is at the same time the symbol of unbridled lust and sensual pleasure. Not only the Christian apologists have felt this and made it the theme of their mockery; Plato too (*Republic*) has with solemn earnestness bade keep this motley world of gods afar from his ideal world. And the satire of the poets from Aristophanes to Lucian shows how little power these divinities had to reënforce true religion. Mere æsthetic feeling cannot rouse the sleeping conscience nor heal the sick one. The divine was revealed to the Greeks as beauty, but not as a Holy Spirit and a power of pardon and newness of life. To such deities a noble human soul could neither surrender itself nor gain from them power

over the world. The personal element in the tales of the deities and their strongly individualized statues made all really religious monotheism impossible. And when the later Stoics and then Neoplatonism tried to transform these deities into powers serving the one great God,[1] this artificial purification was in fact an abolition of the old religion, and too little popular and too tardy to be able to set loose really new religious forces. All that is of permanent worth for the world of human thought in the philosophy of the Greeks is hostile to and destructive of popular religion; it is born, not of religious power, but of theoretical interest in the riddle of existence. The philosophy of the Greeks has created physics (metaphysics, ontology), ethics, and logic, but has founded no religion.

The Greek spirit has therefore had an essentially dissolvent and irreligious effect on the nations that came under its influence. The ethics of Greece transcends, it is true, the slavish and legal type of morality in its effort after a beautiful and harmonious development. But it is at the price of the categorical character that true religious ethics possesses. Beautiful moderation is a very elastic limit for evil. The religious feeling of the Greeks shrank from Titanic arrogance and barbaric excess. But springs of pity for others' woe, of sympathy with poverty and weakness, of recognition of the dignity of man even in the barbarian, or of inward purity, have not flowed from this fair world of gods. True love, real repentance, condemnation of the flesh, and the vital longing for redemption find in it no support. For the wounds and pains of life there is here a veil, but no medicine. The best morality in Greece

[1] Xenophanes, Anaxagoras, Metrodorus, Prodicus, Epicharmus, show the beginnings of such a reinterpretation. Euhemerus humanizes the gods.

has arisen outside of religion or in opposition to it (Plato to the Stoics). Hence early Christianity felt itself the foe of Greek religion and did not see that one side of the revelation of the divine has nevertheless found imperishable expression in the world of thought and fancy of the Olympian religion. The Christianity of the present can understand and appreciate the immense significance of the Greek spirit, even the religious, for human progress. We see that it was only through contact with the Greek spirit and Greek culture that the religious spirit of the Hebrews became capable of producing a universal religion for the civilized races; that "Japhet must dwell in the tents of Shem." But primitive Christianity could not feel so. As religion the world of the Greek gods was doomed to destruction, to live in art. The Greek world itself, even before it turned to Christianity, turned away dissatisfied from the gods of Olympus and sought satisfaction in mysteries and foreign cults. Alongside of the mysteries of Eleusis, the secret cults of Mithras and of Isis flourished in the world of Greek and Roman civilization. Or it turned with scorn and unbelief from popular faith, and sought a substitute in spheres of philosophic thought that were not, as in India, children of religion, but born of opposition to it.

### 18. *Ethical State Religions*

1. The intertwining of religion with the large interests of society and the state is common to all culture religions, just as all primitive religions are based on the interests of the family and the clan. But of all Occidental races the Romans have, in accordance with their instinct for purpose and order, most completely developed the religion proper

of their realm in this direction, starting from the nature cults of Italy which survived among the common people. The peculiar piety on which Rome's greatness rested, as even its Greek admirers justly said, is essentially identical with the reverence for law and custom, with the discipline and capacity for devotion, that constituted the core of Roman civic virtue. Organized worship was a part of the constitution of the state. Even penal law had a religious coloring (*sacer esto*). Conscientious and reverent observance of the dues of the deity, shrinking from no sacrifice, but without æsthetic or theological interests and of no emotional depth, characterizes the *religio* of the best age of Rome.[1]

2. The countless divinities of this religion corresponded to the various forces on which the physical and historical prosperity of a land is built or by which it can be endangered. Only a few, like Varro, attempted any actual survey of this swarm of deities. Figures like Salus, Victoria, Honos, Virtus, Bonus Eventus, Clementia, Fides, Pax, Libertas, Fortuna, Concordia, Pudicitia, had their cults and their shrines. But also powers like Pavor, Pallor, Febris, Bellona, etc. Alongside of these the noble families honored in their ancestors the greatness of their houses. The state did not intrude on this right nor on the religious functions of the *curiæ*, etc., but it supervised them through the pontifices. Rome's own greatness was seen and adored in Jupiter *optimus maximus rex*, and the dignity of woman on which the prosperity of society rests in Juno. When the state became a monarchy, the *genius* of the emperor naturally represented the divinity of Rome to which subject nations must do homage. To the welfare

[1] *Dis te minorem quod geris imperas* (Horace).

of Rome were directed the ancient punctilious rites, festivals, and spectacles. To it heroes sacrificed themselves by voluntary death. In order to doom the foe to the infernal powers, Curtius and the Decii dedicated themselves to the gods of the dead. And heroic legend and mythology were summed up in the glorification of the origin and the future of Rome. Thus here love of country and legality coincided with religion and produced a people of incomparable excellence and endurance. In its character of universal empire Rome's devotion tolerated also foreign cults. A later age blended, in poetry and mythology, the Roman religion with the much-admired world of Greek gods. But Greek genius had a dissolvent effect on this inartistic race. Rome's own religion was well adapted to strengthen civic feeling and valor; but it was also inextricably bound up with all the horrors of conquest and with all the brutal egotism of a conquering despotism. It perished with the rule of Rome. But its spirit descended to the papal church.

3. In the remote East, on the basis of the Turanian nature religion of spirits, the union of religion and civic life was wrought out in a still more logical fashion by Cong-tse (Confucius), who, not as prophet or philosopher or poet, but as practical rationalistic teacher, statesman, and collector of ancient popular wisdom, brought what the peculiar character of the Chinese people and state had long been aiming at to completion (551–478 B.C.). Although apotheosized, his figure stands out pretty distinctly in history. He saw in popular wisdom and its ancient monuments (Kings),[1] above all in the wisdom of the Prince

[1] Yi-King, Shu-King (books of history partially destroyed in 213), Shi-King (songs), Li-Chi (rites), Tchun-tsieu, — Hsiâo-King (filial duties, by Cong-tse himself ?).

of Châu (Wân dynasty), the expression of the same unswerving reason that the laws of nature, and above all of the sky, reveal. The golden mean, the calm of the law-abiding sage, is for him the ideal. In its fidelity to ancient customs, the life of the people is to be the reflection of this eternal reason. If such is not the case, relaxation of law shows itself even in nature in catastrophes and physical ills. Cong-tse in his innermost being was a moralistic, non-religious, and unphilosophical nature. He says: "It is a long time since I prayed." And he confesses: "I do not know life; how can I, then, know death?" And he has stamped these traits on the piety of his race. Furthermore, he is firmly convinced that right instruction and good laws can infallibly and in a short time make man virtuous and the state happy.

4. Originally Heaven was worshipped in China as the greatest among the many nature spirits adored in the popular cult. It was the Great Emperor (Shang-ti). And in external form it has remained so ever since Cong-tse. Cong-tse takes in every way the point of view of the conservative Chinaman. But Heaven, which as late as the Shu-King was a living, acting, personal being, is no longer looked on as personal. The rationality of the world-order is seen in it. It has no voice and no inclination toward or from individuals. It is revealed in the phenomena of nature. Heaven, earth, and man must be in accord, else the order of the world is overthrown. But man alone stands free and self-conscious over against this order. He has the world-reason (*tao*) in his soul. He is also alone responsible for this order not being disturbed. By nature he is good, but he must assert the good disposition of his reason over against obscurations and temp-

tations. To this end the state and penal laws can and must work. They are the reflection of the order of Heaven. The emperor is the Son of Heaven. His office is intrusted to him by Heaven. The state, especially the emperor, is hence responsible that law and order be restored. If physical ills show that the harmony of the world is disturbed, the emperor must regard himself as guilty and do penance. The ways of Heaven are not unchangeable. Its fates can be averted, but not what one has brought on himself. The omnipotence of the state rests on its agreement with the eternal ordinances of reason, not on individual caprice. Even revolt may be a duty. For Heaven has no predilection for any special dynasty, but for right and order. If the emperor transgresses the great ordinances of the state, the officials must oppose him in the name of reason.

5. The order of nature enters into society in omens and dreams, in prodigies and natural phenomena, above all in the calendar. Agriculture is universal reason applied to the treatment of nature, and hence the most sacred profession, in which even the emperor takes part by guiding the plough, and the empress by spinning silk. New Year's Day is the greatest festival. This originally living cult has faded to mere symbols (sacrifice of gilt paper), and the old spirits of nature survive now only in the fancy of the people. Only the worship of ancestors, especially that of the imperial ancestors, who are looked on as spiritual rulers, has preserved an inextinguishable vigor, and in ethics filial piety is the most striking and the most pleasing trait. Marriages are concluded and courts are held before the ancestors. Unfilial children are regarded as more detestable than great criminals. On the death of

parents, the period of mourning lasts twenty-five months.[1] A high official superintends ceremonies. Instead of priests there are teachers; instead of temples, memorials of virtue; instead of prayers, ascetic practices and penance, homage to the order of the state, and execution of penal law. The fundamental trait in morals is honesty and observance of law. Gentleness, patience, peaceableness, and reasonableness are the chief virtues of private life. Music is considered the best means of attuning the soul to the harmony of the heavenly order and of improving wayward hearts. Hence Cong-tse laid the greatest emphasis on the cultivation of the good "old" music in opposition to musical innovators. Hence there rules in China a moral rationalism, with no living consciousness of God, — one put at the service of the bureaucratic state. This rationalism has come to a peaceful, and in some degree friendly, understanding with Buddhism, which has been stripped of its original brilliant paradox. The two never come in conflict. The dreams of Jacobin sentimentality of 1794 are here realized in a history covering thousands of years. But religion as such is a faded wraith. All its peculiar functions have become forms that have lost their original life. The logical state religion is but the richly adorned grave of religious life. It can end only in omnipotence of the state, in lifeless ceremonies, and in the dismal tedium of a commonplace rationalism. The classic philosophy of the Chinese, Taoism (Laotse), has no independent significance for the history of religion.

[1] Hence, the position of the present empress-mother is entirely normal from the Chinese point of view.

# PART III: PROPHET RELIGIONS

## (*a*) On Aryan Soil

### 19. *The Reformation of the Aryan Religion of Light (Dualism)*

1. Neither priestly philosophers nor poets nor statesmen have been able to guide religion toward its true development. Only when it calls forth in souls endowed with religious genius so powerful and unique a sense of its reality that their religious life takes that of others captive and carries it on with it toward a goal, can religion perfect itself. Where that happens we speak of prophet religions. And we do not primarily inquire whether this sense of the divine is a pure and true revelation. The main thing is, that such religions spring from overwhelming religious experiences of personalities endowed with religious genius. In them the founders always constitute, directly or indirectly, the main content of the religion, because the way in which they experience the divine is decisive for the community.

Now it is true that very different views may be held concerning the limits of the right to this designation. Whether the religion of the Avesta is really a prophet religion or only a culture religion developed by the priests, and how far an historical Zarathustra is essential to it, is very dubious. And in the same way Buddha can be looked on as originally only one of the circle of philosophical

ascetics who developed Brahminism. So that perhaps the term "prophet religion" ought to be limited to Semitic soil, where it unquestionably belongs to the Old Testament religion and to Islam. But, nevertheless, the Persians have had a consciousness of God sharply marked off from the piety of their fellow-clansmen, and have traced it back to the personality of Zarathustra. And Buddha has, in fact, influenced the piety of millions by the peculiar religious life of his personality. Hence it may be permissible to characterize these religions of Aryan origin also as prophet religions, even though we recognize fully their difference from the Semitic prophet religions.

2. The sacred literature of the Persians was not edited until the age of Sassanides, when it was increased by younger additions. But if it is compared with the inscriptions of the Persian kings, with Greek statements,[1] and the younger material with the older,[2] we get a pretty distinct impression of this religion. It has plainly not been everywhere the same as the national religion that flourished under the first Persian kings. At least it would be then unintelligible that Cyrus should have confessed himself the adorer of the gods of Babylon, or condemned Crœsus to death by fire, or that Darius in his inscriptions assumed a burial of the dead. The two forms were, however, unquestionably very closely akin. But the real Avesta reli-

[1] Herodotus, Pausanias, Plutarch. (Theopompus.)

[2] The sacrificial hymns (Yaçnas), of which the five Gathas are the oldest, the Vendidâd (laws and myths, in part very ancient), and the Vispered, form the part cast in the ancient tongue. This tongue is not identical with old Persian proper, but a separate dialect. Of the books in the later Persian dialect (Pahlevi) by far the most important is the Bundehesh, which, on comparison with the older works and with Greek reports, proves to be a very faithful reproduction of the ancient religious documents.

gion was probably founded by the non-Persian Magi, and came from Media. Raghae is the ancient sacred mountain of the successors of Zarathustra. It was first generally introduced by Artaxerxes Longimanus, and at the restoration of the Sassanides became the state religion, even though the Arsacide, Vologoses I, Nero's contemporary, was among its confessors. It goes back to Zarathustra, the friend of King Gustasp (Hystaspes), 1000 B.C. And since Zarathustra appears even in the Gathas as a real human figure, the historicity of this tradition is probable. In the later writings he is, it is true, a wholly divine being, the helper of Ahuramazda, and his revelation. Sacrifices were made to his *genius*. The evil spirit flees at his magic words.[1]

3. Its origin was probably not due to conscious opposition to the old Aryan nature religion that was turning into Brahminism. On the contrary, it appears as a further development and reformation of this, while retaining the greater part of the existing material. The religious forms and expressions of ancient India recur in large numbers, as for instance, Yama-Yimi, Soma-Haoma, Vritahan-Verethragna, Mithras, Agni, Varuna. So also the sacred production of fire from the "wood" by friction, the ritual use of the sacred girdle and the holy boughs, of bundles of grass, of cow urine, etc. And if in the use of the name Asura as divine name, and of Daeva for evil spirits, there seems at first glance to lie a clear opposition to Hindoo thought, this arises only from the later Hindoo use. In ancient times, even by the Hindoos, the word *Daêva* was used indifferently (= δαίμων) and Asura was a divine name. The further development may have taken place gradually in

[1] Yaçna, 9, 12. Vendidâd, 19.

priestly circles. But probably some creative religious genius has been the determining factor; for what the Persian religion expresses far transcends the thought of other priestly religions. In it the nature deities became the spirit army of the great light-god who is the good. God's attributes were transformed into living forces that work redemption in the soul. Heaven and hell took on a spiritual character. In short, the nature religion, with its countless deities, became the religion of the one good light-god, who reveals himself in all the forces of life, and comes off victor in the struggle with his opponents. Piety became the devotion of the soul to the good, to help build the realm of the good. And it was not a question of ethical philosophic devotion to a self-chosen ideal, but of believing religious love for the personal world-ruling good.

4. God, in the religious sense, is here One, Ahuramazda, the ancient god of the bright sky. Around him stand the seven spirits of good (Amesha-Çpentas), his first creation.[1] Although the popular cult might appeal to them by the ancient names, they are nevertheless no longer gods alongside of the one God. The latter has created them, as he has all good. He then created first of all man for good thoughts, words, and works, then the elements (fire, water, earth), that hence are to be held sacred, the wholesome trees, and the good beasts. Among these, alongside of the cow that has ancient sanctity among the Aryans, stands out with special prominence the dog, perhaps on the basis of ancient mythical conceptions of the "dogs of the storm-god," but also as the friend of shepherds and hunters. His injury is punished almost more

[1] Good Thoughts, Sanctity, Lordship, Humility, Health, Obedience, Purity.

severely than that of men.[1] He is the guardian of the dead against demons and the sentry on the bridge of immortality. In this direction religion sees in the world the pure revelation of God. But the world of reality is a world of conflict, not merely of conflict in nature in the sense of the old Aryan religion, but also of the moral conflict of good-light-life with evil-darkness-death. And this conflict the Avesta conceives of as one involved in the original nature of things. Over against the good God there exists the destructive spirit of negation (Angrô Mainyus), also eternal. For the attempt to deduce both principles from a higher unity, from "eternal time" (Zrvân Akarana), is the speculation of a later generation. The destructive spirit has existed from the beginning alongside the life-giving one, as Loki beside Odin, Set beside Osiris. The aboriginal ideas of nature religion are here everywhere in evidence, especially the Aryan conception of the old "cloud and ocean serpent." Nature exists only in the conflict of aboriginal powers. The evil spirit has also his army of evil spirits (Daeva and Drujas[2]) that grow by sin and sickness. Of them spring the noxious beasts[3] and plants and the ills of life. Above all, death and deceit are his element. Not to serve him and his spirits, to fight them by destruction of their works, is the chief religious duty of the "Mazda-Yaçnas." Thus religion is, to be sure, unable to rise above irreconcilable elements of nature to the conception of a God who is absolute master of the world. But only to the One, nevertheless, is homage paid. And

[1] Singular is the exaggerated position of the "water-dog," the beaver. The cock, too, is rated very high.

[2] Winter, Deceit, Anger, Lies, Poverty, Darkness, Lust, Pride, Contempt, Sickness, etc.

[3] Snakes, flies, scorpions, vermin, etc.

in eschatology the good God is looked on as victor over the evil one.

5. The ethical and the natural are not yet clearly distinguished in this religion. As important as moral duty, whose heart is truthfulness, are countless ordinances that belong to the sphere of nature and have no connection at all with the inner life. And both in the practice of the people and in the sacred books, the ceremonial elements quite outweigh the moral ones. An endless succession of purifications, washings, and magic formulas fills the Avesta. The care of the "good" beasts and plants and the extermination of the "evil" ones appear as chief merits. Careful avoidance of all defilement of the elements by anything impure, above all by anything "dead" that has fallen a prey to the powers of destruction, forms an essential part of piety and leads (*e.g.*) to the well-known custom of giving the dead a prey to birds in the "towers of silence," a custom that is still observed by the Parsees. Furthermore, the religious community is a physically limited one. Iran is "the first created land"; Turan, the land given over to the evil one. At the same time the cult of "spirits" opens the way for polytheism. The Mithras cult, with its mysteries and the worship of Anahîta, have made the popular religion since Artaxerxes Longimanus more and more like the Asiatic nature religions. And the spiritual God is still held and limited by the bonds of nature (dualistic). Hence the path to God leads essentially through natural forms, and the means of serving him rightly consist, not only of morality and piety, but chiefly of sacred formulas that have power over the evil one, and of sacrifices, without which God becomes weak. Ancient lyric and liturgical formulas, such as the *Aschem Vohû* and the Gatha

*Ahuna Vairya* (mostly only panegyrics of the good and of purity), appear as victorious spells over the evil forces approved in early times and used by Zarathustra. Strange rites of purification taken over from the old nature religion maintain themselves with indestructible vigor (cow urine). And the old Aryan view of the world lives on in a motley world of myth. The sacred hymns sing of the heavenly waters that flow from Hukairyo into the lake of Vouru-Kasha, and of Mithras, who dashes the Daeva in pieces with his club. The cosmological tales of the Bundehesh have plainly arisen from the ancient Aryan ones. In six works (in a year) the world was created. In "Paradise" stands the tree of immortality, Gaokerena, the tree of the white Haoma. By it dwell Mashya and Mashyana, the first man and woman. In the sky-ocean, Vouru-Kasha, grows the tree All-seed. The bull represents the fructifying rain. The cloud-snake is the symbol of the evil principle that is hostile to life.

6. Most purely religious is the eschatology and the philosophy of history of the Parsees, concerning which, however, we possess only secondary sources out of the age of the Sassanides. The first period of the world (three thousand years) was a golden age. Evil was bound by the spell Ahuna Vairya. Man (Yîma) was happy. In the second period Ahriman raised himself one-third of the height of the sky, descended to earth as a serpent, and seduced men to falsehood and to worship of the Daeva, by which sensuality gained control over them. Yîma would not preach the law and fell by deceit; and then began the struggle between the powers of evil and the revealers of Ormuzd, Thraêtona, Kareçâçpa, and the greatest and most victorious of them, Zarathustra. By him the

victory of the good was won in principle. The last age will come when Ormuzd shall triumph, when, miraculously born of the seed of Zarathustra hidden in Lake Kasâwa, the deliverer (Sosyosh, Çaoshyanç) shall appear, when the old dragon shall be destroyed and the world purified. Meanwhile individual men come at death, escorted by their good or evil deeds, to Paradise or to the penalties of hell. The good man's soul lingers three days by the head of the corpse and enjoys there as much delight as all the living together. Then it passes over the mountains of Hara and the Chinvât bridge, by good thoughts, words, and works, to the eternal light. In the fields of Paradise it is met by a charming maiden, who says: "I am thy life, thy good deeds." The souls of the wicked experience the opposite of all this.

## 20. *Buddha. The Prophet's Reformation of the Brahminic Priestly Religion* (*Pessimism*)

1. As an historical personality, Buddha has doubtless resembled the other teachers and ascetics whom the priestly religion of India has produced in the most various forms, and seems in no way to have stood in sharp opposition to the recognized sages of his age. His doctrine assumes a metaphysic and a mythology such as had long existed on Indian soil. But he was distinguished from the other sages of India by one of those "great thoughts that spring from the heart." He has, in fact, by the moral and religious genius of his personality, burst the limits of the older religion and pronounced the final verdict on the Aryan nature religion. The nature deities, possessing no real power over the world, cease for him to have any significance for religion, and the human spirit that understands

its own true being becomes lord of the world and of the gods. The founder of the Jainas must have been most nearly akin to him.

2. Buddha and his life are known to us only in legends, in which he is already an object of worship and a miraculous being.[1] According to the later legend, he is living, after having blamelessly completed countless lives, in the heaven of the gods, freed from the unhappy cycles of existences. Out of redeeming love he is once more born as prince.[2] His birth is miraculous. Prophecy greets the new-born child and promises that he shall be a ruler of the world or its deliverer. In order that the former lot may be his, he is bred in splendor and happiness and guarded from all knowledge of human misery. Then he accidentally meets Old Age, Sickness, and Death, who reveal to him the inevitable woe of existence, and he sees in a hermit the victory over the phenomenal world. The spirit of his calling comes upon him and drives him from his father's house. He cuts off his princely locks and exchanges his royal robe for a beggar's cloak. Thus he leaves parents, wife, and child and seeks the solution of the riddle of the misery of existence. First he tests the wisdom of the sages and the renunciation of the ascetic. But he finds no salvation for the world there. The truth dawns on him when he has renounced the old ways and overcome the severest temptations. Under the sacred Bo-tree he withstands the last and mightiest assault of the tempter (Mara), who tries to induce him selfishly to win

[1] Lalita-Vistara, Buddh. Sutr. xi. 46. (Almost like the embodiment of a nature myth.)

[2] Shuddhodana of Kapilavasttha and Maya are his parents. His name is Siddhartha; later, as preacher, Gautama; as ascetic, Sakhya Muni; as illuminator, Buddha.

deliverance from existence for himself alone. Mara's bolts, before which the gods flee, fall like rose leaves at his feet. He recognizes himself in all the forms of existence that he has passed through. So he becomes enlightened (Buddha) and the preacher of redemption. According to the older tales he appears in northeastern India as teacher of wisdom, and collects around him, without strife with other teachers, and with no claim of miracles, a society of monks, and in advanced age, probably between 480 and 460 B.C., dies a natural death. His doctrine became the ruling religion through Açoka, the grandson of Chandraguptas (256 B.C.). In India proper it vanished in the seventh century A.D., before the restoration of Brahminism and the Moslem conquest. In Ceylon, Further India, Thibet, China, Japan, it still reigns, although much mingled with other religions and not very vigorous. Its canon (Tripitaka) of Vinaya, Dhamma, Abidhamma (rites, morals, metaphysics) has come down in many languages. The northern, written in Pali, is the most valuable. Genuine old memories are probably contained only in the Sutras of the Dhammapada. Everywhere now Buddha is the centre of the cult. The preacher of atheism has become a god. His relics form the most sacred possessions of Buddhist piety. In the temples stands his statue, with an expression of gentle happiness on its features. The countless "gods" of popular fancy humbly encircle the figure of the saviour of the world. The rites are essentially a panegyric of his virtue and a proclamation of his gospel.

3. Buddhism, like the wisdom of the Brahmins, seeks liberation from the unhappy cycle of the phenomenal world, whose motive power is the law of recompense.

And its view of the world differs only at certain points from that of the Sankhya philosophy. The fundamental idea of Buddhistic philosophy is not being, but becoming. But whereas, according to Brahministic teaching, redemption is possible only by ascent within the castes, in Buddhism it becomes possible for every being that understands its true welfare. By this the castes are abolished from within, without Buddha, as it seems, having actually opposed and rejected them. "As the four rivers on falling into the Ganges lose their names as soon as their waters are mingled with the sacred stream, so all who believe in Buddha cease to be Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaiçyas, Sudras." And whereas an aristocratic secret lore (knowledge of the Veda) and an asceticism impossible to the common man seem to the Brahmins the sole means of deliverance (ἔργα and γνῶσις), here faith in a simple gospel intelligible to every child saves (the four Truths).[1] By this the mysteries of Vedic lore and the pride in secret esoteric knowledge is banished from religion forever. Buddhism can take its place as a world religion.

4. The four Truths are: (1) Pain is the necessary accompaniment of every existence; for there is no being, but only becoming (Samsâra). Everything is and is not, is at once eternal and non-existent. Change is eternal.[2] From heaven to hell all is transitory, and hence comes woe. There is no happiness but calm. (2) Pain arises from the impulse to existence, from passion, desire for happiness in the world of the senses. No god drives beings into

[1] In the actually existing state of things the resemblance to the relation of Christianity to Pharisaism is undeniable.

[2] "Change, O disciples, has its beginning in eternity. No beginning can be known." "More tears have flowed than all the water that is in the four great oceans." (Seed, tree, fruit, seed. Egg, hen, egg.)

existence, but their own will and the logic of their own acts (Karma). It is not man's soul that survives in death, but the result of his past life. The "self" remains the same through all change. But it cannot be represented by itself. It exists only like salt in sea-water. Hence only "the self" can free itself.[1] (3) The suppression of the passion for existence can abolish pain. (4) Knowledge can abolish passion. Not indeed scientific or philosophic knowledge, but the knowledge through religion of the illusoriness of existence. This knowledge that leads to peace (to Nirvana) is the sole theme of Buddhist preaching.[2] But it is possible only as a practical conviction. It arises only on the basis of moral self-discipline and purification. He who "believes in Buddha," *i.e.* takes this gospel into his life, has passed beyond castes, philosophy, and good works. He has come to know the master architect. "Thou shalt not build the house again." He is an Arhat, master of all worlds and endowed with miraculous powers. But if he feels the omnipotent redeeming love for his fellow-creatures, he becomes a Bodhisatta and may in a future age, as a new Buddha, preach the gospel that has been forgotten. For Buddhism assumes that there have always been Buddhas and always will be new ones. Hence an almost limitless tolerance is possible. Wherever anything like the doctrine of redemption is believed, a Buddhist can see a perhaps half-forgotten teaching of former Buddhas. Thus, for example, in the presence of Christianity: "The doctrine is the same, only

[1] "Self is the lord of self. Who else should be lord?"

[2] "The wise man no longer takes part in disputations. He is calm among the disturbed, and seeks no further knowledge." "To cleanse oneself of all impurity, as a goldsmith purifies silver."

the interpretation is different." In the present age, according to Buddhist doctrine, four deliverers have already appeared, of whom Sakhya Muni was the last. The fifth will be the last saviour, Metteya. But the same is repeated in the countless ages that are ever born anew. At bottom the Buddhas are, of course, only guides. They set the "wheel of doctrine" in motion anew. Every creature must redeem himself. He who has quenched the lust of existence by right knowledge is happy and at peace.[1] He has already passed from Samsâra to Nirvana and is certain at death to enter into Nirvana. Buddha himself has not defined this idea more precisely. Nirvana can be understood as a life above existence or as complete extinction. It means in itself "extinction," "as a lamp goes out" (Sutta Nipata, 39). The milder theory thinks of the extinction of the sensual impulse toward life and of unhappy worldly existence. But without doubt the complete cessation of individual existence is the real logical consequence of the system.[2]

5. The Buddhas themselves can save no one. They can only, as guides, call the truths of redemption to a living consciousness in men. And the gods can, to be sure, give worldly gifts, but not salvation. Hence a cult is excluded of itself, for in a cult man aims at attaining salvation. But religion fills up this gap by the cult of the Buddha, though to be sure it is only an extolling of his virtues. The spirit that has freed itself becomes god, and Nirvana,

[1] "We live in great joy, sound among the sick." "With no wish for the pleasant, nothing is unpleasant to us."

[2] One can remember that the Ζωὴ αἰώνιος in John has also at once an eschatological and religious meaning. All the clearer is the diametrical contrast of the two views of the world. The Ζωή is the strongest possible affirmation, Nirvana, the emphatic negation, of existence.

more or less positively conceived, becomes the highest good. Buddha, Dhamma (the law), and Samgha (the church, *i.e* the *perfecti* of Buddhism, the monks) form the Buddhist trinity. That the religious needs of the people have created substitutes for the real God, like the old world-creating Buddha of the Mongols, is natural. In Thibet there reigns a form of Buddhism that reminds us in many ways of Roman Catholicism and has been perhaps directly influenced by Christianity. Tsong-Khapa, the reformer of Thibetan Buddhism, did not appear until the fourteenth century, when through monks and political emissaries news of the Catholic church had long penetrated into the interior of Asia. The resemblances are so great that the Catholic priests Huc and Gabet (to be sure, not very critical) believed in a diabolic imitation of Christianity. In the great monastic cities, in whose heads new incarnations of Buddha are honored, especially at Lhassa, the residence of the Dalai Lama, they found stoles and mitres in use, censers and tonsure, crosiers and rosaries, confession and holy water, sacred pictures and relics. Prayer has here become mechanical. Ingeniously constructed prayer-mills, driven by wind or by water, show the divinity as they turn the old Indian invocation written on a roll of paper: *Om mani padme hum.* Monasticism and its support by alms seem in almost all Buddhist regions the main affair of religion. The monks (lamas) are the real "church" of Buddhism. They live in spiritual communities of many thousands. And in the southeastern regions of this religion every man must for a while choose the monk's life. It is the honor and joy of the laity to fill the monk's begging bowl. Buddhaghosa's parables are essentially "monkish fancies" (500 A.D.). For women

original Buddhism has the saying: "Look not on them; speak not with them."

6. The ethics of this religion knows no exaggerated self-torment, although, of course, the extinction of the passion for life includes a very ascetic attitude toward marriage, the state, and property, — one to our notions inconsistent with society. The perfect man must renounce all intercourse with the other sex and all intoxicants and stimulants. He must limit himself to one daily meal, may not have a comfortable bed, and must renounce dancing, singing, the stage, jewellery, and ointments. The larger community of the devout must strictly shun all killing of a living creature, as well as theft, falsehood, drunkenness, and unchastity. Marvellously deep and morally ripe, nevertheless, is the conception of duty and virtue in Buddha's own sayings, according to the Dhammapada.[1]

7. Thus Buddhism brings a liberation of man from the world and a supreme good through the word of faith. It makes the poor happy, and abolishes the conceit of wisdom, privilege of caste, and trust in works. But this liberation is wrought, not by devotion to God, but by atheism (philosophy). Its supreme good is the renunciation of the

[1] "Hate is never cured by hate; hate is cured by love." "Poison does not harm him who has no wound; evil does not exist for him who commits no wrong." "Seek no joy through another's pain." "He who does not act according to his words is a fair flower without fragrance." "One way leads to wealth, another to Nirvana." "The fool who thinks himself wise is the true fool." "Conquer wrath with love, evil with good." "As a mother guards her child at the risk of her own life, so shall every one cherish a boundlessly friendly sentiment toward all beings." "What is the best pilgrimage? Purity of heart. Who is rich? He who does good to others. Who is born? He who awaits no rebirth. . . . Who is blind? He who has pleasure in what is forbidden." (Wreath of Jewels.) "What art thou doing with that braid of hair, with that apron of skin? In thy soul yawns the gulf. Thou touchest only the outside." (Buddhaghosa.)

rights of personality. Not the conquest, but the negation of the world, not love, but pity, is the source of its peculiar power, and the pity is in itself devoid of all moral purpose.[1] Buddhism has, it is true, been able to subdue rudeness and unbridled desire. But its effects are enervating and hostile to culture. And, at bottom, its ethical motive, like that of the Stoics, is purely egoistic and excludes all impulse to common action. Only the Buddhas show real love. As a fact, this religion has almost everywhere issued in new superstitions or in empty works serving hierarchical ends, where it has not, as in China and Japan, made peaceful terms with other religions. At first the impulse of redeeming love that proceeded from Buddha abolished quietism. But, in fact, quietism has long ago crippled redeeming love.

### (*b*) Semitic Prophet Religions

### 21. *The Prophet Religion of Israel* (*Old Testament Theology*)

1. Israel, as a nation, is the result of a comparatively recent union of pastoral Semitic tribes. Hence it is only natural that primitive Semitic paganism should have formed the groundwork of its religious life. And the religious history of this race, as far as accessible to us, shows distinctly enough the traces of such a religious foundation running up even into the higher phases of its religion. The worship of the tribal deity, without thought concerning the existence and character of the divinities of other peoples (henotheism), the limitation of religion to

[1] The "pity" of Buddhism makes no distinction among "breathing creatures." All are, at bottom, of the same sort, pilgrims at different stages of the journey. But love demands personalities for personal communion.

the life of the one clan (particularism), the interweaving of piety with various nature rites (ritual), Hebrew paganism has shared with all primitive nature religions. But it was free, in common with Semitic religions in general, in distinction from the Hamitic, from two things that would have made the transition to a spiritual monotheism impossible, viz. the worship of the great mother goddess, with its orgies, and the motley mythology that created individualized gods. Boundless devotion to the "holy" God, before whom nature trembles, and to the "hidden" God, whose inscrutable will is wrought omnipotently; enthusiastic admiration of the "King," who protects his people, maintains the rights of society, and overthrows the foe; and a rude simplicity, — such were the essential characteristics of the religion of these pastoral tribes. In the ecstatic figure of the prophet, and in the appearance of the Nazarites, which was a protest against enfeebling culture, this peculiar quality of the Hebrews has most distinctly declared itself. Here the soil was ready for religious monotheism, but only the soil. Without a revelation of God through prophets, Israel would have had no more significance for religion than Edom or Moab.

Out of this simple form of religion was developed a higher one, when Israel, under the leadership of Moses, had achieved a fixed abode. The beginning of this higher development may perhaps go still farther back. But Moses, the founder and liberator of the nation, has, nevertheless, been the decisive personality for the "people of Jahve." The strong traces of paganism in the people were gradually eliminated among the leading classes by the efforts of the prophets since the eighth century. To this end, along with the prophetic gifts of such men, the

sense of failure of national vigor and the rise of "stronger" foreign deities must have contributed. The conception of God as a tribal deity, bound by natural ties to this one people, could not be maintained when overwhelming judgments fell upon Israel and when its national feebleness was more and more clearly revealed. Religion must either disappear or become a belief in the one God who carried out his moral purposes in Israel and in the world in righteous and omnipotent ways. And the religious community of the Second Temple, organized anew after the destruction of the national life, developed this loftier conception of religion with a logic and a purity that have no match in pre-Christian religious history.[1] It is true that the peculiar nature of this development carried with it dangers for the healthful growth of prophetic religion. This religion, the foundation and premise of Christianity, does not rest, therefore, on a single prophetic personality. The Old Testament tradition, which represents it as springing up ready-made under the hand of Moses, is not historically defensible. But it is the work of a succession of prophets, who, beginning with the founding of the nation by Moses, developed in touch with one another and in the same direction, and were thus able to make their living piety decisive for the religious life of their nation, in spite of all the opposition of pagan tendencies. Hence we have here unquestionably a prophet religion, born of an historical revelation. The revelation of God in the souls of devout men is its creative principle. The Hamitic culture religions in Babylon and Egypt have furnished much material to Israel's culture and to its religious imagination, but

[1] The comparison with the restoration of the Persian religion under the Sassanides and with the editing of the Avesta canon is very interesting.

on its religious development they have had effect only by force of contrast.

2. The God of Israel, Jahve, who since Moses absorbed the deities of the several tribes, was for a long time not understood by the people as the only God in the abstract sense, but only as the sole permissible object of the popular cult. But the more deep piety grew, and the more it was understood that Jahve could not be the supreme deity alongside the gods of other nations, the more strong and pure did belief in him become as the one God (Deut. 6) to whom all other nations and gods were absolutely subject. Thus the people of Jahve became the religious community of the one God. When Israel saw in Jahve the self-existent (Ex. 3, 6) and the creator of the world (Gen. 1, 2), monotheism was practically established. The revelation of the will of this God seemed at first quite as much the establishment of rites for God's own egoistic and personal satisfaction and the inexorable carrying out of certain sacred usages belonging to the realm of nature, as the personal interposition of God in favor of the great foundations of human morality and civil law. Here, as with the Persians, nature and morality were not clearly distinguished. But the prophets saw more and more clearly that God had no pleasure in rites in themselves, but in justice, mercy, and truth in the lives of his worshippers. And in the Holy of Holies lay the Decalogue as the condition of the covenant as now conceived by Israel. The community of the Second Temple has, to be sure, based the elaborate ritual and the whole system, composed of very various elements, of the peculiar forms of Israel's life, directly on God's will. And it has also resurrected long-dead motives of Semitic

superstition in a modified form, as, for instance, its view of blood, the impurity of "dead" matter, and the prohibition of certain animals as food. But the limitation of sanctity to one spot rendered the cult incapable of serving practically as the daily expression of personal piety. It had, in short, become at bottom a symbol, and the majority of the people took only a spiritual part in it, through their faith in the uninterrupted community of God with his people. And the special forms which served as bulwarks for the now unprotected national life of Israel receded in the eyes of real piety, as the hymns of the Second Temple show, behind the great conceptions of morality, faith, and hope. This we can naturally assume to have been most the case in the circles of the Jewish Dispersion, for which the connection with the ritual life of Israel was loose and the necessity of contact with Gentiles imperative. Thus the danger of falling back from a progressive religion into a reactionary current existed only in the community in Palestine. But there the relapse occurred, in the fashion of all professional ecclesiasticism, legality, and formally organized learning. And as the growing inclination to make cult, dogma, and ritual the real centre of the newly arisen "Judaism" became more and more supreme through the Pharisaic tendency in the people, the point was reached where the perfection of this religion must be achieved, not by quiet development, but by a break with the old. Israel's Christ must become the founder of a world religion that reduced Judaism to the level of a sect (*στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου*).

3. The genuine prophet religion in Israel combines the optimism of the Persians with the profound idealism of

the Buddhists, the grandeur of a religion of humanity with the enthusiastic glow of a national cult. God reveals himself in it as the almighty and holy One, whose will is identical with the idea of morality among men. Therewith vanishes the old terror before the inscrutable will of God, — though, of course, living on in the popular conscience as an instinct. The morality of man becomes positive, — one based on character. The morally good will takes the place of tribal custom as the centre of life. The religious community feels itself, by faith and morality, partaker of God's favor and united with him (righteous). The ancient feeling of a natural community with the tribal deity becomes faith in God's gracious choice and in a covenanted relation to him conditioned on moral conduct. And Israel believes in the forgiveness of repented sins, a forgiveness usually wrought through the cult as the expression of the desire for pardon, but where the ritual of the cult is not possible, also looked for simply from the covenanted love and faithfulness of God. Repentance and faith are the real conditions of the forgiveness of sins. And, fully conscious of its sinfulness, the people feels itself, nevertheless, reconciled to God by its connection with the men of God who guarantee to God the fidelity and devotion of Israel (covenant). The sufferings of the servant of God through love for the sinful people and fidelity to God are the highest sacrifice of atonement, and one that guarantees Israel's future. The fundamental mood of piety is the humility that receives all as a grace, and the happy confidence that overcomes even suffering and doubt. Theoretically, it is true, the doubt that must continually arise from the contradiction between the actual world and the postulates of religion, as long as the goal of per-

sonality is sought in the external satisfactions of this world, is not overcome. The sufferings of the pious man are the great trial of faith in the Old Testament; of them the Psalms speak, and the Book of Job seeks an explanation without really finding it. At this stage of piety that the sufferer ceases to taste God's grace, that he has to bear long and unusual misfortune, remains an insoluble riddle. All the grander appears the power of this religion when it has been able to conquer this temptation to doubt by hope or resignation; and in the thought of "vicarious suffering" and of the "mysterious discipline of God," it has come near to its solution. The typical quality of Israel's piety is the resolute defence of God's will, in which honest hatred of the enemies of that will is necessarily included. The wisdom of Israel is the viewing the world and the task of life in the light of faith. Its hope sees a perfected people of God, adorned with all the goods of nature and of grace, a victor over the opposition of the world. And the nations of the world share in this perfection. The great central thought of religion, the idea of the kingdom of God, is here planted in the soil of a national life, to develop into an ideal for humanity. The figure of the Messiah appears only as one, by no means essential, feature in this picture. And, although his figure may have had a powerful effect among the people and grown more important to it in dark times, it has had no significance for the religious relationship of the individual to God.

4. In this religion lie all the conditions for true piety. The absolutely transcendent God, whose will is one with the good, can lift his people, who feel themselves bound to him, above the fear and enslavement of the world, and

give their moral life imperishable strength and power. "If only I have thee, I care nothing for heaven or earth." But the life of the individual remains still so completely a part of the life of the community that the eternal significance of moral personality does not come to its rights. The doctrine of the resurrection did not arise till very late, perhaps not without foreign influence, and was never recognized generally as a constituent part of piety (Sadducees). And even it has plainly been applied to the individual at first only in connection with the resurrection of the nation and the judgment of its unworthy members. The God of the world is not yet fully separated from the old God of Israel, and the moral not entirely freed from the natural. God's own final motive for his revelation by no means appears as yet as love to men. Hence this highest motive of morality among men could not be born from faith in God's own purposes. And a human life that conquers sin and death in God's strength and makes the world subject to it is, to be sure, longed for by hope and pictured by prophecy, but appears nowhere as a reality to which the pious man can cling by faith and in which he can find comfort. So the last joy of belief is lacking. Israel's religion is only a stage in a higher development, and only in this sense is it a true revealed religion. But what it longed for was not a new theory, but a deed, not a new prophet, but a redeemer and king.

### 22. *Islam. The Reformation of Arabian Paganism under the Influence of Biblical Religion*

1. The Moslem sees in his religion the conclusion of the revelation made to the children of Abraham. With right chronologically, but wrongly if we bear in mind the

home of this religion and the character of the culture possessed by its founder. Islam is an anachronism. Mohammed (born 570 A.D.) knew the Judaism of the Talmudists, but not the religion of Israel's prophets. Independent Jewish tribes were then settled in Arabia, chiefly around Medina. And almost every Surah of the Koran shows that Mohammed was familiar with the marvellous legends of the scribes based on the Old Testament. The angel of his visions is "Gabriel." At first he plainly entertained the hope to win the "holders of Scripture" as his allies. He started from Jewish observances, enjoined, *e.g.*, at first facing toward Jerusalem in prayer. Not until he saw his expectations futile[1] did he emphasize the Arabian character of his revelation more strongly and adopt, as far as possible, the ancient customs of the cult of Mecca. But the spirit of the Psalms and prophets never touched him. Christianity too he knew only in its sectarian forms. The legend of Jesus, the virgin's son, he willingly accepted and did not deny him the honor of being the judge of the world. It is true that he conceived Christ's passion in the Docetic fashion, with which the Gnostics and Manichæans that, along with Esseans, Ebionites, and Nestorians, had fled from the realm of orthodox Christianity to the Arabian steppes, had probably made him familiar (Surahs 3, 5, 18, 19). A passionate polemic he has carried on only against those who called Jesus the "son" of God or made him of the same nature with God. These seemed to him to falsify the preaching of Jesus.[2] But he

[1] From this time on he complains that they have corrupted Scripture and oppose him as they did the old prophets; that they deify Ezra and show the false quality of their piety by their fear of death (Surahs 9, 62, 85, 90).

[2] "The Christians are the friendliest to the Moslems because there are priests and monks among them and they are not too proud" (Surah 5).

knew neither of Jesus' words nor of the theology of Paul and John. Hence he does not stand on the summit of previous religious development, but in his antecedents is on a lower stage of development.

2. The religion that Mohammed found among his own people was a simple and pretty rude form of Semitic paganism. The Kaaba and the pilgrimage to Mecca were the sanctities of one of the most venerated among the local cults. Mohammed's tribe (Quraish) took a conspicuous part in this cult of Mecca. Earlier and contemporary Jewish and Christian influences had probably led many to a somewhat higher conception of religion, though we must not exaggerate, with Sprenger, the significance of these Hanifs. But the rude pagan character of the popular religion had not changed. Beside this piety of his countrymen, Mohammed's religious convictions involved doubtless a much purer conception of God. Beside the Old Testament and Christianity, they are an obscuring of the already existing revelation of the divine, and Mohammed is a false prophet.

3. However unfavorably Mohammed be judged, however much his original aims be considered as essentially social, and the deep shadows of the moral content of his life — especially his cruelty, faithlessness, and sensuality — that appeared after he had begun to wield political power in Medina be emphasized, still, in view of the first half of his life and the most significant Mecca Surahs of the Koran, it can hardly be denied that he was gifted

"Jesus is Mary's son, the emissary of the Sublime and his word. He has made him descend into Mary's womb. But say not that there is a trinity in God. God is one. Far be it that he should have a son" (Surahs 2, 10, 17, 19, 21). "Jesus has wished only to proclaim God's honor and be a servant of God like the angels" (Surahs 4, 23, 43).

with religious genius and originally regarded himself with inner conviction as a revealer of God. His hatred of polytheism and his sense of the unity and sublimity of God, although roused in him by Jewish and Christian influences, have, nevertheless, taken on in him the character of an immediate personal certainty and enthusiasm. He has never given himself out as anything else than a God-sent "warner" who is to restore to his people the old legacy of Abraham (Surahs 3, 18, 22, 26, 27, 41). And he bore long years of failure with the strength that only faith gives. In twelve years he gained scarcely a hundred adherents, and had to fly his native city (622). Also, his moral standard, in view of his race and age, is no low one. We must not forget that Khadijah, for whom he, though much younger, preserved a lifelong fidelity, always remained firm in her faith in him; and that his first adherents, among them men of unusual keenness of judgment, like Abu-Bekr and Omar, have believed in him even after his reverses (at Mt. Uhud, 625); although he never claimed to be a miracle worker (Surahs 6, 17, 20), and led his life among them without any mystery (Surahs 10, 17), nay, although they by no means approved of some things in his conduct, such as his extra-legal marriages. Much that offends us in the picture of his life must be judged by ancient Arabian ideas; for instance, his cruelty and guile toward his enemies, chiefly toward the Jewish tribes (Surahs 2, 5, 9, 47), or his polygamy, to which probably, as with the ancient kings of Israel, political considerations often moved him. If we think of the moral point of view of the age of the Judges in Israel, whose religious and moral plane is something like that reached by Mohammed, we shall not refuse him a mild verdict. To his

friends he has seemed, in spite of his weaknesses, a model of manly virtue. In the fulness of his power he lived poor, and he died poor. But because he had received from God no real "revelation" for man, he has broken down morally under the weight of the contradiction between his prophetic claims and reality. In his later period we meet unquestionably deliberate falsehoods, for instance, in the Surahs in which he covers his own errors and misdeeds by alleged new revelations.[1] A certain lack of feeling for truth is certainly early visible in him, for instance, in the efforts to come to terms with the cult of Mecca, though such pagan usages contradicted the real essence of his religion; or to take over into the new religion the popular goddesses, Lât, Uzza, and Manât, as "daughters of Allah," — an act that he has, to be sure, later openly regretted. As to how far his disposition to self-deception and to sensual indulgence has had a physical basis — perhaps an epileptic disorder — connected with the excitability of the ecstatic, different opinions will be held according to the historical value assigned to the oldest accounts of his life.

4. After long doubt of the reality and divinity of the revelations experienced by him, Mohammed reached an inner conviction of his mission that seems never again to have left him. The first angelic vision that came to him is told in Surah 96 ("Read in the name of thy Lord"); the decisive revelation that put an end to his doubts, in Surah 74 ("O thou Veiled One, arise and walk") (Surahs 53, 94). But for him revelation is not, as for the men of the Bible, a vital infusion of God's power and thought (spirit), but the communication by an angel of the "Book" preserved with the absolutely hidden God. Hence in its

[1] Surahs 3, 8, 12, 13, 33, 49, 59, 66.

form Islam has entirely the character of pure supernaturalism, while in its content it is at bottom essentially rationalism, mixed, to be sure, with the superstition that his age and culture, together with Talmudic Judaism, thrust on Mohammed.[1] The worship of the one God[2] is the real content of Mohammed's revelation: "The Lord thy God is a sole God, he is not begotten, he has not begotten, he has not his like" (Surah 111[3]). Along with this he preaches resignation to this God's absolutely sovereign will, belief in angels (*i.e.* revelation) and in the Day of Judgment, observance of prayer, justice, and charity. The real Islam is "belief in the Last Day and the angels and the Book and the prophets, and to do good to one's kin and orphans, the poor and wanderers, and to keep the covenant and be patient under poverty, suffering, violence" (Surahs 2, 42, 98). It is regarded as the completion of the old revelation and the reproclamation of the religion of Abraham. Judaism and Christianity it can in a certain sense acquiesce in as corrupted forms of the true religion. "So those who believe, Jews, Nazarenes, Sabians — whoever believes in God and in the Last Day and does good — they have their reward of God, and no fear touches them" (Surahs 25,

[1] Surahs 2, 250 confound Saul with Gideon; 28, 2, Laban with Jethro. The further development of Jewish legend is seen especially in Surahs 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 14–21, 23, 27, 34, 37, 38, 40, 51.

[2] Before his time Allah was the great God among the local gods and goddesses of Arabia, though the latter, to be sure, were far more prominent in the cult.

[3] Also Surahs 5, 6, 13, 25, 37, 38, 42, 55, 57, 59. The second Surah is very grand. The first (*Fatihah*) serves for common prayer: "Glory be to God, the Lord of the worlds, the merciful, the gracious, King of the Day of Judgment. We serve thee, we cry to thee. Guide us in the right path, the path of those whom thou blessest, not of those on whom falls thy wrath, and not of the erring."

42). But it looks on them as outlived forms, far below itself. "If they say: Become Jews or Christians, let yourselves be taught, say thou: Nay, be ours the religion of Abraham, the Hanif who was not one of the idolaters." "Were Abraham and Ishmael, Isaac and Jacob, Jews or Christians? Will ye be wiser than God?" (Surahs 2, 3, 16). With the flight to Medina (Yathrib), Mohammed became the prophet-chieftain and warrior, and the sincerity of his religious consciousness has been impaired by this ambiguous position. His own person, in accordance with the purely supernaturalistic character of his revelation, has either not become an object of faith and part of the content of the religion (Wahhabi), or has become so without logical consistency.

5. Islam is essentially a "pure feeling of dependence," though it knows also gratitude and admiration. It can inspire and elevate. But it is utterly incapable of filling the soul with clearer and fuller confidence and so making it really free. For its God is the hidden God whose will is the unknowable will of arbitrary caprice. It is true that, in general, benevolence and justice are ascribed to God. He is gracious and forgiving, does not demand what is hard, but what is easy. And he is also the Lord of the Judgment Day. But he is not the love that seeks community with man, nor the perfect holiness that cannot suffer evil and demands the sanctification of the soul. In resignation to God's will lies, it is true, the power of not fearing the world, but not the trust that God will, from the impulse of his own love, preserve and complete the moral personality of man. Belief in providence becomes belief in a fate that, fixed from all eternity, determines human fortunes beyond hope of escape (Surahs 3, 4, 9, 15, 35, 36,

41). And belief in a living revelation becomes acceptance of a book (Surahs 2, 6, 10, 16, 59) "to which no doubt can attach." Patience is the fundamental virtue of the Moslem, — not as the expression of a childlike trust in God, but of submission to the inevitable. The thought of external penalties and of sensual bliss is emphasized in countless passages again and again as the sole motive to virtue. Hence the joys of Paradise are painted in new and glowingly sensuous colors (Surahs 38, 44, 52, 55, 76, 78). Prayer, alms, fasts, and pilgrimages stand as *bona opera* alongside of a *justitia civilis* that neither penetrates the depths of the heart nor shrinks from compromises with the flesh. The Moslem is not to do wrong or suffer wrong. Against treachery and hate, treachery and hate are admissible. One must not be a niggard, but also not so generous as to strip oneself. It is permissible to unite with the duty of pilgrimage profit in trade or war. From burdensome injunctions, *e.g.* fasting, the rich man can buy himself off with money. He can by alms atone for thoughtless oaths, nay even false oaths (Surahs 5, 6). In marriage laws the widest scope is given to the caprice of male sensuality (Surahs 2, 5, 6, 8, 17). But, on the other hand, justice toward the dismissed wife and in the division of inheritances is strictly insisted on. Usury, greed, infanticide, slander, are sternly reproved. Benevolence and magnanimity are often enjoined. And that each of the "Faithful" belongs as such to the aristocracy of the race and is equal to the highest gives this religion an unmistakable loftiness and a charm for inferior races. The regulations touching the external forms of life are limited to a comparatively small number. Fasting is confined to Ramadan. Aside from certain injunctions as to

food and circumcision, only pilgrimage and taking part in the holy war are prescribed. Abstinence from wine and games of chance is based, not on superstitious considerations, but on the great harm wrought by these two indulgences (Surahs 2, 5). Friday has by no means the legal character of the Sabbath, which is left to the Jews (Surah 16). The turning in prayer is treated as a matter of indifference (Surah 2). But thus simplified, these ordinances, as well as civic honesty and justice, are looked on as direct commandments of God. It is significant that even the civil and military institutions that were necessary at the beginning of Islam become eternal commandments of God as they appear in the Koran. Thus the stage of culture in Arabia at Mohammed's time becomes a divinely established and unchangeable standard for law, state, and knowledge. It is, to be sure, much that religion is here entirely freed from the limitations of nationality. Every Moslem has the same religious rights. But the place of the nation is taken by a religious community that is organized into a state and maintains itself by political means. The ideal is a universal religion that should rule all men, not from within by recognition of their individual quality, but from without by reducing of them by force to one common level perhaps comparable to the empires that the Mongol invasions created. Thus Islam became hostile to culture and progress. It can, to be sure, elevate for the moment in times of enthusiasm by its belief in Kismet, but on the whole it must make men apathetic to the claims of culture, and passive. And it is the death of higher morality, because it knows no inflexible ideal and nothing of a pure heart. Its hopes look forward to nothing more than egotistic happiness *κατὰ σάρκα*. And whoever has the true faith and observes the

commands of God has a good conscience. There is easy and comfortable absolution for transgressions. God takes human sin lightly and man is freed from his guilt without appearing before the court of his own conscience. In the first forty Surahs recurs more than forty times: "God is forgiving and gracious." It is only wrongs to his majesty that God does not pardon. Comfortable and consoling to the natural man, influential and not without benefaction for the civilization of primitive paganism though it is, Islam is from the point of view of religious history an immense backward step; though it is true that in comparison with the Judaism of Arabian scribes and the idolatrous Christianity of the Eastern church, Mohammed's religion was spiritually superior. Mysticism is entirely unknown to this religion. Where it has appeared on the soil of Moslem culture, it has come from foreign sources. There can scarcely be a sharper contrast than that between Islam and the pantheistic mysticism of the Sufis, *e.g.* Jalal-uddin Rumi's, who sings of the "death of the dark despot Self through love," who finds the deity only in the heart, according to whose doctrine God has created the world from love for the individual human soul, who preaches deliverance from the phenomenal world, and for whom all revelation (book, angel, prophets, divine steed) becomes the experiencing of God in the heart. Here we have Hindoo, not Arabian, thought.

In the same way the rationalism of the Motazilites and their attempt to frame an ethical idea of God and to lessen the authority of the Koran has proved to be inconsistent with the deepest instincts of this religion. The great schism of the Shiites and the Sunnites, and the four Sunnite schools, have no significance for the position of Islam in the philosophy of religion.

# BOOK III

## *CHRISTIANITY THE PERFECT EMBODIMENT OF RELIGION: DEFENCE OF CHRISTIANITY*

## PART I: THE NATURE OF CHRISTIANITY

### 23. *Jesus in History*

1. CHRISTIANITY cannot be understood at all apart from its mother soil of the pious community of Israel and its foundation in earlier revelation and the sacred Scriptures. Jesus has always taken his stand decisively, sometimes with deliberate harshness, within the limits of the revelation of God to Israel. He knows himself sent to the lost sheep of the house of Israel. His fellow-countrymen are to him the "children" who have the first claim on the "bread" from God's hand. And no jot nor tittle of the sacred Scriptures of his race shall be lost. He has come, not to annul, but to fulfil. And he has demanded nothing that the prophets of Israel had not also demanded, viz. repentance, *i.e.* the turning of the mind to the real goods of life, and belief in the present, new, living, perfect revelation of God. It is true that he has not read the Scriptures as a scribe but as a devout man, and has appropriated, not the theological and legal traits of the piety of the age, but its prophetic and religious content. But neither he nor his disciples have doubted that there was room for their piety within the religion of Israel, if rightly understood.

Looked at from this side, Jesus appears as the richly endowed reviver of the true content of the Old Testament revelation, which of course, if only from the continual reading of the Scriptures in the synagogues, lived more or less clearly in countless upright hearts; and as the liberator of his people from the more and more dominant fashion of Pharisaic pedantry that threatened to stifle the religion of the people. The "Teachers of the Law" were the real spiritual rulers in Israel. It is true that the worship in the temple at Jerusalem, by this time beautifully ordered and splendidly equipped down to its smallest detail, was the pride and joy of the whole people as never before in the religious history of Israel. But for the millions of the Jewish community who lived far from that shrine, this cult could have been no integral part of their daily piety and communion with God. It must at bottom have seemed to them a thing to be experienced only spiritually, faith's guarantee of the favor of God toward his chosen people; a guarantee that they could exchange for a purely spiritual pledge of the divine favor, *e.g.* the preaching of the cross, without becoming conscious of any essential change in their religious attitude. But with the Law every Israelite had to reckon in his daily life and hence with the authority of the heads of the schools that interpreted this law and taught its application. And the great majority of these teachers were guiding the piety of the people into fatal paths. They inspired it with that pride and that hatred of the Gentiles which were making it the object of universal odium, and with a jealous contempt for the civilization of which other nations were proud. They treated religion as if it were a legal institution. Law and ordinance, not faith and love, were in their eyes

the divine purpose of revelation and the condition of righteousness. With casuistic shrewdness they developed a fantastic religious system of law and drew around the ordinances of the Thora the "hedge" of their "commandments of men," to avert all dangerous approach to the sacred ground. And they taught the people to see in the punctilious obedience of such "ordinances of God" the means of putting the omnipotent God at the service of their political hopes and their national hatreds. The people of religion threatened more and more to petrify into a community of mere external legality. To aims like these Jesus opposed himself, as if they belonged to a different world. Superficially regarded, he might seem related to the pious separatists in Israel (Essenes) whose spiritualistic tendencies were then giving to the movement, widespread in the Greek and Oriental world, toward an ascetic and mystic elevation above the interests of society and the lusts of the flesh, a unique form and one based on the Old Testament. But his piety showed none of their peculiar traits; it was the simple picture of the religion of Israel as set forth in the prophets and the Psalms.

2. In the time of Jesus the majority of the people were, in the hands of the Pharisaic teachers of the law, full of earnestness and zeal, ready to venture everything for the spiritual inheritance of Israel. They were passionate and restive under the sense of the contrast between the religious pretensions of Israel to the lordship of the world, and the historical fact of their being a small and subject race. The synagogue, with its religious instruction based on the Old Testament; the numerous communities of the Dispersion, in which the national and political element of Judaism necessarily receded behind its great

religious and moral ideas; the waxing proselytizing and the Greek Bible, — were making possible a transition from the narrowness of Jewish life to a religion of humanity. And the noble development of a human ethic in some of the great schools, above all in that of Hillel, seemed often to transcend legal form. Hillel's figure, transfigured in pious legend, is not unjustly a favorite theme of modern Jewish apologetes. His tireless zeal for study, his invincible gentleness, patience, and strength of soul, and his comprehension of the core of the injunctions of the Old Testament, lift him far above the average of Jewish teachers of the law. To him and his like go back the sayings contained in the Pirke Aboth: "What you do not wish done to you, do not to others. That is the law. All else is explanation." "He who gives joy to the soul of the creature, gives joy to the spirit of God." "Judge not thy neighbor till thou hast put thyself in his place." "Hast thou done thy duty, do not praise thyself; for it is what thou art bound to do." "The poor are thy fellows." "The best happiness is a good heart."

Modern Judaism is fond of setting up Hillel as the genuine conservative reviver of Jewish piety in contrast with the revolutionary actions of Jesus; just as modern Catholicism sets up Nicholas of Cusa as the true reformer in contrast with Luther's heroic religious personality. In doing this both show that they have no real comprehension of the nature of religion. Even in the best of the rabbinical teachers there is no breath of religious genius nor of redeeming love for their race. They build with legal ingenuity a shadowy world of imaginary legal conditions on the basis of the Thora. Their authority is tradition and the letter of Scripture interpreted by alle-

gorical caprice and yet in accordance with rule. "The decision can be found in Rabbi A." — such is even Hillel's proof; he owes his own influence to the quoting of the sayings of older teachers. The teacher's highest praise is "to resemble a well-pitched cistern that lets no drop escape." Even Hillel spent the labor of his life on the building of the "hedge around the law," disputed concerning tithes, Sabbath observance, and regulations about food, and thought it worth while to investigate whether oil "furnished by pagans" and "pagan" wine were fit for the altar, whether an egg laid on the Sabbath were clean, whether one could go on the Sabbath more than two thousand paces to bring help, etc. These men were fine and venerable figures in the retirement of the study and the school, but no deliverers of the poor and wretched and no renewers of the world. Neither the wisdom of the schools, nor the strange dream-world of apocolyptic speculation, nor the spiritualistic and ascetic doctrine of the mystics, had healing power for the people of religion.

3. In such a race did Jesus appear, untouched by the follies of the schools, possessed in his deepest soul by the spirit of the prophetic religion of his people. He brought neither new theories of the philosopher or theologian, nor new ordinances of the popular leader. He did not separate himself from the worship of Israel, — although he showed personally no need of it, — and he did not oppose the sacred usages of his people, unless their further maintenance was inconsistent with the great principles of piety and morality. He brought the religious miracle of his personality, and a great world-conquering and world-renewing deed. The new and unique relation-

ship to God which he carried in his breast he imparted as revelation to his people.

And in the certainty of being able to conquer the world with this revelation and to realize the hoped-for kingdom of God, he knew himself to be the promised Saviour to whom the ways of God with his people led. With none of the learning of the schools, he found the grains of gold in the Old Testament which the sages passed by. His genius led him away from the legalities of the Thora to the living spring of the prophets and sacred singers. Instead of a stone he gave bread; instead of the form, the spirit of the religion of his race. And by freeing the spirit of the Old Testament from its historical shell he elevated the whole level of Old Testament religion, in which, even at its highest point, shell and spirit had never been clearly distinguished. But he did this, not by annulling, but by fulfilling. He completed what the great prophets had begun on the scale of their age. All external and ritual action has to yield to morality as conceived by religion. The true worth of morality lies in the disposition. And the sole indispensable condition for bliss in God is the humble, childlike soul that is not satisfied by the world, purity of heart, and the resolute will that can dare all for the highest. The content of the law and the prophets is love to God and our neighbor. The simple human duties are, in the same way, the real content of God's will. The ordinances to which the famous teachers of the people bound righteousness are of men. Ritual acts and sacrifices occupy only the second place. The Sabbath is made for man. Fasting has no claim unless it come from the heart, but is a mere ordinance. But to be reconciled with one's adver-

sary, to honor parents by faithful care, these are God's commandments and take precedence of all others. Not the act, but the will, decides in the moral realm. In hate and anger, murder, in the lustful glance, adultery, are already committed. And from all limits of national narrowness and personal egoism, the love of God's children that is born of the perfect love of God shall set free. The Samaritan becomes the neighbor of the Jew. To bless and love our enemy becomes the sign of membership in the kingdom. And with the genuine humility of repentant sinners, that renounces all righteousness of its own and all merit and claim in the eyes of God, is joined a childlike assurance of the inexhaustible fatherly love of God, always ready to receive the prodigal son, and seeking that which is lost. To find one's soul by losing it, to be raised in God above all fear of earth, that is the mind of those to whom the "kingdom of heaven" belongs.

This is the new thing that Jesus, out of his royal authority, proclaimed over against what they of old had taught. It is not new in its details and externally; but it is new as a whole and in its spirit. What in the Old Testament is chiefly prohibition, becomes with him injunction, or better, inner necessity. For the holy and awful God who is also good to his children has become for Jesus the Father in Heaven whose perfection is love, although as the Holy One he judges all that do not enter into his love. Thus Jesus preaches the kingdom of heaven that has come near us, and as king appointed by God wins for himself by his word the first subjects.

4. Jesus did not reject the hopes of his people, but shared them to the full. He too announces the coming kingdom of God that is to be realized on earth, as a

kingdom of righteousness and bliss, by God's creative power, when once judgment has been passed. He too holds the sure and happy certitude that God will create on earth a state of things in which he will bring his holy will to perfect fulfilment, to the weal of his people against the opposition of the world. When he left the earth Jesus referred to this. But the true nature of this kingdom is for him, not the national grandeur of Israel or the change of worldly conditions in favor of the temporal well-being of its members, but a common life for man in communion with God and love to one another. And in this sense the kingdom of God is in its real essence already here. The question may be raised, whether Jesus himself used the phrase "kingdom of God" in any sense but of promise. It may be considered uncertain whether he claimed for himself on earth the title of Messiah that belongs to this kingdom. But no unprejudiced mind will deny, that in his eyes the chief thing and the one of most value to his people is the new significance of life that proceeds even here from him to his. In this sense the kingdom of God has been, for him at all events, a spiritually present one. Its coming was not merely hoped for. It is strown like seed in the field, lies hidden like treasure, is to be found like a pearl. It is mingled by Jesus' preaching as a leaven in the people's life. It grows up under God's protection with inward necessity and vigor. It can be won even now if everything be staked for it; one is a citizen of this kingdom as soon as one enters by faith into the world of truth and love; the franchise of the kingdom can be won and with it the right to ask and receive forgiveness of sins. In its real essence the kingdom of God has been present

among the Israelites ever since Jesus won in Israel a band of disciples who let themselves be moulded by his spirit and took up arms for his royal rights. Whoever thus has a share in the invisible hidden reality of the kingdom of God is also certain to have a happy share in its glorious realization.

5. The revelation of God, by whose believing acceptance one becomes a child of the kingdom, was realized by Jesus on earth and he invites us to partake. To accept it is to become a member of the kingdom. Thus Jesus becomes for his disciples identical with this kingdom and means so to be. For him, as for the kingdom, they are to suffer, be able to bear persecution, learn to "hate" father and mother, that is, be ready to surrender everything on earth that is prized and pleasant to sensual desires. Thus Jesus is no longer a prophet, but the king of this kingdom, no longer the mere subject of religion, but its object. He is, to be sure, a hidden king, who shall not be revealed in his glory from the heavenly world until after his death. Therefore he calls himself the "Son of Man" (Dan. 7, 13, Ps. 8, 4), that is, the hidden Messiah who waits his heavenly revelation; and he enters his city as the humble king awaiting help from God (Zech. 9, 9). He knows not the Father's time and hour, and has no power to dispose of the places of honor in the kingdom of the future. But all is given over to him. He is the son and heir. And the final realization of the kingdom of God is his revelation (*παρουσία*).

6. This position in religion which Jesus has claimed for himself was not based in his eyes on any reasoned knowledge of the possession of a superhuman life or on the memory of a former, higher mode of existence, to judge

from the oldest recollections of him. Nor has it proceeded from far-fetched deductions, such as the learning of the scribes might have made from the Old Testament and developed into dogma. It sprang from the immediate religious assurance of a unique community of love and knowledge with God that included perfect blessedness and power over the world (Matt. 11, 25 ff.). He alone knows God because he alone is what the children of God are to be. From his deepest religious experience he knows that God's essential property is the perfect love that seeks the lost. Therewith fear of God becomes childlike love, and morality the joyful doing of God's will. Through this uniqueness of his religious life his own personality too becomes for Jesus a secret known only to God, one whose comprehension outstrips all worldly standards and can be revealed only to faith. In this sense he calls himself *the* Son of God, — in distinction from the children of God who shall become like God in perfectness of love. He calls God *his* heavenly Father in a different sense from that in which he has announced him as the father of all members of the kingdom. And while he, as individual, is humble and pious toward God and lives in prayer; while he seeks not his, but God's, honor and proclaims not his own words, but what God has laid upon him; while he hides his miracles, is silent as to his early life, and rejects the predicate "good" with solemn earnestness, ascribing it only to his God, — he places himself, as king of the kingdom of God and as the revelation of the true nature and will of God, without hesitation at the centre of religion, since the king, as king, is the personal expression of the state and its ordinances. What he does on earth is God's work for

the establishment of the kingdom of heaven. What he suffers is offering and purchase for the blessed liberty of the children of God. His death is the heroic death of the shepherd for the sheep. His blood is the blood of the covenant in which the community has guarantee of the love of God and God the guarantee of the good will of his children. His deeds of love and his words of evangel are the triumphant struggle against the prince of this world and against the powers of deceit and death. He himself looks on his actions and sufferings as a task imposed upon him by the Father and foretold in Scripture, that he obediently fulfils. But his disciples are to see in them the revelation of the saving grace of God and the foundation of their salvation. Hence Jesus knows himself to be the content of the religion that he preaches, the human revelation of God, the object of faith. And the little community that gathered around him was distinguished from other devout folk by the fact that they had in this man the revelation of the grace of God and the realization of the religious hopes of their people, and in their devotion to him felt assured of the forgiveness of sins as citizens of the kingdom. They found in his actions and sufferings the conditions of their salvation, and so through faith in him possessed a piety which assured them happiness in their personal life, dominion over the world, and an eternal goal for life. So they had in this man the goods at which all piety, consciously or unconsciously, aims. Their faith was waked and strengthened by Jesus' miracles, and the events of the resurrection were necessary, if this faith was not to perish in the terrors of the death on the cross. But its real content was, nevertheless, the life of God that in Jesus had

dawned on their hearts, "full of grace and truth," and that had irresistibly compelled repentance and faith. With this the shadowy world of priestly rule and ritual splendor, of the learning of the scribes and the observance of forms, disappeared without any revolutionary attack. And with it disappeared the dreams of revolt and warlike efforts for liberty with which Israel had intoxicated itself. The poor in spirit received an invitation to the highest good. The particularism of the old religion was broken up from within, without Jesus' having, except in occasional utterances, intentionally pointed beyond the boundaries of his nation or raised the great question around which the thoughts of the Apostle Paul turn. It was at once seen that in his kingdom there was room for all souls that longed for salvation and for all pure hearts; that his feast, scorned by those invited first, stood ready for the hungry and thirsty; that if the "builders" rejected the corner-stone, the temple was founded for the Gentiles. And because he promulgated no external laws and ordinances that must grow old, but eternal and fundamental ideas, Jesus has created something that can renew itself and reveal itself afresh in every new age. It can be justly said that the gospel of Jesus is no "positive" religion like the others, that it has nothing statutory and particularistic about it, — that it is therefore religion itself (Harnack).

7. Jesus had no contact with elements of extra-Israelitish wisdom and piety as far as we know, any more than with the scholastic wisdom among his people. Hence, he can be regarded as the personal completion of the prophetic piety of Israel. He has lived on the words of the prophets, above all on the Psalms. His "culture" has been a purely

Old Testament and popular one. And in the villages and towns of Galilee where Jesus and his first disciples grew up, the tide of the advancing Hellenic spirit had scarcely any effect. But his work cannot, nevertheless, be understood without taking into consideration the spiritual process that for three centuries, chiefly through the contact of the Orient with Greek culture, had been dissolving and changing the form of the religious community of Israel. Not merely in Israel itself had there existed, alongside of the tendency toward a legal fossilization of religion, also a tendency toward its spiritualization. Greek spirit and Roman culture have unwittingly had a hand in the growth of Christianity. The national political background of the religion of Israel had, to be sure, long ago crumbled, and the old realm of David and Ahab had been transformed into a religious community capable of a cosmopolitan extension. But before this the Roman state with its arms and its organization had crushed national spirit outside of Israel and with it the deepest life of national paganism. The world empire demanded a world religion. Cults were mingled. Scepticism and euhemeristic rationalism had destroyed the religious assumptions of the old world. All Occidental religions were, we know, in their deepest nature national and based on a naïve belief in the activity of deities in the various natural phenomena. But the state religion that would theoretically have been able to be that of the empire, was as a fact the special form of piety of that very state under whose iron sceptre the ancient races lay bleeding. Furthermore, the age, as it grew reflective, could no longer acquiesce in the complete absorption of individual moral personality in the idea of the state, after the free civic communities had been broken up. And amid the moral

degeneracy and the national catastrophes there was felt a longing for a religion of expiation and hope. Moreover, the races, Greeks and Romans, that politically and spiritually ruled the world, no longer found peace in their old religious forms. Individuality, roused from its original naïve satisfaction in what nature offered, demanded a certainty that the nature religions could not supply. Certainty of an eternal life lifted above the course of nature, consciousness of purification and reconciliation amid the ruin of morality and the impurity of which conscience more and more clearly accused men, such were the longings that stirred wider and wider circles of cultivated men. The popular religions offered them no satisfaction. So it was sought in secret cults and mysteries. Not merely in ancient mysteries of their own religions, as in the mysteries of Eleusis, but by preference in foreign rites, dark and terrible ones that seized the fancy, as those of the Mithras cult. Men thronged to strange gods. And yet these artificial methods of satisfying the religious impulse, with their exaggerated excitement of the fancy and their apparatus of fantastic superstition, were, even for the small cultivated circles for whom they were accessible, void of any really convincing force. And for the people they had no significance whatever. There was a longing for something real, for a real proclamation of the Godhead. Men had begun to expect it in a new and strange form. The time was fulfilled.

8. Neither must the philosophic labors of the Greek spirit be overlooked among the conditions of the growth of Christianity, although not exercising their full and most significant effect on the spiritual history of existing Christianity until later. The school of Epicurus and that of the Sceptics contributed to the work of Jesus

only by their destructive mockery of the old popular faith; in other respects they were the natural foes of Christianity, as of every vital religion. But what Plato and the Stoics had done prepared the way in many noble souls for the new life that was revealed in Jesus. However little influence the ideas of the great Greek thinkers in their purity had at that time, nevertheless, the effect of the total view presented by them on wide circles of cultivated men was great. Socrates' moral seriousness, Plato's lofty contempt for the world of sense, Aristotle's valuation of the world in terms of reason, the Stoics' idea of the Logos the spiritual monotheism of Anaxagoras, were after all essential constituents of Greek culture. And yet this influence was unable of itself to give what the age demanded and thus to anticipate in some degree the effect of Christianity on the minds of men. Greek wisdom had no consolation for the poor and wretched to offer, nor any hope that could found a church. It roused a need that only the gospel of Jesus could satisfy. Hence even when it later was organized anew as a rival for the rule of souls in New Pythagoreanism and New Platonism, the victory of the cross over such artificial systems was soon decided. But by its longing for satisfaction of the heart and for spiritual life in a world of pain and of unclean lusts it has won followers for Jesus. And even in Jesus' time the ideas of Greek idealism were widely diffused in the Jewish world and afforded the new doctrine new forms intelligible even to the non-Israelite. Jesus and his first disciples did not know them and did not need them. But that they were familiar to a Saul of Tarsus and to the Jews of Ephesus and Alexandria, that they had in the Hellenic world built a bridge between Jewish faith and

Greek thought, has after all been of high importance for the development of Christianity as a religion and for its fortunes. Just as Israel in that age dressed its sacred Scriptures in the garb of the language of the Hellenic world, so Greek thought offered it the means, in the doctrine of inspiration and the art of allegorical interpretation, of introducing higher spiritual ideas into the old world of religious conceptions presented by popular religion. The philosophical conceptions of the Logos and of a world of ideas in which historic values have a spiritual existence before their appearance on earth, offered to the thought of young Christianity, to a Paul, a John, as well as to the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, forms of thought in which to give expression to their belief in the heavenly value of the life realized in Jesus on earth, — forms adapted to transmit it through the centuries, even though in inadequate and often mistaken shape.

But the one thing needed neither theories nor yearning wishes could bring, viz. a redeeming act, a personality in which God spoke to man, a human life that had a new divine and world-conquering content and was strong enough to rouse real religious faith. Jesus has been the Christ of Israel, and Christianity was born of the revealed religion of the Semites. But the noblest powers of Japhet have had to do their part. Jesus has been more than a prophet of Israel and more than Israel's highest hope expected of its king. He is the revelation of God to the children of men. Thus Christianity is the world religion in which the religious and prophetic spirit of Shem is united to the philosophic and civilizing spirit of Japhet.

### 24. *Christianity as Faith in Jesus the Christ*

1. That its founder must also be its religious centre, nay, its essential content, finds its justification in the deepest nature of Christianity. For the special kind of piety on which in this case religious happiness and joy in the world depend, is not conditioned by new knowledge or new forms of cult, but by the new relationship to God realized in Jesus' personality and by the self-revelation of the divine will and purpose in Jesus and his life. It is born of a divine fact. Only in Jesus is the new and happy attitude to God an actuality; everywhere else it is only in process and an object of hope. Hence believers can profit by the gracious relation of God to man that conquers the world and sin, only by participation in the life of Jesus, never on the basis of their own personal life apart from him. The kingdom of God with its grace and power exists only in him and of him. Else it is a mere ideal, a *civitas platonica*. Christian piety is the letting our own relationship to God be conditioned by Jesus and by the perfect community with God revealed by him; the feeling ourselves laid hold of and determined by God in Jesus' human personality. In Christianity, as in every religion, God is the sole object of faith, but here he reveals himself to us in his Son as our Father.

2. This characteristic of Christianity seems to many its really vulnerable spot. The centre of faith, that on which the assurance of our own happy relationship to God rests, seems to be sought in something past, with which the individual, when all is said, comes in contact only in history and which therefore is subject to historical criticism and its variations. The further the church is removed

from the age of its origin and the better scientific method learns to sift traditions of antiquity, the more must the past seem to lose its effect on the life of the soul. How can accidental truths of history be proofs of eternal spiritual truths? (Lessing). And how can the educated man bring himself to feel for a figure of the past the same frank inner devotion that the uneducated man feels for it by force of habit? Is it not better to conceive our relation to Jesus as analogous to the way in which the citizen of a state links his patriotism to the memory of the great heroes that created his country? Reverence and grateful loyalty are in both cases easy. But the happiness and security that the citizen now enjoys do not depend at all on his opinion of what once happened, nor on his own personal and spiritual attitude toward the founders of the state. And it seems still less possible that one's own religious faith and one's own happy communion with God can be based on a personality and a life that have become objects of historical investigation. The uncultured mass of men, fettered by the power of tradition and by authority, may confound the historical person of Jesus and the impression he made on the first disciples with the permanent religious influence proceeding from him which they accept as Christianity. But it seems all the more necessary for the scientifically trained to distinguish clearly between the two, and to be content with the one to which we ourselves can always lend new religious life, leaving the historical person of Jesus to historical criticism and assigning it its place, not in dogmatics, but in the introduction to it and in religious history.

If religion were only a question of truths of reason,

such ideas might be justified. Truths of reason approve themselves to the soul that receives them by their own evidence, no matter on whom they first dawned. And if Christianity were an institution, an organization, it would be able to go on existing and exercising its beneficent effects by its own strength, independently of its founder. Accordingly the more logically the Roman Catholic view of the church is developed, the more inevitably must the historical Christ recede behind the organized forces of the church. But that God presents himself to sinners as a father who forgives their sins and summons them to community of effort with himself, is not a truth of reason. It is, on the contrary, a thing incredible in itself, a thing of which we can be certain only if God himself, by the revelation of his will, offers us the assurance of it. And that can be experienced only historically, and only in a personality in which this gracious will bears unmistakable witness to itself amid the contradictions of the phenomenal world, and in a life that makes man forever certain of the victory of that will over sin and death. Apart from this personality and this life, the Christian assurance of salvation becomes the sport of doubt and an illusory self-invented hope.

And what the Christian possesses in his religion no ecclesiastical system with its mysterious powers and its hallowed rights can guarantee him. For God's love must itself touch the soul immediately and deliver it from guilt and bondage to the world. That can come about only by human life itself entering into immediate communion with God's life. But in every human institution there is only an approximate communion with God, one dimmed by sin and expressed symbolically in external forms. The soul

can find God only if God addresses himself personally to the soul in the personality through which he reveals himself for the purpose of establishing such communion. The church gets its power only from Jesus and in him. The spirit by which it works to renew and bless is his spirit and inseparable from him. Where personal communion with him is abandoned, the Holy Spirit becomes nothing more than the spirit of humanity and loses the power to beget religious peace. A Christianity in which Jesus should become a merely historical figure would cease to be what it has been for the living faith of all ages.

But the difficulty that has led men to such thoughts proves, in fact, to be only an apparent one. For faith in the historical Christ does not at all involve deciding points of historical science, as, for instance, the problems with which the investigations of the life of Jesus have to deal. It is not at all a question of anything that scientific criticism could throw doubt upon, of anything merely past, but of an active personality that has stamped itself as living on the spiritual history of man, and whose reality as it is in itself any one can test by its effects, as immediately as he can test the reality of the nature that surrounds him and the relations in which he stands.

Jesus demands our faith, not as a once living personality of history, whose effects have ceased or are continued only in the form of doctrine or institution apart from it; nor as a transfigured personality that kindles in some strange way a mystical religious life in us. The believer will learn to accept both of these in all their truth and significance. But it is not this that Christian faith begets. Jesus of Nazareth has impressed his figure ineffaceably on the spiritual history of mankind as the revelation of a new

and gracious relation between God and man and of a hitherto concealed divine plan for man; first in the hearts of the disciples that attached themselves to him, then through them and their testimony in the circles that were accessible to their preaching and are so to-day. Thus he meets us also in the Scriptures of the New Testament. His figure appears in them, it is true, in the varying light of the views of his disciples. It has already become an object of doctrine and of embellished narrative. But still it is, beyond all doubt, *his* personality, with effects such as he alone can have produced on his followers; unique and yet historically intelligible; a unit and yet with its peculiar reflection for each one; absolutely new and yet purely human; wholly divine and issuing commands in the name of God, and yet bound to us as our brother. This figure, the impression that the personality of Jesus has stamped on the spirit of mankind, is just as certain a fact as any phenomenon of nature of which we are assured by its actual presence. And what thus meets us is unquestionably Jesus' still active figure and no other. It meets us in the devout with whom we associate, in the life of the church, and in Holy Scripture; but it is not born of the soul of the devout nor of the spirit of the church; it is through his followers that Jesus draws near the soul of every individual as a living and present friend. And in him, as in his own age, God draws near, disclosing to us his gracious will and addressing to our consciences his questions. For Christianity there is no contradiction between the nature of belief and the significance of the historical Jesus.

The historical doubt whether Jesus has spoken every one of the words and done all the works that are reported of him and whether his external life has been passed just

as the narratives of the early disciples report, detracts nothing from the assurance of faith; and just as little the conviction, that the personality of Jesus is shown us, even by the earliest witnesses in the New Testament, in a doctrinal garb that in many respects must seem to us outlived and of a piece with the ideas of antiquity. The "theology" of the church of the disciples has as little decisive significance for our faith as do the results of the study of the life of Jesus. Faith cares only for that personality of Jesus from which that doctrine proceeded. It has to do only with the fact that in Jesus we find a nowhere else existing revelation of the divine will and a nowhere else postulated aim of human life; and that the impression made by these on our conscience compels us to accept or to reject him. The disciples, in distinction from their countrymen, have chosen belief in this personality, not on the ground of compelling theoretic proofs (for else their countrymen too would have believed), but impelled by the Holy Spirit, that is, by the divine power bearing witness to itself in their hearts and by the irresistible truth of the relationship of man to God that they saw in Jesus. In the same way anything that can really be called belief in Jesus must come about to-day. Whoever is in his soul conquered, judged, and made happy by this living and still working personality, for him Jesus is the Christ, *i.e.* the personality which determines his relation to God and to which he feels himself in religious subjection. For him Jesus is the Son of God; in him God is our Father and we too become children of God. He knows God thereafter only in the man Jesus and has in him the assurance of the forgiving love of God. For him the kingdom of God is no longer a mere ideal, but an invisible reality ripening toward fulfilment and pro-

ceeding from Jesus. He believes in the rule of good in the world, although neither in himself nor others can he experience this rule empirically in its purity and beyond doubt.

3. The belief of the disciples in Jesus as the Christ did not become full assurance until, by his death on the cross, the earthly and less precious elements of their attachment to his personality had been forcibly broken; and until, by the appearance of the Risen One, they became certain that he had gained the victory and was still exercising heavenly power. They now understood that the revelation of God in Him was not meant to realize earthly or national aims, but the spiritual kingdom of the good; and that in him they were to be united to God, not as earthly citizens are united to a national deity through an earthly king, but as eternal personalities through a spiritual and world-compelling power. The death on the cross became for them the victory over evil, the price of redemption, the sacrifice of the covenant and of atonement, the secret of the ways of God. The sacred institutions of their race became for them mysterious symbols of this greatest decisive act of salvation. And at the same time the ancient conception of a "community of life" of the clan with God in sacrifice (*communio*) was probably soon associated by them with the blood of the cross and the Last Supper with their Master. The resurrection seemed to them the seal of the grace of God, the liberation of Jesus from the limitations of the world, his passage into the kind of being proper to him. It was the condition of the omnipotent spiritual activity in behalf of the world of him who, till then, had been an earthly teacher in Israel. In this belief in Jesus, in his death and his resurrection,

is to be found the whole new content of original Christianity. But the disciples, believing as they did in Jesus, naturally included in their religious life all the new piety and morality revealed in him, perhaps without ever feeling that here a new humanity was born of a new spirit. Jesus as the Christ, the death on the cross as the gracious act of God, the resurrection as pledge and realization of the lordship of God's children over the world, such was the first Christian faith. On it they expended their profoundest thought, and apart from all scientific impulse, could not help transforming the religious mystery into human doctrine. And in it the community of the children of God found their peace with God, their world-conquering power, and the heroism of hope.

4. The faith that gives a man the right to account himself a member of the kingdom of God, and to enjoy its privileges, cannot to-day be other than this faith of the first disciples. It must rest on the religious impression of the personality of Jesus still active in humanity, and must find in this the revelation of the gracious will of God toward us and of the victory of the good, a revelation to which the soul surrenders itself in trust and without reluctance. It must see in the death of Jesus the price of redemption, the sacrifice for unhappy and guilty humanity, and be certain that this death was a victory of Jesus, that it was for him the entrance on a transfigured life and on a personal wielding of the powers of the spiritual world. No one can produce this faith by scientific arguments, nor can it be disproved by such arguments. Only the power of the divine in the personality of Jesus, as this presents itself to us, and the convincing truth of the divine love offered to us in it (the Holy Spirit)

can evoke it. But where faith has thus arisen, scientific scruples do not disturb it, even though they may make doubtful the historicity of certain miraculous accounts or of certain utterances of Jesus. It cannot even disquiet it to learn that the reports of the appearances of the Risen One, the descriptions of the form of his glorified life and the views of the manner of his resurrection, are very diverse, and show distinct traces of legend. It contents itself with the certainty that the Crucified has convinced his despondent disciples, as later Saul, that he still lived and reigned. It calmly leaves further questions to scholars, and knows that their answer has nothing to do with belief or disbelief; although the believer will certainly be inclined to apply a different standard of historical probability to Jesus' personality and to the picture of his life, than the unbeliever or the indifferent use. Christianity is the religion of a God who is revealed in his Son Jesus as our Father and who bears witness to himself in his Spirit as the power that rules the world. It is the completion and the supersession of the prophet religion of Israel.

5. In the historical position and in the religious content of Christianity lay the springs of a rich spiritual development and of a boundless task for thought. In the first place, the question must arise of the relation of the Christian religion to the religious claims of Israel. According to the spirit of the preaching of Jesus, the two no longer had any inner connection. But he himself, like his first disciples, had observed the external forms of the national and religious usages of Israel. And to many who believed in him this abiding by the sacred forms that they had held from youth up to be the will of God, seemed an indis-

pensable condition of the state of grace to be reached in Jesus. It is plain that here from the first many ways diverged. For some, Israel's law was also the foundation for the franchise of the kingdom of heaven; for others it was a pious obligation for those disciples of Jesus that were of Jewish blood, while for Christians from the pagan world only what made community between them and the Israelites impossible was forbidden (Peter, James). For Paul and his school faith was the end of the law. The law was a schoolmaster to bring men to Christ, and in the Christian age of grace only a prophecy of the perfect. Law and faith were mutually exclusive. The idealism of John looks on Christianity, the absolute religion of the Logos, as already far beyond the worn-out distinctions of Jew and Gentile, law and faith. For the Christian church it was a question whether its religion should be a world religion or a national sect. On the basis of Pauline and Johannine ideas it triumphantly maintained its universal significance, at the same time rejecting with successful determination the exaggeration that aimed to guide Christianity, freed from its national and historical basis, into the current of the philosophy of the age (struggle with Gnosis).

In the second place, the unique nature of the Christian scheme of redemption had to be more fully understood. That it consisted in the assurance of the favor of God directed toward us in Christ and at the same time demanded a new fashion of human life according to the law of the spirit and of liberty, a walking in love, was of course the conviction of all; and the devout man scarcely troubled himself at first about the relation of these two factors to one another. But the soundness of piety and the assurance

of redemption depended, nevertheless, on the question, whether the Christian should base his happiness simply on the firm ground of God's love revealed in Christ, or should also make it dependent on the amount of agreement between his own conduct and the new life that came from Jesus. Where the second answer was given, the standpoint of legal religion had not been entirely outgrown, and under the conditions of the age a lapse into ascetic moralism or into legality could hardly fail to occur. The majority of the Christian communities of the first centuries have doubtless taken this latter stand, one that had in practice a character of loftiness and grandeur from its heroic power of faith and its joyous struggle with the world. All the more important was it that Paul was led by his peculiar training and by the nature of his conversion to emphasize the opposition of faith and works (justification by faith) with clearness and energy. He used all his intellectual powers in behalf of the conviction that only he who accepts his salvation as a gift of God's free grace through faith in Christ, wins the righteousness that counts in the eyes of God, and that the fruit of the blessed consciousness of peace with God is a new life of the spirit and of love. In doing this he has not, to be sure, voiced the dogmatic formula of the Reformation, but at all events the principles that led to it. Equally significant was it that John found the essence of Christianity in believing love for the person of the incarnate Word of God, and proclaimed it with a loftiness before which all justification by works became null and void. In the presence of the new mind of the children born of God, who do not sin nor belong to the world, and who know that in the love they have in them they have passed from death unto life, the

old world of sacred forms falls to pieces of itself. Not by obeying a law, but as living branches of the vine Christ, do Christians bring forth fruit and fulfil the new commandment of Jesus.

Lastly, faith in the significance of the person and the work of Christ urged irresistibly toward giving it definite shape in a world of advanced culture, one bred to philosophical thought. It is true that with this arose the new danger of confounding theological (scientific) formulas with the religious attitude (of faith) toward Jesus, and of regarding assent to them as the condition of saving membership of the church. At first believers found satisfaction in faith in the royal glories of their master, and in the hope of his speedy reappearance, and lived their lives in expectation of the end. But this feature of eschatological enthusiasm, with its tendency to withdrawal from the world and contempt of culture, receded — in spite of the strong inclination to persist in it that found in Montanism its clearest expression — more and more as Christianity came to exercise its activity on whole races and through centuries. Its eternal and inalienable element was the pursuit of an ideal set high above all empirical reality, and the capacity of renouncing the world for the kingdom of God. As the eschatological tendency receded, instead of the world-ruling power of Jesus, the significance of his personality came to occupy the focus of religion. That in Jesus a divine reality, a revelation of God on earth, was to be revered, was certain to all Christians who had a full sense of what Jesus himself meant to be to his people; and that the divine in him was no mere rhetorical exaggeration, but the true nature of the one God himself, the church defended in hot strug-

gles on the basis of the thought of Paul and John, and formulated in its dogma of the Trinity. It understood that the historical person of Jesus can be, for him who looks on it as the revelation of God, nothing less than the historical form taken by the divine life stooping to reveal itself out of an eternal love for our humanity; that his transfiguration is the corporate form answering to his inmost essence; and that the new spirit proceeding from him must be God's own spirit. Hence faith conceived of the one God as himself essentially present in the man Jesus and in the new life of the church proceeding from him, although God remained for it the deity existing in himself before all worlds. Piety was assured of being able to conceive of him as in the world, and yet of being able to worship him as God in contrast with the world. It is true that the early church, like the New Testament, gave this idea theological shape in the language and habit of thought of an age for us long past, and did not hesitate to make the mystery of the personality of Jesus tangible by ascribing his origin to a physical miracle. But these questions involved nevertheless an amount of toil and struggle that made impossible all inactivity of mind. Faith found here God in a man and therewith faced the deepest problem of all thought. It found in a work of man forces making for blessedness and eternal life, deliverance from the bondage of the world and sin, the annulling of the ancient curse of sin and guilt. So there was no important sphere of thought and of life that did not receive from this religion a new and unsuspected light. But at the same time the unattainable loftiness of the ideal of life revealed in Jesus brought into the life of his followers the spur of the

repentance that knows no self-satisfaction and the moral enthusiasm that never lets us rest. The perception of the nature of true greatness that lies in faith in the divinity of Christ made false reverence for the illusory greatness of the world impossible. And the perfect freedom of the doctrine of Jesus from all legality and all perpetuating of ephemeral forms made room for every stage of culture and every peculiarity of national character.

6. In this loftiness of Christianity lies also one of its peculiar dangers, the danger of confounding the belief itself that constitutes the Christian with the theological system by which the church has tried in the course of the centuries to comprehend this faith logically. It is true that the piety of the New Testament church itself has never fancied that the true religious relation to Jesus and the sharing the blessings of his life and death could depend on assent to a definite theological solution of the mystery of his personality or on a logically correct conception of the effect of his death. But this false path lay near at hand and was soon trodden. And the healthful development of the Christian church depends on whether it is able to renounce it consistently. The Reformation raised its protest against our salvation being bound to human doctrine, but did not carry it out logically — the conditions of the age made that impossible. Christianity can retain its health and its imperishable significance only if it distinguish clearly and decisively the gospel, as an object of faith, from doctrine as an object of logical knowledge. To have Christ by faith does not mean the holding fast a ready-made Christological formula, — the New Testament itself presents the one faith in him in the most various gradations. It means the sur-

render of oneself in trust to him and in him to the God to whose reality he witnesses, and the letting the life of the soul be determined by him. And to believe in Christ's atoning work does not mean the acceptance of a definite soteriological theory. Even in the New Testament there is the greatest variety of metaphors and images, in part mutually inconsistent, to wake and keep alive the sense of this blessed mystery. It means only the being certain that in Christ God has become our Father, that his death has been God's revelation of grace for the conquest of sin and the escaping of condemnation, and that by this death Jesus has become lord in the realm of the spirit.

7. The greatest danger of Christianity is, now as at the beginning, that either it be severed from its historical foundation and certain of its ideas be mingled with the smooth current of worldly wisdom (Gnosis, Rationalism), or that some stage in which it has once won new empirical development be taken as identical with Christianity itself (Roman Catholicism, sectarianism). The weapon of the church against both dangers is the possession of sacred Scripture. The Christian principles of interpretation, if rightly understood, can never see in any development of the thought of the Biblical writers a piece of final knowledge, or wish to withdraw the narratives and statements contained in the Bible from historical and philological criticism. Even in Scripture it is only the personality of Jesus as we meet it there that has religious cogency. As Jesus' witnesses, proclaiming what they have experienced through him, the men of the New Testament are religious authorities to us. Meeting Jesus in their words, we feel that the spirit of God breathes upon us from their writings. Where they narrate, pass judgments,

frame doctrines, as individual personalities, they are for us the first and most venerable representatives of the church of Jesus and nothing more. But the principles of interpretation demand that we treat Christianity as an historical religion, that is, seek in its original historic form the comprehension of its nature. Where pseudo-gnosticism tries to transform Christianity from an historical religion into a temporary form of secular culture and religious philosophy, the recognition of the Old Testament as a constituent part of the canon bids it pause, and demands that the historical roots of the new religion be not overlooked. Where a definite system of church doctrine is made into a law for the church, the New Testament protests, and claims for the original impression of the person and the life of Jesus the exclusive right to such authority (documents). And the depth of Pauline and Johannine thought protects Christianity against moralistic and rationalistic shallowness. The recognition of Scripture as a canon includes the principle that all forms of the church's knowledge and practice are to be gauged by it; by asking whether they really correspond to the living revelation of God that we find in Jesus and to the original impression on which the church was built. Hence it makes it impossible to regard any later form of Christianity as the norm and final. Thus Holy Scripture, as the record of the birth of the Christian religion and of the preparation for it, is the final norm for everything that can call itself Christian faith and Christian life.

# PART II: CHRISTIANITY THE PERFECT RELIGION

## SECTION I: CHRISTIANITY THE REVELATION OF PERFECT SALVATION

### 25. *The Kingdom of God*

1. THAT Christianity, as an historical religion, is far superior to the other religions of mankind, if it be regarded as a whole, would hardly need any special proof, even for those who in certain details were inclined to give one of the other higher religions the precedence, for instance, Buddhism or Islam. No one among us thinks seriously of abandoning Christianity for some other existing religious faith. The only question for us is, whether it can be shown that in our religion we possess that realization of man's relation to God, in which the religious need and the longing of which the religious process in man is born, can find full and final satisfaction; so that he who wishes to be pious must feel himself compelled to be a Christian, and he who is a Christian need not fear being led by his further development beyond Christianity.

Of late this task has been put aside as hopeless. Now, as Christians we shall be ready to admit that in historical Christianity the final perfect revelation of God and the final absolute redemption of man that Holy Scripture teaches us to expect at the end of time, are not yet to be found (Bender). It can only be a question of what reve-

lation is the highest for earthly humanity bound to the measure of earthly piety. But from the nature of the historical method the deduction has been drawn that we must look on Christianity, as on the other great religions, only as a purely historical and hence relative phenomenon, although, like all religions, it has felt itself to be absolute. At most we are justified in regarding the Christian religion as the crown of all preceding religions and as the ground and presupposition of all clear and vigorous religious life of the future, and in denying the probability of its becoming outworn or sundered from its historical basis (Tröltsch). It might perhaps seem as if one who in his own religious feelings knew himself moved by the religious power in Jesus[1] might content himself theoretically with such a verdict; since the pious man, after all, needs only the certainty "of being on the right road and of following the right star." But in reality the peculiar way in which Jesus moves the soul does not admit of such resignation. He comes to us as "God's Son" and as "our Lord." For him who recognizes this claim, even the mere theoretic possibility that Jesus could be given up in favor of a better justified personality of the future, must seem an act of disloyalty and make true faith impossible. Now, it must, it is true, seem a false method to gauge the value of Christianity by any *a priori* ideal of religion. But when a normal conception of human religion has been gained from

[1] The absoluteness of Christianity lies solely in the individualization and humanizing of religion that we find in Jesus' own faith and experience and in his demand on our souls; and in the complete separation of the higher and eternal world, of necessity from the earthly and transitory one. The personality of Jesus is one of the great fundamental mysteries of reality. For him who accepts the God of Jesus it is the greatest (Tröltsch).

religious history, it must be possible and justifiable to apply it to the historical material presented by Christianity, and so to assure ourselves that as Christians we in fact possess that which human piety needs and to which the course of religious history has led. It is true that, even in Christianity, the ruling idea is always intertwined with definite historical conditions, and the historical coloring extends even to the "content and ideals of life that are formed in the depths of the soul." But this cannot hinder us from distinguishing what the history of Christianity shows us to be its real content and its essence from its temporal individual coloring, and regarding this by itself. If we "are confident that the victory will rest with the purest and deepest purposive ideas" and may hold "that religion in its principles has already revealed itself," it will also be possible to put this confidence and this conviction in a clearer light. There can, of course, be no talk of a "scientifically cogent proof."

Christian apologetics is far from holding the opinion that an unbeliever could first, moved by rational considerations, decide in favor of religion in general, and then, convinced by insight into the advantages of Christianity, choose the latter. Whoever arrives at Christian faith, does so because his soul is not satisfied with itself nor with the world; because he has learned from the impression made by the person of Jesus the reality of the good, and feels the peace that comes from the revelation of the loving will of God. The assurance of the reality and truth of our Christian fellowship with God rests therefore, at bottom, on a personal consciousness of redemption founded on the revelation of God that we find in Jesus. And this must

enter into the experience of every Christian as something of present significance to him. Never can he base his own assurance on a process of logical proof and its success. But in so far as he is a thinking man, he must be able to give a clear account to himself why his religion can make the claim, not merely to be the relatively most perfect among those that have existed hitherto, but the sole pure and unsurpassable manifestation of religion to mankind. The once common proof from the external form of the history of revelation, or from the divine character of the sacred Scriptures, is at present excluded. A metaphysical proof cannot come into consideration at all. God meets us in history in his will directed toward us in Christ. It can therefore be a question only of making the fact that Jesus has won our confidence intelligible also to reason. To this end we must not insist on special points in the religious theory or in the moral conceptions of Christianity. For in such details not infrequently lower religions stand comparatively high, and much more perfect ones rather low. The Old Testament in its national particularism and its external ordinances stands below Buddhism and Islam, and in its "this-worldliness" below the Egyptian religion. The grand idea of the purification of the world existed among the Germanic races alongside of elements of primitive nature religion. In its monotheism and its devotion to God, Islam stands apparently at the head of all religions. And Christianity itself leaves the widest room for progress and further development in dogmatic and ethical questions, in accordance with the whole nature of its origin. It can be a question only of the decisive religious principle itself. Man seeks in religion, through fellowship with the self-revealing God,

the satisfaction of his personality by means of goods the world cannot give him. Hence the perfection of a religion depends (1) on whether this satisfaction is real and complete; (2) on the way in which the reality of the divine is made plain. Both are disclosed together in Christianity in the person of Christ and in the effects that proceed from him. But Jesus himself has merged the estimate of his personality in his announcement of the kingdom of God; just as in the Old Testament, not the form of the coming king, but that of the kingdom in which God is revealed, forms the starting-point for hope. And, now as then, Jesus touches the pious man vitally only as the circle of a new humanity proceeding from Jesus opens itself to him. "The gaining of Christian assurance through the church is not only the usual, but the only possible, method" (Herrmann). Hence it is proper for apologetics to begin, not as the practical presentation of piety must do, with the personality of Jesus as the perfect revelation, but with the kingdom of God proceeding from him as the perfect satisfaction of human need. In doing this we use the phrase "kingdom of God" simply for the new religious and moral organization of humanity proceeding from Jesus and existing among us as an invisible reality, carrying with it the assurance of its ultimate completion. The question of Biblical theology concerning the limits within which Jesus himself has used the expression, we leave completely aside.

2. The highest good, in the sense of religion, must include in it the satisfaction of the individual spiritual personality, and at the same time the perfecting of human fellowship, through fellowship with God and as the result of a divine act of revelation. Hence religion, as

long as it remains nature religion, cannot give the true good at all. For if the divinity is himself a part of the world, he cannot raise personality above the world nor make it free. And the highest spiritual aim cannot be realized at all by a divine that is itself in any way akin to nature and that has not created the world for spiritual ends. From the world of nature, working according to its own laws, salvation of the rational personality can never come.

In the primitive nature religions this is plain. In them the divinity still lacks all moral character, and no one thinks of a final purpose for personality or in the world. Man aims at only a purely natural control of individual conditions by magical means. But even in the culture religions of paganism the situation is logically not different. It is true that in them the gods always subserve moral ends, above all the ends of popular communal life, as well as their own. And although they themselves remain inextricably bound up with natural phenomena, nevertheless the great ordinances of the state and the family, the sanctity of oaths and of marriage, the inviolability of hospitality, are concerns of the gods and protected by religious awe. Almost everywhere in these religions the majesty of law is connected with divine ordinance, the royal power with the divine. Thus the thought of a kingdom of God appears on earth in the most varied shapes (Egypt, Babylon, Rome, China), but still only as a prophecy and a dim external picture. For this kingdom of God is from the start limited, like the gods themselves, by natural conditions. It is in its very nature primarily national, and where it aims to become universal, it tries to diffuse itself by physical force and by the subjugation

of other nations. It remains always "of this world," a *civitas mundi* in Augustine's sense. And its aim is solely to realize the fundamental conditions of law and of morals necessary to the social life of man. But the moral nature of personality itself, as far as the latter is not involved in effort for the good of the state, does not come into consideration at all. Moral personality does not become free in God from the world, as it seeks to become in religion. It remains hopelessly entangled in the conditions of physical life in general, and in the limits set it by birth and social conditions in particular. As member of a "kingdom of God" in which he is placed by purely natural conditions, man is bound religiously, too, to a mass of purely natural relations, and limited by them. All sorts of merely natural forms crowd into the shrine of the religious life as "elements of the world," in the shape of ritual injunctions, sacred usages having to do with external conduct and remnants of old customs grown unintelligible. On the other hand, in his inmost life man can remain a "natural man." The fellowship with divinities that are everywhere interwoven with the life of nature cannot raise him above the standards of the natural. Hence society, too, on this religious plane can have only an uncertain and defective control of the world. Since it rests on natural conditions, its joy in life is suffused with doubt and pessimism. Hence it looks backward or forward to a Golden Age. And the highest good that nations at this stage hope for and aim at excludes, not includes, the aims of other nations. It is not an ideal of love, but of selfishness. For the law of everything natural is selfishness and conflict. As to the gods, so to the

kingdom of God, there always clings a remnant of natural being that is not absorbed in the idea of the good. Hence the last word of nature religion, as soon as it comes in contact with a really highly developed ethic, is the atheism of Buddha.

3. Even the prophet religions, so far as they still have a national character, that is, are closely linked to the mother soil of nature religion, must share the just enumerated defects of paganism. Thus the Persian and the older Israelitic religion have in them many traits of nature religion. In them, too, the divine purpose is limited by national boundaries and prejudices, and secular forms and ordinances appear alongside of the moral as essential for entering into relation with the divinity. The significance of the moral personality and the qualitative distinction between moral and natural actions have not yet attained to clear expression. But every prophet religion must, nevertheless, as such, bring with it a better comprehension of the highest good than is possible in nature religions. When a revelation of God is received in the soul of a man of religious genius, and communicated by him to those about him, it must, from its very nature, appeal to every human personality. For what the human soul has itself experienced has validity for every human life. And it can, in its real purport, have only a moral appeal and one addressed to the spiritual life of personality. For only the spiritual can address itself to the soul and be really experienced within. Thus all genuine prophet religions aim, even though unconsciously, at becoming religions of "mankind" and at subordinating external physical activities to moral and personal ones. The religious history contained in the Old Testament exhibits this process of

evolution from the natural and national to the spiritual and universal in its purest form. But also among the Persians such a tendency is unmistakable in the strong emphasis laid on the moral, and in the universality of its hopes. In Islam, Buddhism, and Christianity the national and particularistic character of the kingdom of God is completely done away with. And in these three religions morality claims decisively to be the centre of religious purpose. In the prophetic development of the Old Testament religion the overcoming of naturalistic and ceremonial elements of piety by the ethical forms the real centre of prophetic activity, and in Christianity all such traces of nature religion are eliminated from the real religious life, as shadow and prototype. What comes from the heart, not what goes in at the mouth, defiles a man. Sacrifices and ceremonies are transformed into worship in spirit and in truth. The Sabbath and sacred offerings have to give way to love for one's neighbor and the duties of kindness. It is true that most of the ecclesiastical developments of Christianity have, in this respect, not kept on the high level of Christian principle. Only evangelical Christianity has ventured to consistently maintain the full grandeur of the New Testament thought. For it, as for Jesus, the world-ruling and the world-conquering power of the good is the real content of the kingdom of God.

4. In Islam the secret will of God to which the pious man bows is not identical with the moral ideal. It remains the mysterious will of the highest Power, for whom there can be no laws. Man does not consciously promote the purpose of God, he simply accepts it, without understanding or appreciating it. Hence in Islam the highest vigor

of the soul is not aroused, the force of moral action is checked. And moral action is furthermore obscured by all sorts of morally indifferent elements. And the moral idea does not assert itself without many compromises with the flesh. The grace of God that forgives the penitent appears as a "natural benevolence" that, provided God's own honor is not offended, "demands not the hard but the easy," and quickly pardons. So there is neither a just and radical "repentance," nor a new and happy life of new birth and sanctification. Lastly, the kingdom of God of Islam is bound to the conditions of law and civilization of ancient Arabian life. Hence it has in itself an influence hostile to culture and checks progress. For every external form that has grown up in time must grow old, and, if it cannot change, become the enemy of true development. And Islam tries to assert itself as a temporal power that accomplishes its ends by temporal means, that is, it depends on temporal conditions. Even the eschatological ideal of the highest good does not in Islam coincide with the realization of the good in human society, but consists in the sensual, and so temporal, satisfaction of the individual, and hence is entirely eudæmonistic and egoistic.

The defects of Buddhism lie in another quarter. In it the highest good really seems accessible to every man, quite aside from his temporal condition. The power by which its "kingdom of God" is diffused is the spiritual power of the word. Its heroes carry, not the sword, but the alms-bowl. And whatever asceticism and special temporal forms its ideals still include, these are asserted to be not in themselves constituents of the highest good, but only the means of attaining it. They are either necessary to self-deliverance from the illusion of the world,

or are an expression of pity for the sufferings of living creatures. And in the case of Buddha personality, on attaining the highest good, is entirely freed by the power of faith from the bonds of the world. But this good is not the revelation of a divine and benevolent will, but a result of the self-knowledge of the human spirit. It is therefore, at bottom, conceived not religiously, but philosophically. And the belief in the victory of the good over the world is not founded, as in religion, on fellowship with God, but arises from comprehension of the power existent in humanity to free itself from the misery of existence. Above all, the highest good is something purely negative. It is not a question of possessing by faith something absolutely valuable, but of getting rid of something worthless and purposeless. Personality aims, not to rule the world, but to get free from it by fleeing it. Thus all joy in action is lamed. The world itself remains for this religion a dark, insoluble riddle. Hence even the moral features of the world have no real place in this ideal. State, marriage, society, art, industries, and labor are in themselves worthless, nay, they are incompatible with the true realization of the highest good. And the sole knowledge of value is that of the misery of existence and of the way of escape from it. The *perfecti* of Buddhism are cut off from all connection with the civilized interests of mankind. Thus this religion, too, has only a destructive effect on culture, because the world as material for moral effort is not included in its ideal. And the highest good of Buddhism has, like that of Islam, a thoroughly isolating effect. It begets a higher form of selfishness, like all philosophical systems that see the highest goal in the independence of the individual of the external world. It is true there lies

in the redeeming love of the Buddhas, and in the mood of pity for all suffering in the world, something that apparently leads above egoism to love. But this pity is after all only a substitute for love, for it knows no lofty common effort. And with the actual attainment of the highest good in the sense of Buddha, all fellowship will be abolished. The soul rises to liberty alone. Hence the Buddhist ideal is an absolutely insufficient one, if only because the common goal and the goal of the individual are completely independent of one another. The Buddhist goal is that of eudæmonism, but in the negative sense that results from pessimism.

5. The Christian "kingdom of God" offers the full satisfaction that religion demands. It is, like the highest good of Islam and of Buddhism, without national or political limits; like that of Buddhism, without temporal means and ends; like that of Islam, a positive and hopeful one. And it reveals in the absolutely perfect highest aim of personality at the same time that of human society. The highest good of religion must (1) lie absolutely above the world, with its aims and conditions. For else it cannot guarantee personality its freedom from the world. As long as it has a worldly character, man remains bound in spirit to the world and included in its negation. But the highest good must (2) be able to be realized in the world. For else the world remains an obstacle to the true good. Therefore it must be able to realize moral freedom and religious happiness in the world and in spite of the world. Only thus can it deliver from the world, without producing the ecstatic, ascetic, and unprogressive frame of mind that makes a sound and vigorous national life impossible. The kingdom of God in Christianity

answers both demands. It is, on the one hand, a perfect reality, grasped by hope and lying absolutely above the world, one revealed by God. The eschatological element of primitive Christianity is an inseparable part of this religion, and the tendency that would like to abolish it, instead of merely freeing it from its fantastic garb woven of ephemeral elements, must be held to be a falsifying of Christianity. But it is just as much an invisible spiritual reality, grasped by faith in the midst of the world, and thus the redeeming power over the ills of the world and the might to rule this world morally. In the personality of Jesus and in the effects proceeding from it, it has established its reality even in the eyes of a reluctant humanity. In the certainty of the pardoning paternal love of God, that is, in the guarantee of the eternal worth of his own personality in the eyes of God, the Christian has the bliss that is the essence of a share in God's kingdom, although he may lack worldly happiness. He knows that to them that love God all things are for the best, and can exult even in sorrow. In prayer he feels himself lord of the world. In the moral task he acts as fellow-laborer with almighty God. Thus the kingdom of God is at once a revelation of a supernatural act of God and a common moral effort of the community.

6. The highest good of religion must reveal itself as God's own purpose in the world. Else it cannot offer true world-conquering joy and assurance of victory as a permanent and perfect goal. But at the same time it must approve itself to the heart and conscience as the necessary and highest aim of our own personality. For else it cannot bring inward freedom, but only love of reward or servile fear. The kingdom of God, as it is

revealed in Christianity, appears as the realization of the eternal thought of God himself. The Logos by whom the world was created meets us here in a human and historical form. The spirit who works in this realm as the spirit of human fellowship is God's eternal Spirit in whom he knows himself. That the human fellowship proceeding from the man Jesus is God's own purpose with man is, of course, the fundamental thought that the dogma of the divinity of Christ aims to express. Thus in the kingdom of God the "heteronomy" of Christianity meets us in its most sublime form. But this kingdom is realized in a personality of eternal significance, one that draws near the soul of every man and in which the conscience must of itself recognize its own deepest demand. Thus it can be accepted inwardly through religious conviction, and work as the satisfaction of the deepest postulates of the moral personality itself. In this kingdom of God, therefore, the autonomy of morality is also perfectly preserved. The Christian does not surrender himself servilely to a foreign ideal, but he is joyfully conquered by his own ideal. In the unity of motive (of the Spirit) the church becomes one with God, and God is revealed as love.

7. The highest good cannot consist in the egoistic satisfaction of the individual, not even in its nobler forms. Else it could not be the all-uniting principle that true morality demands. Egoism is a severing principle. And only the good in which all other moral goods are also contained can be really the highest. But it must realize, along with the highest aim of the moral community, also the highest personal aim of each individual, that is, must guarantee him the bliss in which all other true happiness is also contained.

For moral personality must never be understood as a mere means for fellowship. In the Christian kingdom of God the highest moral fellowship is the absolute goal to which every individual aim and every egoistic happiness must be unreservedly sacrificed. But at the same time the individual knows that he gains his soul in this sacrifice, that is, realizes his own highest personal ends, — not his individual temporal ends, not the happiness his senses long for, but the ends of his moral personality itself, in which he has all (treasure in the field, pearl, the one thing needful).

8. The highest good must not involve the renunciation of the moral tasks of life. For else it destroys all power of moral action and keeps personality, through fear and disinclination, in constant dependence on the world. The egoism that flies the world is just as contrary to morals as that devoted to the pursuit of worldly pleasures. While worldliness enslaves personality by the chain of desire, the negation of the world enslaves by the chain of fear. The world may, it is true, be negated as world, but not as the material for moral action offered us by God. But just as little may the highest good take the form of an external worldly organization, such as state, church, and society. For then, being itself the absolutely highest aim, it must deprive other moral organizations of all value. The state will become the servant of religious interests. Civilization will take the stamp of an unchangeable and uniform ecclesiasticism. And along with moral and religious ends, purely worldly ends of policy, of greed, and of ambition will be aimed at (Islam). The highest good must subsume worldly means and forms in itself as a thing above the world, and include changeable worldly conditions in its unchangeable eternal purpose.

The Christian kingdom of God is not of this world. It is an invisible community that finds its expression in all moral communities, but is not identical with them, and whose motives must underlie all moral action in order to give the latter true moral character. The love that is revealed in Christ has nothing at all to do with worldly conditions. It is the principle of fellowship itself, joy in the good. It is not the impulse to fellowship that arises from worldly interests and special tastes, and that is found, in different stages and of very unequal value, everywhere in the world. It is the effort, born of faith in the love of God and in the highest goal for man, to achieve moral fellowship with all men, since they are created to this end, and to promote a common advance toward the highest goal. Its sign is the cross, its purest form love of our enemies. It is absolutely above the world. It can therefore never be the sole motive to evoke a special action, nor urge to activity as a special motive along with others. But no action is Christian in which this love is not the ultimate and decisive motive. It must inspire the Christian even where he is compelled to stand up for his own rights or those of his friends, or to face the injustice and falsity of others with reproof, contradiction, and honest opposition, aiming at the welfare of another and the possibility of true moral fellowship by conflict with him. And the fellowship of men promoted by this motive, that is, by pleasure in moral fellowship with men simply as men, can never be an external reality. In the actual world men act together only under certain given conditions, as fellow-citizens or strangers, rulers or subjects, as they are guided by the same or by contradictory worldly interests, as placed in various family circumstances, or determined by like or incompatible

tastes. Only when the kingdom of God was realized on earth as a principle, that is, as an ideal in opposition to the world, did it take its stand in distinction from all external worldly organizations; only in Jesus himself do we find the picture of the fellowship of the new spiritual humanity that shone in his personality and from it with a heavenly radiance upon the earth. And only in Jesus, only as this new humanity is revealed in him and proceeds from him (*i.e.* in his redemptive work), do we see the love that is the motive in the kingdom of God manifested as the omnipotent, all-determining motive of the whole life-purpose of a personality. The kingdom of God that proceeds from him can never be a concrete reality on earth, neither as state nor as church, neither as family nor as society. And on the other hand, no external moral community is Christian in which this kingdom does not work as the highest impelling and ruling aim, and where it is not involved in a steady process of realization. Thus Christianity forbids none of the moral fellowships. But it fills each one with an eternal content, and excludes from it the merely worldly element as one destined to pass away. It cannot grow old, for its highest good is bound to no transitory conditions of history and culture, but gives its confessors the happy certainty of living for an eternal purpose and of gaining imperishable goods. It knows no unchangeable statutes, institutions, or customs. But it furnishes an eternal principle of morality that can beget ever new stages of culture. It does not aim to abolish or change the principles of morality that proceed from the reason. But it gives them, through the love that is born of God and manifested in Christ, a moral power that is above reason, that renews everything and lifts morality above the standards of the world. He

who understands this knows also that Christianity must cease to be the perfect religion, whenever the kingdom of God takes the form of an organized state with laws and methods of enforcing them; or when the fruits of human culture are looked on with distrust and indifference; or when the renunciation of possessions by certain moral communities in imitation of Jesus' poverty or of older ecclesiastical forms of the Christian life is looked on as the mark of true Christianity. Only the spirit of God that is liberty can remain unchanged. Only as understood in the evangelical sense is Christianity the perfect religion.

9. In the kingdom of God, as it is revealed in Christianity, the highest needs of personality and the decisive demands of conscience are satisfied. Moral personality gains the power to rule the world through faith in the revelation of God in Christ. He who is embraced by God's love knows that no worldly power can harm his personality, and that no region of the world created by God can be denied him as a field for moral action. The true negation of the world (the dying to the mind ruled by the world) and its true affirmation ("All is yours if ye are Christ's") come together of themselves. The lordship of the world is not realized by worldly means nor for worldly ends, but by religion, by the power of God, and for the highest ends of moral personality in moral fellowship. The highest personal goal, which is at the same time the goal of the community, hovers as an ideal guaranteed by God's promise before hope's soul and gives it strength to act and to endure. It lives as an invisible reality in the souls of believers, and gives their conduct a secret meaning and an eternal value. And it needs only believing devotion to the will of God toward man as revealed in

Jesus to belong to this kingdom. Hence, that at which religion, as religion, aims and in which its inner necessity lies, is here presented in an absolutely perfect form and one capable of no further development. Moral personality becomes free from the world, in the midst of the world's causal law, through faith in the God revealed to it in the redeeming love of Jesus; in the God who is love and life, who has created the world for the kingdom of the good and realizes it omnipotently, personality is assured of its value and its eternal goal, and happy even though "through hope." And it has the power to rule this world morally as God's world, in God's spirit, as the inalienable task of all genuine ethics demands. He who does not hold religion to be illusion, must, if he thinks logically, become a Christian, and a Christian in the sense of the free evangelical conception of Christianity. To show the highest good, in the sense of Christianity, in Jesus' personality and to proclaim it by deed, is the sole way that promises success for missions in the realms of Islam and of Buddhism. Dogmatic instruction can there count on no result at all.

### 26. *Deductions from the Christian Idea of the Highest Good*

1. *Religion and Morality.*[1] — As long as the highest good has not been rightly revealed, religion and morality must walk beside one another more or less estranged. From the common weal of society and from practical reason there arise everywhere demands on the action of the individual. The actions that bring honor and advantage to society and promote the welfare of its members appear increasingly praiseworthy to the reason. Breach of faith,

[1] *Theol. Studien und Kritiken*, 1883, pp. 60 ff.

cowardice, disobedience of existing authorities, lack of loyalty, wanton neglect of the family, offences against domestic decency and modesty, are condemned by it everywhere. It has in it an instinct for "moral love" of the good. But such morality has in itself no real connection with the nature deities and their arbitrary will, nor with the actions that aim to secure the favor of these deities. And the inner life of the individual himself is scarcely involved at all in the moral demands of society. Conscience recedes completely behind dominant usage.

A union of religion and morality begins, it is true, even here by inner necessity at various points. The mere rousing of the joy of sacrifice and of renunciation in the service of the gods, even though egoistic in intention, helped strengthen morality. Above all, wherever the cult developed in close connection with the traditions of the family and the clan, the great interests of the clan were necessarily closely bound up with it. The worship of ancestors strengthened piety, and thereby some of the most important elements of moral nobility and of the family life. And the usual close connection between civic and religious aims introduced into the life of the ancient city an element that lifted men above caprice and license, and that impresses the observer again and again.[1] And the higher civilization rose, the more the idea of city and state developed, the more did the worship of the national deities reënforce and strengthen the dread of violating the great ordinances of law, of nature, and of traditional custom. Oaths and hospitality, marriage and filial duty, were under the protection of religion. Over the great fundamental laws of domestic morals watched the avenging Erinyes.

[1] Fustel de Coulanges, *La cité antique;* Erwin Rohde, *Psyche.*

And as the cult was a part of civic duty, so, on the other hand, the valor and justice of the citizen took the form of duty toward the national gods. But still even here what the gods demanded was primarily respect for their own rights. The more they had in them elements of nature religion, the more indifferent were they thought to be toward true inner morality.[1] The highest pagan religions bore this stamp. Ceremonial injunctions, prescriptions as to food, forms of the external conduct of life, everywhere occupied the foreground. Not only among the Romans was *religio* essentially legality and the careful fulfilment of the legal claims of all the deities, and found its festal expression in gladiatorial shows and licentious spectacles; but also among the Persians there existed punctilious care in respect to external purity, to sacred formulas, to the distinction between clean and unclean creatures; nay, even in the popular religion of Israel, whose overesteem of feasts, sacrificial rites, and morally indifferent actions the prophets denounced century after century. Even in an advanced stage of paganism human sacrifice and ritual immorality were regarded as religious duties. Since conscience was determined by religious motives, it by no means always decided in accordance with moral standards. And on the other hand, in regard to the moral demands of the gods, it was always only a question of the act as such and of the relation of the individual to organized society. Character and private life were excluded. The stranger had a claim to be treated according to the principles of morality in vogue in the race only if, as "guest and stranger," he put himself under the protection of the

[1] To lay a knife in the fire, to strike a horse with the bridle, to wash one's clothes, seemed to the Asiatic nomad grave sins.

native gods, and even then not perfectly. As long as he remained really a stranger he had no right to take part in the cult of the national deities, or to expect moral justice from the members of the nation. Paganism could establish neither a moral duty of "man to man," nor an ideal of humanity.

In the prophet religions all moral relationships are subordinated to the revealed will of God, and this is no longer directed merely to outward actions. Morality and religion begin to be inwardly united, not merely in the sense that the cult is a civic duty, and civic duty has a religious basis. All the activities of society take on a religious character. But all the more does what is left in these religions of merely naturalistic and ritual elements seem a mysterious and sacred action enjoined by God himself, to be regarded as fully equal in value to the moral duties. And there arise new dangers for morality from religion itself. Morality takes the form of an unchangeable ordinance. It loses the capacity for development and the character of individuality and freedom. The slavish mind, looking to rewards, creeps in, and with it anxious timidity or superficial self-righteousness in the judgment of self.

In the Christian kingdom of God the place of statutory divine commands concerning morality and sacred forms is taken by a new principle of morality born of religion itself, the love that is the determination of God's own will. And this moral principle is the fellowship-forming one *par excellence*, and makes every immoral activity impossible. "Love does no ill to its neighbor." Thus the place of servile and interested obedience to an external command of the divinity is taken by the new moral direction of the will that is aroused with an inner necessity in

believers by the revelation of the grace of God. The belief that God's love aims to create a fellowship of love must in itself give birth to the spirit of love, if it is a real belief, not self-deception or falsehood. Hence it must show as its fruits the activity of the truly moral mind — genuine good works. The kingdom of God, as a fellowship in activities springing from the divine love revealed in Christ, includes all true moral action of necessity. Christ is the end of the law. The letter becomes spirit, submission to command conscientiousness. Action takes the stamp of individuality and of moral freedom. It knows no other unchangeable rule than this: to act under the given conditions in every case according to holy love, and to aim at the greatest possible promotion of moral fellowship. This becomes the task of the newborn personality, and carries religious happiness with it. It can become ever new in its manifestations, and yet remains always the same in its principle. Its essence lies in the mind of love. He who should give all his goods to the poor and his body to be burned would profit nothing without love (1 Cor. 13). It is based on the assurance of God's love, and hence is free from false fear and hope of reward. But it brings with it the consciousness of its value for the eternal world (reward). And its ideal stands at every moment so high above reality that humility and penitence must take the place of self-satisfaction.

From the will of God revealed in Jesus and from the idea of the kingdom of God can proceed no special ordinances having reference to the merely natural life. All that pointed to this is shadow and figure. All nature is in itself pure, being the work of God. The kingdom of God is not eating and drinking. What goes in at the

mouth does not defile a man. God is spirit and must be worshipped in spirit and in truth. The place of the ceremonial law is taken by moral demands that keep the spiritual personality always lord of nature and unconfused by the natural impulses (holy). And since the kingdom of God is the whole of God's will toward man, there is no longer any ritual duty that is not intelligible from the point of view of the moral idea. The true sacrifice is morality. To place oneself and the instruments of one's personality unreservedly at the service of God is the reasonable worship (Rom. 12, 1). Christ and God are served in our brothers (Matt. 25, 40–45). The love of God has its truth in love of our neighbor (1 John 4, 20). The all-sufficing God needs no honors and gifts. Jesus is the last victim and the last priest. Thus all moral action has a religious basis, and all religious action is morally determined. To worship God in spirit and truth is to keep alive the vigor of the religious life within us, and to give it outward expression. The external cult ceases to be the standard and the most important affair of religion. It is an incense that accompanies the offering of life; just as fast days become days in which the religious life is strengthened, and prayers at stated intervals become the revelation and inspiration of prayer "without ceasing."

Hence Christianity everywhere sinks back into lower forms of religion where external natural forms are set alongside morality as commandments of God, where in ritual is seen a magical influence in God or an act demanded by God in his own interest, and where the mark of living Christianity is found in external participation in the cult. In its observance of the Sabbath the Reformed

Church has sunk below the Christian plane, as has Pietism in the emphasis it lays on certain social actions. Consistently Christian in those respects is only Lutheran ethics. But the whole evangelical conception stands over against the Roman Catholic system of forms as a really Christian stage over against a Jewish or pagan one. A church in which the Lord's Prayer has become a ritual act (*res molesta*), which celebrates its worship in a foreign tongue, in which the House of Prayer has become the house in which God dwells in the consecrated Host, which seeks to honor God by the pomp of processions and priestly splendor, is not the expression of the thought of Jesus, even though it rouses the pagan enthusiasm of the multitude better than the worship of God in spirit and truth.

2. *Marriage.* — In all the more important realms of the moral life the Christian idea of the kingdom of God has been the first to create perfect principles adapted to every sound development. Above all in marriage. As long as there is no goal above this world and so no absolute dignity in moral personality, marriage must always have essentially the character of a natural relation. As a fact the position of woman and the conception of marriage and marriage customs have varied greatly among the pagan races, with their degree of civilization and national character. The physical factor of marriage receives religious emphasis. Woman is a means in the hands of the stronger man and his property. Woman's honor is the property and right of the clan. Children have no rights over against the father. Polygamy, in which the personal dignity of woman is lost, is nowhere rejected on principle. In this matter Islam has remained wholly on the plane of

the pagan conception, mitigated by reasonable treatment; just as in its maintenance of slavery as a principle it shares the pagan misapprehension of the dignity of man. On the other hand in its dread of nature Buddhism comes near regarding marriage as a lower form of life which the truly pious man cannot share. And wherever the natural has been regarded as the limitation and not as the expression of the divine will, there has been an inclination to a similar verdict. Even Christianity, when it first appeared, has inclined in this direction and found a higher perfection in abstinence over against the strongest natural appetite and the one most interwoven with sin. Even in Paul this tendency is unmistakable in connection with the spiritualism that at that time ruled all thoughtful men; though he bases renunciation of marriage only on the special tasks of a religious community summoned to a struggle with a hostile world and waiting its speedy glorification. In the account of Jesus' childhood in Matthew and Luke such a view plainly plays its part. And the impression of the life of Jesus himself has certainly worked in this direction. But not until its coalescence with the idealistic and dualistic currents of nobler Greek culture did the Christian church raise the superiority of celibacy over marriage to a principle, and give it legal expression in monasticism and for the episcopate. It was a very bold step of the Reformers to proclaim the divine right of matrimony in the face of the usage of a thousand years and of apparently condemnatory passages of Scripture, even though with no flawless logic. But in the true nature of Christianity there lies, rather, an ideal conception of marriage. Woman is the equal of man as a personality of eternal value to God, subordinate to man only

in the realm where the special capacities of the man assign him the leading place. Like him, she is a moral end and not a means. The physical mystery of sexual love is pure and springs from God's creative will, but only where it is put in true marriage (monogamy) at the service of a moral good. Otherwise it is rejected, with an energy and clearness that the old world never knew, as a desecration of personality (πορνεία). Marriage is thought of as instituted by God and indissoluble where it is a marriage of true Christians. And through the supernal redeeming love revealed in Jesus, wedded love becomes a good of eternal significance and the image of that highest love that unites the church with Jesus (Eph. 5, 32).

3. *Culture, Art, and Science.* — The realms of art, social life, and science are in themselves, of course, independent of religious conditions. Born of inalienable instincts of human nature, they develop wherever a certain stage of culture and sufficient development of talent offer them the necessary conditions. They may be very undeveloped beside high piety, highly developed beside a low state of religion. As they had in pagan antiquity a period of bloom never again attained in many respects, so also they are the splendor of the worldly age of the Renaissance and flower most in the unbelieving circles of our society, that fancy they have in them a valid substitute for the religion they have lost. Hence they often present themselves as dangerous surrogates of piety. And in the same way the life of trade with its results, and the higher developments of private rights, depend in no way on religion. But since without health in these spheres a human culture cannot develop and grow noble, only that religion

can be looked on as perfect which in its highest principle meets them with influences that do not check, but promote and purify. It lies, it is true, in the nature of religion that all energetic piety, conscious of possessing the one thing needful, must be inclined to face these interests, when they make claim to satisfy the soul, with a certain hostility, and that every genuine religion in its earliest realization is indifferent to them. In art and science the spirit of a people, with its dangers and sins, expresses itself most strongly and enticingly. A highly developed society easily seduces to the lust of the world. We cannot serve God and mammon. And where these elements are strongly developed in a race and rule the popular soul, they easily become dangerous rivals, and try to assert themselves as surrogates, of morality and religion. Hence Christianity has at first met the flower of Greek culture and morals with indifference, nay, with dislike. It has seen without pain the spiritual and material wealth of antique life go to ruin. But this is, in fact, only a proof that the new religion of redemption was conscious of offering what was better and more indispensable; and that it was and aimed to be nothing else than living religion. Even where it is only a question of the honor and existence of a nation, the achievements of art and culture, and the riches they have created, must be counted as naught. How much more must they, in comparison with the highest good, be counted as worthless things which the pious man can without hesitation renounce. Hence no inference can be drawn from the historical attitude of early Christianity toward the culture of a world that it aimed to replace with a new one, in regard to the attitude of the Christian religion itself toward these interests. It can only be a question,

whether Christianity is able to make room in the pure development of its principle for these interests of humanity. Buddhism, that on principle makes men indifferent to them, and Islam, that tries to maintain the status of knowledge and society of an undeveloped age as a constituent part of religion, cannot be the religion of a healthfully expanding humanity.

Christianity cannot offer these interests positive aid in the way in which many of the higher stages of paganism have done. In its eyes the beautiful is not the real revelation of the divine, pleasure in life not the life with God, wealth not the expression of the favor of God. In its eyes poetry and art are not in themselves worship. For it the moral, not the æsthetic, is the decisive factor in judging the value of human life. Hence it has neglected the art and the joy of possession of its pagan contemporaries, and has seen them perish without regret. And every attempt to return to the exaggerated pagan estimate of these interests must be vigorously rejected by Christianity as often as it recurs. It can see its own essence as little in the splendors of the age of the Renaissance as in the modern exaltation of art and artists. The naïve joy in the pleasures of the natural life and the "religious" attitude toward the beautiful are impossible for the Christian (lust of the eyes, lust of the flesh, pride of life). The one thing needful can be neither art nor wealth, but the perfect moral fellowship born of the love of God. And the Christian can be "happy," even when the goods of culture and wealth are denied him. Nor does Christianity in itself beget science. Its need is the faith that can be more perfect in the μικροί than in the scholar.

But Christianity in its real nature knows nothing of a monkish contempt for these interests. Nature is for it God's work, given man to be moulded by his spirit. It teaches "all is yours," "to the pure all things are pure." It bids its disciples long for everything that is lovely and of good report. Teaching us to see in nature a holy revelation of God, it furnishes the scientific instinct after knowledge a religious basis, and elevates it to a duty. It fills the soul with ideals that must produce a unique art. It ennobles work into a service of God, and hallows property as a means for the moral tasks of life and for works of love among our fellow-men. In Christ the divine is conceived as human, that is, as an object of artistic representation. Christian instinct must, it is true, feel it to be pagan for art to attempt to represent God himself in human form. But in Christ it asks to see God in his human revelation. And in the "men of God" it sees the one divine spirit in the richness and variety of personal human life. As an historical religion in the highest sense of the phrase, Christianity offers inexhaustible inducements to all mental activities. The school is the daughter of the church. The cult has produced a new and unique development of architecture, painting, and music. Only for sculpture does Christianity offer hardly any positive impulse. For the beauty that this art can express, the beauty of external form, based on the life of nature, is not the beauty in which the divine life shines upon us, according to Christian feeling. Sculpture must always choose by preference the gods and heroes of the higher nature religions. The "man of sorrows" is no fit subject for the sculptor. The "teacher" is no sufficiently inspiring one for him. The Christian ideal, that aims to

present the beauty of the soul, is much better adapted for the art of the painter. The development of the soul by inner experience of the divine and by its historical revelation has created a loftier, deeper, and riper poetry than the old world knew. Not only Dante, Calderon, Klopstock, Milton, Tersteegen, Paul Gerhard, but also Shakespeare, Goethe, and Schiller, cannot be conceived apart from the presupposition of Christianity. The incomparably greater wealth of thought and of spiritual life that we meet in Hamlet or Faust, even when compared with the noblest figures of classic poetry, shows what Christianity has contributed to the national soul. Only the popular epic, born of the naïveté of an age forever fled, a child of the paganism whose deities passed into heroic legend, can never again be created in its old charm by a reflective age.

And where love is the ruling principle, a social intercourse must grow up that reflects the real joy in fellowship and the true nature of noble recreation, instead of the mere appearance of mutual helpfulness. This love alone is able, by a better organization of the life of toil and by personal sacrifice, to overcome social ills, to free toil as well as wealth of its pagan stamp. However little Christianity aimed at a change of the social conditions of the great pagan world (it hoped in a few years to see a new and perfect Christian world), it is nevertheless certain that the necessary development of its ideas has transformed the laboring classes from slaves and mere tools into men with moral and civil rights, having their share of the fruits of culture. And all that is sound in the social efforts of our time is really "applied Christianity."[1]

[1] Social democracy itself rests, it is true, exclusively on the pagan principles of the absolute value of sensual pleasure and the rights of the natural instincts.

The achievements in this field and the forces of mercy and love that Christianity has disclosed are the most convincing defence of Christianity; and in them the Christianity of the present will have to give the proof of its imperishable significance. For foreign missions, too, but above all for the victory of Christianity in the lands of the Christian church itself, the might of redeeming love is the decisive power.

But only that Christianity is the perfect religion that in all spheres keeps itself free both from pagan devotion to the things of this world and from puritanical contempt for the beautiful and delightful and cold aversion to profitable and pleasant fellowship. In the conception of Sunday a good standard can be found for the health of Christianity. Where it is a day of worship, of kindliness, and of pleasure in all that is good and fair, it represents the Christian idea, in contrast with Jewish narrowness and with pagan incapacity to rise above the monotony of toil and of amusement. And as long as the church in any way takes a suspicious attitude toward the full and frank development of science, as if it were a danger to religion, there still clings to her something of the lower religious stage which looks on the kingdom of God as an external phenomenon, one bound to certain definite results of culture and knowledge, and hence at bottom a worldly one.

4. *Church and State.*[1] — From its start religion has not been an affair of the individual, least of all of his inner life, but a concern of the family, the clan, the city. The head of the social body was also the representative of the cult. The gods wanted no worship from strangers. Paganism was absolutely tolerant, leaving to each people

[1] Schultz, *Staat und Kirche in der Religionsgeschichte*, an address, 1895.

its special cult undisturbed, and regarding it as pledged to that cult. But it demanded observance of the cult from all the members of the clan and from those entering it. In this respect paganism was absolutely intolerant. Its principle was, *cujus regio, ejus religio.* In marriage the transference of the wife from her own domestic deities to those of the husband was necessarily included. Hence, as soon as a real civic life began, state and church were one, that is, all state functions were religious and all ecclesiastical ones civic. The life of the state was holy. Its wars were fought *pro aris et focis.* And although the state's interference in religious interests, and the exploiting of religious for political ends had a disastrous effect, nevertheless there lay in the union of patriotism and piety a great power. Even in Persia and in Israel this relation existed originally. "Thy people shall be my people, and thy God my God" (Ruth). But the logical development of the prophet religions involves the impulse to realize a religious community outside of tribe and state, that is, to produce a church alongside of the state (universalism). In Islam, to be sure, where the Prophet was at the same time chieftain, and where his successors claim to be heads at once of the church and the state, the state is at bottom only the church equipped with executive powers, either as a union of all believers or as an organization of a part of them. Law springs from the religious revelation (Koran). Religious customs are civic duties. War is a religious act. And the state has the tendency to become a universal kingdom of Islam. A national state and a church developed purely religiously are in this case alike impossible.

In Buddhism and in Christianity, on the other hand,

church and state are separate, and it is the church only that has sprung from religion. The power of the state was originally indifferent to both religions, nay, often bitterly hostile to them. It was as societies of believers indifferent as to what their civil or national affiliations might be that the confessors of these two religions first gained their consciousness of fellowship. In Christianity there is neither Greek nor barbarian, Jew nor Gentile. Even for the Buddhist, believers cease to belong to a caste. And the church had no influence on the form of the state. This situation, in comparison with the corruption of later ages, has often seemed ideal. And it shows at least that genuine Christianity has no need to shrink from the complete severance of church and state. But the ideal of the Middle Ages, the consistent return of the church to its original poverty and to its indifference to the organized life of the nation, is by no means the Christian one. Where love of country and civic virtue are on principle without religious foundations; where the church must create for itself a corporate life to which religion in itself offers no impulse; where the national life as such is not in general open to religious influences and possibly completely closed to them; and where the life of the state must seem to the devout man at bottom undivine, a kingdom of this world over against the kingdom of God, — this can only be the result of unfavorable circumstances. Buddhism shows its incapacity to become a religion of humanity by the fact that, even where circumstances are favorable, it has shown no interest in the state and its affairs, has organized itself as a community of ascetics, and has left the state no rôle but that of patron and almsgiver to the church.

Christianity of itself gives birth to no prescriptions on state, constitution, and law. It can be united to any moral form of state and can thrive in any honest party. But it sees in state and law, as in the family and society, divine ordinances that it needs for its healthful development. It therefore fills love of country and sense of law with its own peculiar religious life. And in the principle of love it furnishes an inextinguishable impulse to so help mould the life of the civil community that its moral ends can be attained more and more perfectly. Christianity is the principle of legality and of progress at once. It can suffer neither indifference to the state nor its degradation to ends foreign to its God-given purpose. The true Christian must be a good citizen in a higher sense than others. From the Christian religion flows unceasingly the effort to abolish all institutions in the state that harm the moral dignity of personality or make certain social classes incapable of true moral fellowship, and to level all unjust inequalities arising from the undue power of wealth or rank. Christian love is the principle of social reform. But the community of religious life that Christianity begets, the church, is by its nature totally independent of legal and national conditions. It must always be ready to provide from its own resources, in case of need, the means of maintaining its existence, and to protect itself by religious forces. Its inexhaustible treasury is the self-sacrificing contributions of the faithful. Its last weapon is martyrdom. Where either should fail the church would be dead. And it must let its religious and moral life be limited by no laws that have not sprung from its own nature. But inasmuch as Christianity honors the state as an ordinance of God, it can obediently subordinate the civil and legal

side of the church's existence to it, and in common with every organization that promotes the ends of human culture, claim its protection and kindness; although it knows that it must also be able to dispense with these. On the other hand, it must decline the interference of the state with its own forms of life. Pure doctrine, cult, missions, etc., it must not try to establish by the aid of the state. Hence the normal situation, according to Christian ideas, is a close union of church and state, of profit to each and without mingling or conflict. The church is not the kingdom of God, nor the state a merely worldly institution. And even if the state of itself withdraws from union with the church, still Christianity does not stop contributing to it forces of moral strength and growth from the impulse of its inner nature. It is true that genuine Christianity must cast off the errors that cling to it historically from earlier religious stages. A state church and a territorial system are pagan. The theocratic development of the church and its wish to exploit the resources of the state for its own ends answer to the ideals of Islam, not of Christianity. The distaste for any participation of the religious man in the affairs of the state is Buddhistic. And the dislike for order and organization in the church contradicts the principle of love that demands community of life even in religion and does not suffer its members at their pleasure to limit their efforts to their own salvation or to the religious life of narrow circles.

## Section 2: Christianity the Perfect Revelation

### 27. *Christ*

1. That in Christianity we have the perfect revelation of God to man, the apologetics of the eighteenth

century sought to show chiefly by pointing to the special historical form of the revelation which has given birth to the religion of the Bible. It claimed that miracles and prophecy were intended to rouse confidence in the supernatural character of the history here laid before us, and in the divine character of its transmission (inspiration). The very nature of religion and of revelation implies, as we have seen, the unjustifiableness of the assumption that the true revelation can be recognized by such external peculiarities of origin and manner of communication as can be proved even to unbelievers, and thus distinguished from merely alleged revelations. And we must frankly confess that, in view of present historical methods, this method of defending Christianity can have no prospect of success. Miracles are accepted only where belief is already present, and hence cannot of themselves beget it. The unique character of the Biblical books (inspiration) is evident only to him who has already accepted the revelation of the divine that we find in them. And the probability that an event of the past has been given a miraculous coloring by uncritical piety will always seem greater than the other alternative, viz. that in a few cases the laws governing the sequence of things and approved by daily experience have shown themselves invalid. What is to arouse belief in us must not be something merely past. It must be able to show itself at any time alive and present. Hence the defence of the perfection of Christian revelation must not base itself primarily on the argument that certain historical events in ancient times have by their supernatural character shown themselves to be revelations of God; but on the fact that the self-communication of God in the person of Christ, that is always open to our examination, approves

itself to us by its very nature as the full revelation of the divine, not as a theoretic ideal, but as an inspiring reality. Christ himself is the apology of Christianity, not the various historical incidents of his earthly life. And the new life proceeding from him to man is the apology of Christ, not individual acts that he has done or the individual prophecies that he has uttered.

2. In paganism the revelations of the divinity do not concern themselves at all with religion or morality, and have neither history nor sequence. They take the form of scattered announcements from the world of spirits, and are attached to certain localities and aim at definite worldly or ritual ends (spiritism, hypnotism). Prodigies, magic formulas, and visions are the forms the revelation takes. It is by no means thought of as limited to historical events of an earlier time, but is always expected to occur afresh in the same fashion in which it took place of old. And it really offers something typical. Revelation is not antiquated. "The world of spirits is not closed." But these revelations have chiefly to do with the cult, and are connected with certain shrines or with remarkable natural phenomena whose interpretation belongs to the priests. There is neither historical progress nor personal conviction. In its original form even prophecy kept wholly within the limits of this sort of revelation. Whether the prophet take his stand on his professional skill or on ecstatic inspiration, his duty is to receive and interpret certain announcements of the deity that have significance for the sphere of secular interests.

But as soon as religion reaches the prophet stage an inward change comes over the figures of the prophets. They now experience in their souls announcements of the

will of deity to the community, that determine its life and fortunes and aim to establish in it a standard of piety and morality. In Israel we meet this new sort of prophecy, and can trace its development from the primitive type, with special distinctness. A religion that rests on such revelations of God through prophets is thereby permanently linked to its historical origin. The individual revelations from which it arises constitute a history. And if the community is no longer conscious of a living revelation in its midst, it still feels itself religiously and morally determined by the past revelation and its record, and looks on its religion as finished, even if the possibility of a further revelation is not theoretically excluded. The two unite without contradiction. After the formation of the canon the Jewish scribes regarded religion as a fact and, as far as their own religious life was concerned, as finished. And yet they have never denied the theoretic possibility of its further development and completion, as presupposed by prophecy. In Islam, on the other hand, the revelation contained in the Koran is held to be absolutely final. And even Christianity, in the presence of the assertions of the perfectibility of its religious essence, cannot admit the possibility of a really higher revelation, as long as it holds to the doctrine that Jesus is the Son of God. In such prophet religions do we first find firm religious convictions of a final character, objective religious fellowship, and unified moral and religious conceptions. This gives them the capacity to awake in their members an immovable personal conviction. But it carries with it also, together with the new danger of intolerance, other not inconsiderable disadvantages. Later generations must accept the revelation on authority as an historical one,

without any personal experience of it. Hence arises the danger of blind faith in the letter on the one hand, and of the undermining of religion by historical criticism on the other. And because such religions are naturally in many respects of a piece with the culture of the age of revelation and with the personality of its recipients, they have a tendency to oppose all further spiritual development. They grow old. Moreover, every prophet who is no more than a prophet must know himself to be personally distinct from the revelation that he receives, as from something foreign to him. Hence he cannot communicate the religion that proceeds from him in the shape of a principle living in him, but only as law and doctrine, and creates thereby ordinances and dogma.

3. The revelation in Christianity is prophetic in the true sense. But it is more than prophetic. It unites the advantages of prophet and nature religions, and escapes the defects of both, by something unique and new. It is historical in the truest sense. A personality in which we find the full revelation of God for human life, and which lays absolute claim to the confidence of every man, claims to be an authority for all time as God's Son, King of the kingdom of God, the Lord, the incarnate revelation (Logos). And the record of the effects of this personality is enshrined in a literature that has sprung living from them and claims to be regarded as the fixed norm for all times and for all developments of this religion. But the revelation is in this case not merely historical. The historical personality presents itself, in Scripture and in the effects by which it has stamped itself on the hearts of men, to every age and every soul as present and living. And a new principle of life becomes effective (Holy Spirit), in which every mem-

ber of the community can have an inward and personal share. Hence the true Christian experiences the revelation personally. God in the person of Jesus enters into intercourse with his soul. And he is conscious of the presence in sacred literature of the same Spirit that he can experience, as a divine life of revelation, in himself. The old promise of the covenant of the Spirit and of the pouring out of the Spirit on all members of the community is here fulfilled (Joel 3, Jer. 31). The Christian is at once scribe and prophet. What he receives historically can become in him a personal experience, an immediate conviction, an enthusiasm that suffuses all life. And hence historical doubt can, to be sure, attack the external history of Jesus, but not the revelation of God in him, and can criticise the literary and historical dress of sacred Scripture, but not its religious and moral truth. Jesus testifies of himself to the conscience as the second Adam, in whom the effort to attain true humanity finds satisfaction, and from whom proceeds a new type of humanity that mankind has never been able to evoke of itself. And Holy Scripture bears witness to itself by the Spirit working and ruling in it as a whole (*testimonium Sp. S. internum*), whose witness is in no way shaken by the inconsistencies of the separate books, nor by their various literary and scientific defects. Christianity has not been revealed as a "book." And because in Christianity the revelation of God is completely identical with the personal life and the religious self-consciousness of its herald, it no longer presents itself to the community as ordinance and doctrine, but as the disclosure of an inner unified religious life and as the self-communication of perfect piety. As the spirit of this personal life, it promotes the development of per-

sonality, and can, in every age and at every stage of culture, take new forms and yet remain the same. It is a question of the living revelation of God in a still active personality, not of the authority of a past age and of a man who is only an historical figure. Jesus stays with his own and in them. He sends his Spirit of truth as their "comforter." "Jesus Christ, the same yesterday, to-day, and forever." And only personal life has the power to beget personal life.

4. That this conviction of the Christian community in regard to the character of the revelation which it has in Christ, is not a pious self-deception, making of a simple historical prophet the self-revelation of God, but that it answers to the reality in Jesus, apologetics can, it is true, not prove, like a scientific truth, to those resolved to oppose it or to the religiously insusceptible. For this the historical sources are too meagre, and, as witnesses to the faith in Jesus, too little inexpugnable in the presence of a criticism that applies the probe of historical investigation without faith. And how could one ever prove scientifically the unique quality of personality? But what is based for believers on an inward religious experience can be made clear to all who are accessible to moral and religious impressions and who are fair critics. Even if a sufficiently certain picture of Jesus and his life can no longer be had, the principle of "sufficient cause" would speak for the claim of Christian conviction. And we must not regard it as accidental, that in Holy Scripture itself the verdict on the character of the personality of Jesus as a revelation is submitted to the judgment of conscience and of moral experience (John 7, 17). That Jesus has created the moral and religious ideal by which

Christianity lives and toward which it aims, that he has identified his life with and given it for this ideal, can be doubted by no reasonable man; nor that for him this ideal has been no foreign one, that had dawned on him perhaps in the highest hours of his religious life or in ecstatic exaltation, but one identical with his personal consciousness of his calling. In the circle of his earliest disciples there is nowhere any conceivable starting-point for this new life. Least of all in Paul, who has himself been conquered by it and has then incorporated it in the formulas of theological thought. The existence of a community of men filled by a new religious spirit that they can have received from no one but Jesus, is a fact that makes every explanation impossible but this: that Jesus is the personal revelation of a new life that daily approves itself to the conscience as the true human realization of the divine, as the true liberation of personality from the world, and as the true bliss amid sin, guilt, and death. In Jesus' own personal life, and nowhere else, has the sonship in God dawned, and with it the assurance of the eternal and supernal significance of human personality. In Jesus' religious experience God is revealed as love, light, and life, and the goal of man as the fellowship of love, truth, and happiness. All this would be unintelligible if Jesus had not really been what he was convinced that he was, and what his church sees in him.

5. But even an historical proof of the dignity of Jesus as the perfect revelation of God is entirely possible for us, provided it is not meant that we are to prove, for instance, the dogmatic statement of the belief in him (divinity of Christ) scientifically, or show him to be the greatest philosopher and theologian, or guarantee the historical

trustworthiness of all the Biblical narratives about him. On the miracles reported of Jesus apologetics will certainly never be able to base such a proof. For however certain it is that the original impression made by his life would not be intelligible without the marvels he wrought, and however indisputable the piety and truthfulness of the narrators in the Gospels may be, nevertheless the possibility cannot be denied that the enthusiasm of pious and uncritical circles has placed these acts in a more marvellous light. And even if these narratives be accepted, they could not place Jesus qualitatively above Moses, Elisha, and Elijah. They would therefore only prove his quality as prophet, a thing which even opponents do not deny.

6. For the disciples of the Lord, doubtless the appearances of the Risen One have been the final decisive proof of his being the King of the kingdom of God and the perfect revelation of God; and the fact of these appearances can be doubtful to no reasonable man, however inconsistent the reports of the several incidents may be. The disciples have gone out into the world as witnesses to the resurrection, and have died for their testimony, as they have lived for it. Hence the fact is absolutely certain that they have seen the Crucified, even if the way in which it took place must, in its detail, always remain historically a subject of dispute. But they have seen him as believers. He who does not share this faith of theirs will attach to the fact, which even he cannot doubt, all sorts of questions that are not lightly to be put aside. It cannot be ignored that the attempt has been made to explain the appearances of the Risen One, as far as they are historically established, from the so often mysterious

realm of visions. It is true that this explanation must ignore many important points of the narratives as unintelligible. It is compelled to make conjectures as to the mental attitude of the first disciples of Jesus that are little probable. As the conditions necessary for such visions on the part of the disciples, we should have to assume, along with the excitement and shock that we certainly can assume in them, also a very great vigor of hope and energy of belief grounded on definite expectations, — things that we have no right to assume of the deeply stricken men. Still, such an assumption would not be absolutely impossible. And in Paul we find many of the predisposing conditions, which, in the case of a man subjectively disposed to visions, would enable us to understand why the victory of Jesus, whom he hated and who nevertheless did not leave his soul at peace, manifested itself to his soul in visible form. But Paul puts his seeing of Christ on exactly the same plane with the experiences of the first apostles (1 Cor. 15); hence, from the point of view of scientific conviction, little more could be proved than that the personality of Jesus was not checked by the death on the cross in its effect on his followers, but attained a new spiritual field of activity. But this would by no means decide the question here under discussion. To faith the question is a very different one. It is, to be sure, not certain in what bodily form the Risen One revealed himself; whether his grave was found empty, whether the "three days" of rest in the grave are an inference from Scripture or are historical, whether the appearances of the Risen One took place only in Galilee, etc. For these are historical questions, with which faith has nothing to do, and which do not affect its content.

But it is convinced that by the power of God the Crucified has been revealed to his followers as the victor and Living One, in order to strengthen their faith, — a strengthening that was indispensable, — however it may have come to pass in detail. And it is convinced that this Jesus to-day reveals himself to his disciples, though in another way, as victor and as the goal of history. But these are convictions of faith on which apologetics must not base itself.

7. It is far more a question of the total picture of this personality, whose living impression meets us unmistakably in the precipitate it has left in the traditions of the community. Jesus has proclaimed the will of God, not as theologian or philosopher or scribe, but as prophet, with no other proof than his own personal assurance, even where he had to put himself in opposition to ruling views and current piety (*ὡς ἐξουσίαν ἔχων*). He has revealed the final will of God toward man, as the one who alone knew God and alone was acknowledged by God. He has accordingly simply made the fact of his own religious life the basis of his church. And so he works even now on all who open their hearts to the personality of Jesus disclosed in Holy Scripture. He stands before men as the Son of God, and calls the prophets only servants. He is full of loyalty and fidelity to God's earlier revelations. Every jot and tittle of the law is sacred to him. But he sets his "I say unto you" over against the teachings of the fathers, and sees in the ordinances of the Old Covenant something provisional, the true will of God being only imperfectly realized in them. The code of Sinai receives in his interpretation a meaning that goes vastly beyond its letter. From the prohibition of perjury springs the religious condemnation of "swearing."

Murder and adultery are recognized in the mere hate and lust of the heart. The Sabbath becomes a means for attaining the ends of man; divorce, a remedy for human sin. Sacrifice must be subordinated to love of neighbor. He awakes in the just penitence, and in the sinner trust in the gracious will of God. His preaching of the kingdom of God is, at the same time, a preaching of himself. For him his disciples are to give up everything, as for the good itself. He, therefore, who recognizes that the Christian kingdom of God is in fact the perfect good, must also be convinced that in Jesus God's whole will toward man has been personally revealed.

8. The certainty of the justness of this impression — a certainty completely independent of all historical questions — can be gained by every one who, with honest faith in the ideal that lives in his conscience, puts before himself the picture of this new human life set forth in Holy Scripture as proceeding from Jesus. The reality of the good, its rights, and its power to rule the world of experience meet us, in the picture of the personality thus revealed, with an immediate power that puts to shame every doubt. There is no alternative but an obstinate aversion of the will from it, or a penitent submission to it. So Jesus testifies of himself to every one as the judge and the lord. In him, to-day as of old, God addresses our hearts, to testify to them his love and to disclose to them his true will. In this personality that knows itself one with the good, and that, out of love for men as creatures destined and called in spite of their sins to the kingdom of God, freely gives all worldly goods and at last its own worldly life, is revealed the sin-conquering and guilt-forgiving love of God with unmistakable power. It witnesses to itself

in the heart, and does it so unmistakably that we can be inwardly certain of possessing God in Jesus perfectly and blissfully, as the one who lifts above the world and annuls every worldly woe. Thus he bears witness to himself as the Saviour, as the one who reveals the true nature of God and beyond whom there can be for man no higher revelation of God. This certainty holds, it is true, only for those who bow themselves honestly and unreservedly before the ideal of the good aroused in them ("who will do his will"), and who open their hearts in trust to the highest realization of the divine mind, here become a fact. But no one whom Jesus has touched can withdraw from him without overlooking or suppressing the most certain and most valuable elements in his own life.

9. To try to compose a picture of the moral and religious uniqueness of Jesus from certain prominent virtues in his life would betray a complete lack of comprehension of the essence of a moral personality. And the attempt to arrive at the "perfect sinlessness" of Jesus by the path of a purely historical investigation, must show from the start a misapprehension of the limits of scientific knowledge and of the peculiar nature of the records we have. It is certain that the narrators of the life of Jesus mean to tell nothing of him that is not in perfect accord with their ideal of morality. Their own conviction of his moral perfection is of course firm, even if it were not expressly stated (2 Cor. 5, 21; Heb. 4, 15). And even if we should find in their narratives elements that according to our moral standards might seem to make Jesus' sinlessness doubtful, we should always have to assume that they are not so understood by the narrators, and can suppose that the dubious element in them is due to the narrators' undevel-

oped moral judgment. But the objections to the moral perfection of Jesus that are drawn from the Gospels fail to see: (1) That the individual actions of a personality must be judged in connection with its calling and its given conditions of life. No contemporary of Jesus would have doubted that a prophet had the right to use natural objects for the purpose of the revelation of God's will, without regard to scruples that might be deduced from rights of property or questions of utility. This sets aside the criticism of the story of the dried-up fig-tree, or of the swine of the Gadarenes, as a misapprehension. Even Jesus' enemies have not disputed the right of a prophet to perform these actions or to cleanse the temple, but have only demanded that he establish his claim to be a prophet. The repulse of a pagan woman from participation in the grace of God so wonderfully manifested in Israel was Jesus' duty as a prophet sent to Israel. He could depart from this only in exceptional cases, where the higher claim of the faith of the petitioner had approved itself. The special way in which Jesus led his life, his renunciation of the joys of home and family, his aloofness from the life of labor, were the necessary sacrifices imposed upon him by his unique calling of Saviour, that took precedence of all other tasks. And the narrative in Luke 2 means by no means to report of Jesus a lack of filial obedience or a blameworthy caprice. His parents had left Jesus in the sacred city, and he only expressed his surprise that they had looked for him there and not remembered that he could be found in no other spot than the temple of God. Or else (2) such objections try to measure the idealistic picture of the incarnate Logos in the Fourth Gospel — one removed far above man and his world — by the standards of ordi-

nary human morality. For against the defenders of the historical use of this Gospel, it must be most distinctly asserted, that the way in which Jesus appears in it (however marvellously beautiful, pure, and sublime as an expression of the belief of the community in its Lord, the incarnate God) would, nevertheless, if it were a question of the actions and words of an earthly and historical personality, not coincide with the pure conception of moral perfection. An earthly man, even though conscious of "his divinity," would have spoken differently to his mother than is reported in John 2, 4. A prophet who had come to save his people would not, after a few preliminaries, and on the ground of miracles such as were told also of the ancient men of God, have dared to require of the multitude belief in his divinity, nor to account their very comprehensible astonishment and hesitation to them as mortal sin (John 5, 19 ff.; 6, 41 ff.; 8, 42 ff.). A man, however superior he may have been, would have had to give a more honest answer to the questions of his brothers than that in John 7, 8. All these statements are sacred and true if they are taken as traits of the picture of that Master whom the Spirit had transfigured in the eyes of his followers (John 16, 14), and whom their faith led them to glorify in respect to his divine significance and his elevation above the limitations of the world. For an historical estimate of his personality they are inapplicable.

But it is here a question of a personality, only a small part of whose life has become the subject of narrative at all. And these narratives have proceeded from enthusiastic faith, not from historical interest, and have undergone no criticism. Under such circumstances it is simply impossible to conduct a cogent historical argument for Jesus'

sinlessness in the strictest sense. It is psychologically wholly false to maintain that transient moral obscurations and weaknesses at the period of childish growth must necessarily have left permanent scars on the conscience and have hindered a prophet, after he had attained perfect peace with God and gained the consciousness of being engaged in a great prophetic task, from speaking to his contemporaries as physician of souls and herald of the grace of God, without reference to his own sins. It will be difficult to persuade a conscientious man who does not as yet believe in Jesus, that it must have been impossible for Jesus to say the Lord's Prayer with his disciples without expressly omitting the ἄφες, with which, however, Matt. 19, 17 seems so well to agree. The absolute sinlessness of Jesus is no result of historical study, and hence, too, no dogma of apologetics. If it is understood that "sin" is something more than the conscious transgression of definite injunctions of God, it will also be seen that the question of "sinlessness" leads into those depths of the inner life which no historical observation penetrates. The sinlessness of Jesus is a dogmatic doctrine, an inference that thought makes from faith's experience of the influence of Jesus. It is true that even dogmatics will have to surrender the utterly inapt negative word "sinlessness," because, if too low a view of sin be taken, it says much too little, and does not really characterize the peculiar character of the personality of Jesus at all; while, if a really deep view of the ultimate nature of human sin be taken, it is apt to beget a Docetic view of the historical Jesus. The word must be replaced by the positive phrase "religious and moral perfection," in which the creative genius of Jesus really finds expression.

10. But still it is possible to prove what is of most importance for apologetics. Beyond all doubt, Jesus has spoken and acted from the conviction of being in his own person the full and blessed revelation of the will of God toward man, and of being parted by no worldly interests of his individual will from the loving will of God. And inasmuch as he scorned to appear as an ideal of righteousness, as understood by the school dominant among his people, — nay, down to his death on the cross, opposed this ideal, — the suspicion of any intentional doctrinal presentment of his person is, in the presence of his personality, not to be maintained for a moment. In the same way the possibility is excluded that there could have been a contradiction between his own consciousness of himself and the impression that his disciples received of him. For though a man is not necessarily bound in his intercourse with others to give expression to his own full self-consciousness, a prophet who demanded that his disciples stake their life and death on his personality, and who with biting severity reproached the leaders of his people with *ὑπόκρισις*, would have been guilty of a morally annihilating lack of truth, if he had not given, as far as was possible, perfect and exhaustive expression to his inner life in relation to God and God's kingdom. If penitence and atonement had been the presuppositions of his own religious life, he would have had to cry to sinners: "Seek grace and pardon in God's paternal love, as I have done." Instead of speaking of temptations overcome (Matt. 4), he would have had to tell of the hours in which he had overcome all sense of the separation from God and all fear of the judgment, and so had become the beloved Son of God. But not the least suggestion of such

experiences is to be found in his preaching of the gospel. He is, it is true, a man who struggles with temptation, — not good like God whom no temptation touches. But he is free from all trace of repentance and need of reconciliation. He does not yearn to be one with the divine purpose, but has it in him as the aim of his own life. He is not sick, but the physician of the sick; not in need of redemption, but the Saviour and helper. He is the only-beloved Son of God; in the eyes of his disciples in full personal union with the idea of the good and with the kingdom that he promises. And of a misconception, even though an unconscious one, of the relation of his own personality to God and to itself, no unprejudiced man can think in the case of Jesus. This self-consciousness he has held fast even in the deepest abysses of human suffering. By its unity, assurance, and joy his personality carries home the conviction again and again of its oneness with what man is to be, and of its complete fellowship with God. His religious humility and his childlike mind, along with a royal loftiness toward all that is prized on earth; his indifference to egoistic and sensuous satisfactions in full and unreserved surrender to God's own purpose; the holy delicacy and healthfulness of his comprehension of nature and man; the tireless might of his redeeming love; his royal inward happiness amid external poverty; the charm of his harmonious and yet powerful and strongly marked character, — all bear witness to him. Jesus' life is the life of God himself among men, without any admixture of egoistic aims. The motive power of his life is the divine love itself that seeks the salvation of its brethren, a love free from all worldly conditions and bounds. That is the beauty of the "fairest among the sons of men," a beauty that has over

and over again proved more powerful than all the dubiety and criticism of the sages of the world. In the prayer for his enemies on the lips of the dying Christ, in the ceaseless service and help in which every selfish worldly motive vanished, this beauty of the Only-begotten finds its most conspicuous expression.

11. All this we find in full clearness and splendor in Jesus' death on the cross. He has given his life a sacrifice for his brethren, as the price of the good, amid shame and agony. Not, like the martyrs after him, in the strength of an already victorious cause, but supported only by himself and his faith. That is the highest deed of love, and the convincing revelation of its world-conquering power. In it is preached to us by deed, not word, the gospel "God is love." And that this death has not checked his personality in its activity, but has led to higher spiritual efficiency, is the proof that here a higher principle, one not of this world, has entered the world. Christ's cross and his resurrection are the real apologetics of Christianity, and hence of religion in general. Whoever does not deliberately withdraw himself from the impression they make must see in Jesus the true revelation of God, judging our sins and making us happy by faith. And he must receive in his soul the certainty of the victory of this revelation over the opposition of the world, over its pain and its death, as the power of eternal life. This impression, however, stands above all justifiable doubt, as one born of a true history and yet living and working in the present. Even without assuming a special inspiration for Holy Scripture, we can expect of every truth-loving man that he see in Scripture the personality of Jesus as it showed itself in its effects among the

earliest disciples, and hence look on it as an authentic witness for the revelation of God made in him to man.

28. *Deductions from the Fact of Christian Revelation*

1. Only in Christianity is God fully revealed, and that in a personal human life, that is, without any dark remnant of the natural and without any arbitrary or incomprehensible element. Only here, therefore, has religion attained full actuality. God draws near us in a personality that reveals the kingdom of the good as its sole aim in life, that addresses itself to all men, summoning them to this kingdom, and that aims to open to them the same happy fellowship with God that it enjoys. And God draws near to us in a life that reveals God's grace to the repentant sinner, and exhibits triumphantly the omnipotence of redeeming love amid the depths of the most terrible suffering. Hence perfect childlike trust in God is here possible. God is the almighty love that guides personality to its true goal, even through sin, and makes all worldly things means to this end. God reveals himself as spirit. In surrender to him is therefore perfect deliverance from the world. The dread and the magic rites of paganism cease here, as does the servile effort to satisfy the unintelligible demands and to appease the uncomprehended anger of God, which reigns in Talmudic Judaism and in Islam becomes apathetic resignation to Kismet. God reveals himself as the idea of the good. But this revelation does not aim at condemnation nor at making men unhappy. God means to lift every one who yields his soul to him and trusts him, beyond servitude to the world and his sins, above the world, and to unite him to himself. Thus the goal is reached at which all religion aims. The

revelation of God is at once the power that rouses penitence and urges to constant moral renewal, and the power that makes the believer happy and lifts him above the world. The Lord's Prayer is the proof of the religious perfection of Christianity. And God is really appropriated by the soul. We face the God concealed in the processes of nature as something absolutely foreign to us. He crushes us and is utterly outside of our own spiritual life, uncomprehended, incomprehensible (sacred awe, spiritual estrangement). Spiritually we can surrender ourselves only to that which makes explicable the innermost secret and the final goal of our own personality (absolute dependence, and freedom from the world). Only what is revealed to us in human form can we men make our personal possession. Only the God who meets us in his human revealer and in the life that he wakes in men, is really manifest to us both in the reality and the mystery of his being. This is the religious and redeeming power of the belief in the triune God, however much it is obscured by the unfamiliar form. That the God who reveals himself in Jesus and rules the world for his own ends is the sole God, needs here no proof. And only when God is manifest as a personal power of good does the belief in his unity gain religious significance (Xenophanes, Anaxagoras, Aristotle). Only in the Christian conception of God is the goal attained at which in all religions the healthy instincts of piety aim.

2. In the true conception of God is involved the true comprehension of the world.[1] The world becomes the sum total of the conditions of life amid which God's love has placed personality, meaningless and dangerous only if it

[1] Schultz, *Optimismus und Pessimismus*, address, 1884.

be looked on, not as material for the moral personality to work with, but as the goal. In Christianity the lordship of the world that personality demands is no longer sought in the shape of a supposed temporal conquest of the world by a magic that fancies it makes God's miraculous control of the world subservient to itself. It is given immediately in the certainty that we are the object of God's almighty love. The relative justification of pessimism (the misery of every effort for satisfaction in the world, and the worthlessness of the world where it is made the goal of personality) attains here just as logical recognition as in Buddhism, nay, a more logical one. For in the consciousness of sin aroused by the person of Jesus human personality appears incapable of itself to free itself from the misery of the world. Learning, art, and civilization appear only futile attempts to veil the nullity of the world. But at the same time Christianity brings the true optimism. Since the world is of God, that is, is means for his ends and material for moral good, it is absolutely and without exception good. There is nothing in nature in itself unclean or evil. Only opposition to God's will is evil. Even the ills and sorrows of the world are good as material for moral virtues. The verdict on the world as foundation for the kingdom of God must be an entirely optimistic one. For the highest goal is positive, not negative. In Jesus God reveals himself as active and purposive, as the highest good aiming to realize itself in the world. And "all things must work together for good to them that love God." Optimism is a religious duty, and its noblest expression is the hope that the world is to become wholly the instrument of God's will, that is, transfigured. Pessimism is the verdict on the world as

still incomplete, and on the misery and folly of refusal to aim at the highest goal. Alongside of genuine Christianity there can exist neither the joy in the world of ancient and modern paganism, nor the timid withdrawal from the world that fears in the natural as such an element of evil and would find true piety in renunciation of the attempt to spiritualize the natural. In the place of the naïve happiness of youthful and vigorous races that has faded with their youth and been transformed into pessimism, Christian faith puts an eternal youth (Is. 40, 30 f.) and a bliss that lasts even amid the trials and sorrows of life (Rom. 5, 3; Jas. 1, 12), because even these are understood to be God-given aids toward the eternal goal of personality. From the optimism of frivolity, that on the edge of the abyss exults in the pleasure of the senses and thinks itself happy in enjoying a world without a God, and from the pessimism that looks on the world as the devil's and has often had an attraction even for strong Christian personalities, the religious mood of pure evangelical Christianity is equally remote.

3. In the true revelation of God the true nature of sin is also disclosed. Sin is not something natural, comparable to the withering of the spring blossom, or the death of the light, or the destruction of the productive power of nature by the heat, as paganism conceived it; nor is it like the contrast of night and day, of shadow and light. The world is God's. Sin is also no necessary accompaniment of human growth. Christ has died on the cross because sin ought not to be, and his cross is to wake repentance. The consciousness of sin is not got rid of by regret for one's own weakness or by idle longing for perfection. It includes the judgment passed by the man on himself and the convic-

tion that that should not be, which yet by his own will really is. Nor is sin opposition to an arbitrary divine will, nor does it consist in the violation of certain prescriptions for which divine punishment can be feared, apart from inward self-condemnation, and for which remission can be found in the same arbitrary will (Islam). Sin is the opposition of the will of personality to the true purpose of God with it that is revealed in Christ, and the surrender to the natural instincts that ought to be material for the divine love, that is, to the sensuality and selfishness of the natural man (*σάρξ*). It is found wherever the new life in Christ does not exist, wherever, and so far as, men are children of the first Adam, even if the order of life be externally satisfied. And yet it is always an act of the individual will, and is not in the physical sense a misfortune that men have to "bear." The judgment of self in regard to the whole natural trend of one's own personality that the cross of Christ awakes, is the true religious recognition of sin and wholly independent of theological or philosophical explanations. And this judgment of self means the immediate consciousness of a guilt that cannot be bought off by services to the divinity, but demands reconciliation.

4. In the Christian revelation reconciliation and redemption are immediately involved as an act of God, and are an absolute and happy certainty for every one who lets himself be touched by it. The loving will of God aims to make the world of sinners into a kingdom of God and to draw them to him, in spite of sin, as God's children. It reveals itself in Christ's life, and above all in his death, as an almighty world-conquering reality. Hence the sins of all who let themselves be received through repentance into the kingdom of God no longer separate them from God

(reconciliation), and no longer thwart the aim of their personality by making them slaves to the world (redemption). Thus there is an end to the childish attempts to appease the wrath of a hidden God by sacrifices, observances, and renunciations of a worldly kind, or to get rid by natural means of what is based in the will (*piacula*, *devotiones*, *satisfactiones*). The place of these is taken by the penitent surrender of the will of the natural man to the revealed will of God. The rationalistic superficiality of a belief in a God who is indulgent toward the natural man becomes impossible (Islam). The cross of the Son of God is the condition of reconciliation. Just as impossible does the conception of reconciliation as flight from the world or as surrender of one's own personality become. On the basis of what Israel's prophets have laid down, it is plain that God can have no fellowship with those who persist in personal opposition to his will; and at the same time the conviction is roused that all whose personal life is united to God and who seek forgiveness of their sins in the revealed fatherly love of God have part in his redeeming grace. Hence there are no longer any acts of atonement and no self-torment, but only trusting surrender to God's grace; no work of man aiming to reconcile God, but a world-reconciling act of God himself. All works of man in which religion once sought reconciliation have become mere shadows by the death of Jesus. This is the guarantee of the love of God that conquers the world and sin, and also of the inviolable fellowship of the community with God that is born of Jesus (covenant sacrifice), and is therefore the great act of reconciliation. The act that has brought to light a new humanity and passed judgment on the sins of the world is also an act of reconciling

grace. Of it is born hatred of one's own wrong nature, and at the same time the blessed consciousness of the love of God that conquers the heart. And both rest, not on works of man, but on God's revelation. And the blessedness of reconciliation is not purchased, as in Buddhism, by renunciation of the aims of our own personality, but that personality is born anew and given new power in the assurance of the divine purpose (Holy Spirit). In the consciousness of the fellowship with God and his will that is assured by God's grace, lie the forces of a free, happy, and childlike morality, in which all mere legality, with its self-righteousness and self-condemnation, is at an end. It is true that this holds only of that Christianity in which reconciliation with God is received of God's free grace through faith in Christ; not of the lower forms of Christianity that teach the attainment of eternal life by good works and renunciation and the oft-repeated reconciliation of an angry God by the sacrifice of the mass; or which degrade the atoning work of Christ, in the fashion of paganism and Judaism, by measuring the personal and moral act of the revealer of God by the standards of the material and legal, calling it a supererogatory merit that earns for us the forgiveness of sins. Even the doctrine of atonement of the Old Testament prophets stands high above such "Christian" misapprehension.

5. The assurance possessed by the disciples of Jesus that God's purpose for them reached beyond this world, lends the hope of a perfected personality that shall survive bodily death an immediate religious certainty that we seek in vain in the systems of the philosophers. It is true that this hope has been cherished by religion in the most various forms, from the worship of the dead and of

ancestors down to the eschatological ideas of the Egyptians, Scandinavians, and Persians. And philosophy has tried ever anew to find a basis for it. The element of truth in the arguments for the immortality of the soul is limited, at bottom, to the assurance of idealism that in the rational personality something supersensual lives that cannot yield to the attacks of the order of nature (Matt. 10, 28); from which, however, a real imperishability would by no means follow. But this mere "continued existence" of a "soul," that is of course impossible to picture, is in itself no object of hope. The ancient world has believed it, without feeling much more than horror of it. Nirvana is, in fact, more desirable than an endless existence without real content and without activity. Hence the fancy has liked to adorn the picture of the life after death with ever new colors of heightened earthly happiness; which after all would be intolerable if conceived as endless and contradicts the character of existence outside earthly life. By a false deduction from the longing for an imperishable life, or from the idea of eternity (which could, however, be conceived of as in time) as immanent in the soul, a guarantee has been sought for its existence beyond this earthly life, without ever considering how often both are absent. An argument for the endless duration of man has been deduced from the fact that a few great men have felt within them vigor and content of life enough for a limitless continuance of their personal life; but in fact most men have lived themselves out in the course of their earthly life and become weary of it. From the demand for moral recompense an eternity of human personality has been inferred; as if the sufferings and sins of the average man de-

manded endless happiness or endless torment for their compensation, and as if there were no bar of judgment in ourselves. Only when the eternal world had shone as a reality upon this world and an eternal and blessed goal for man had been revealed in fellowship with God, could such shadowy pictures yield to the assurance of faith. Only with the resurrection of the Crucified, and with the belief that his cross and his resurrection are valid for all mankind, has immortality become a happy certainty and a consoling conviction. The "Spirit" is the pledge of resurrection. And the purity of the Christian hope is not dimmed by the fact that pious fancy has adorned it with the colors of earthly happiness. It does not occupy in Christianity the position it does in Islam, in whose eschatology sensuality and selfish carnal enjoyment appear as the real content of hope, while moral perfection, fellowship with God, and unity of human aims are wholly lacking. The bliss which the Christian conceives of is no accidental worldly happiness. Its centre is the vision of God (full religious satisfaction) and the loving fellowship of men (moral perfection). The ideal of hope is the kingdom of Jesus Christ, who is the judge of the hostile world, not an egoistic life of pleasure. The Spirit of truth and love is the pledge of hope. All other "happiness" appears only a necessary result of communion with God. And since this is so, it is a matter of complete indifference to religion if the imagination lend this happiness natural forms. Equally distant from a materialistic entanglement of personal life with the course of nature and from the surrender of a well-equipped and effective personality for the blest, the hope of Christianity makes at once for moral purification and for happiness.

It emphasizes the eternal worth of the individual personality, and yet knows of a perfect life only in spiritual fellowship. It leads away from the empty picture of an "immortality of soul" that would exclude all activity and all fellowship, to the belief in a bodily form for the blest, in their reigning and acting (Luke 19, 17 ff.). But it holds it folly to think in this of the old bodily form of earth (1 Cor. 15, 36 ff.), or to count on a repetition of the conditions of the flesh (Matt. 22, 30), although fancy has in this sphere always combined physical and spiritual conceptions. It does not claim to be a deduction from scientific considerations. It is a purely religious assurance. But it has nothing about it that could contradict such scientific knowledge, and it satisfies the persistent claim of human self-consciousness, as something personal and spiritual, to a significance above nature. — Even it must, of course, sink below the level of Christianity as soon as the world of pictures that is the garment of religious hope is made its real content, and the spiritual clarity of piety dimmed by sensual or mystical excitements (chiliasm).

## 29. *Christianity as the Solution of the Religious Problems of Civilization*

1. Christianity, by its conception of the highest good, excludes the danger of mutilating or giving a one-sided development to the moral interests of mankind, as, for instance, by subjecting the state to the church, or demanding that the culture and knowledge of a certain age be looked on as universally valid and final; and it has in the manner of its revelation the capacity of influencing all the problems of human culture, as far as religion is

concerned in them, in the direction of an unlimited and healthful development.

2. With religion the "priest" entered the world. At first, it is true, paganism knew no priestly caste distinct from the chiefs of the family and the tribe. But on the ground of the assumption that certain formulas and acts can influence the divinity and certain rules interpret its will as revealed in the phenomena of nature, there grew up of necessity a special calling in which the offices of priest and prophet were blended. Bound to the conditions of nature, often hereditary, the earliest priesthood had no moral dignity and was more an object of dread than of real reverence. Magic and ceremonies are the expressions of its life. With genuine civilization and knowledge this type of priesthood is by its nature incompatible. It is even inimical to religion, for it prevents men taking a personal and spiritual share in the religious process. But it maintains itself tenaciously even in the culture religions of highly civilized races. Is the priest who by his sacred formula transforms the earthly elements into the present God or by mysterious sacramental rites works a change in the inner life of a personality without any act of its will, at bottom anything else than the perfected form of the magician of the ancient religions? — In principle the hostility of this office toward culture was not changed when among the civilized races of antiquity the priests became a highly cultured caste set apart to care for religious interests. The priests of this new sort were, it is true, themselves the chief representatives of the national culture and developed it into a sort of religious science. They claimed high reverence by virtue of their connection with religion. And the more these religions ceased to be simple and popular, the

more the sacred words and writings became unintelligible, the sacred acts archaic, the myths mysterious, the more did the priests as the sole representatives of religion become surrounded by a halo of sanctity and the community feel itself profane in comparison with them. They absorbed the religious life of the people and became their spiritual masters, or there sprang up a class of religious experts among them or of interpreters of the will of God alongside of them. Among the Hindoos, as among the Egyptians, the priests were the privileged teachers of the people and its spiritual masters. In the Levitical priesthood and in the clergy of the Roman Catholic Church the same situation is found. But among more ambitious races in the long run a reaction against the priesthood has never failed to appear. The mendicant orders are the rivals of the Brahmins, and in Buddhism they have won the victory. The scribes have in Israel robbed the Sadducean aristocracy of priests of their control of souls. In early Christianity the lay preachers of the gospel opposed triumphantly the priesthood of Israel. And in the Reformation the preacher has supplanted the priest in religious power. — Such a priestly caste can by its very nature suffer worldly culture and untrammelled knowledge only so far as it is able to deduce both from its own assumptions. By preference it keeps to a language that is no longer alive on the lips of the people (Vedas, Accadián, Syrian, Coptic, Latin) and to formulas that are unintelligible to the community. And in his deepest significance the priest is, in this form too, still the magician who influences the gods and nature, and holds in his hands the national fortunes (theurgy). For all his real wisdom and indisputable services to popular welfare, he is incompatible with true culture.

All prophet religions are by nature anti-hierarchic. The prophet is, it is true, in his oldest form closely akin to the priest. Both interpret God's will. The priest has only the advantage that the possession of a recognized shrine carries with it. But the prophet, as founder of religion and channel of revelation, is something very different from the priest of the legally established cult. He feels himself authorized by the new religious life that stirs within him to give a new form to the intercourse with God and cannot cede to the representatives of the established order the right to gauge his piety by the sacred forms of the past. So prophet religions seem to the representatives of priestly rights and traditions as by nature revolutionary and hostile to "piety." And they have no impulse to beget a priesthood themselves. They arise mostly in direct opposition to the accepted religious traditions; and their revelation, addressed to the intelligence of the multitude, creates a holy community conscious of a living fellowship with God and his will, and necessarily lays more weight on the whole conduct of life than on unchangeable forms of ritual. Without exception they give the impression of laying the chief emphasis on lay piety over against the clergy. Christianity has in this point attained complete finality. It reveals the whole will of God in a personal human life, one valid for every individual personality, and the norm for all its relations to other men. It has no place for an independent external cult alongside of the moral task, but demands a spiritual worship that no one can perform for another. It knows nothing of unintelligible magic words and acts, and puts every member of the community in direct relation to God as his child. Its mysteries are acts of the community.

Its means of grace are the free and public possession of all believers. Its cult is devotion and edification, penitence and gratitude, reverence for God and surrender to him. With no mysterious ceremonies it bases itself on the Word and demands the inner sympathy of all its members. Emphasis is no longer laid on the exact performance of certain ritual acts. And the revealed truth is contained in a record that has been born of history and is historically intelligible to every one. Hence Christianity has no place for the pagan conception of the priest, to which corresponds the pagan conception of a "profane" world. All real Christians are priests, and can approach God and offer him their spiritual sacrifice themselves ("a royal priesthood," "one is your master"). Of laity, in the false sense by which the members of the community were once distinguished from the clergy, we can speak in Christianity only where we wish to distinguish those who are Christian only in name, the *membra admixta ecclesiæ*, from the real Christians. And the place of a priestly class set apart by a mysterious consecration for sacred acts and to approach God, is taken by the office that dispenses the means of grace as forces necessary to the life of the community; an office that is indispensable and necessary to the health of the church, as to every organization that is to maintain its existence through a series of generations. But, like every office, it is conferred by the community in due form on fit men. It is not conferred on a special class by a miraculous consecration or by divine laws. Its bearers have the duty of taking upon themselves as their profession and responsibility the common tasks of the church, like the bearers of any such office in human societies. — It is true that a new hierarchy of a Jewish or

pagan kind has asserted itself in Christianity. And we can understand this, inasmuch as the Christian church must have felt the need in the presence of the danger of dismemberment to consolidate itself historically for its great struggle in the world, and inasmuch as it found around it in the world, as something that was a matter of course, the presupposition of priestly magic. Moreover, we can grant to the hierarchy the merit of having preserved the culture of the ancient Christian world through ages of barbarity. But it is rightly abolished as far as the spirit of this religion is concerned. Since Luther placed the preachers of God's word over against the priests, hierarchy and priestly magic must be looked on as elements inwardly foreign to Christianity, elements that have sprung from atavistic impulse and by which the perfection of the Christian religion is obscured.

3. Just as little as the hierarchy of Roman Catholicism, does another phenomenon, that in Buddhism results from an inner necessity, belong to the true nature of Christianity. A real member of the "church" of Buddha can in the nature of things only be one who has, while still on earth, extinguished the will to live and freed his life from everything by which the "world" could draw his personality into its circle. Only the "monk" who renounces marriage, property, calling, rank, and kin is a "Buddhist" in the full sense. All others are only "associates" that are not yet able to aim at perfection for themselves, but aid the perfect by alms and reverence. When Christianity entered the world, the same impulses could not be unknown to it. For as soon as the new religion began to receive large groups of variously developed men, the ideal of the new life set it by revelation

seemed to stand so high above reality that, though men had the courage to make the Christian consciousness of reconciliation accessible by ecclesiastical means to this whole circle, they still dared not cherish the confidence of being able to regard all its members as true and fully qualified partakers of this ideal. And the hostility to nature of the idealism of those times, the necessary reaction from pagan intoxication with nature, led to aloofness from wide realms of natural life being regarded as a condition of regular standing as a Christian. So arose the thought of a special Christian perfection that, at least as a rule, seemed to be bound up with complete freedom from the tasks of civil life, from marriage, property, profession, and personal self-determination, and that caused the mass of Christians to be regarded as only in a limited sense partakers of the life of Christ. Such a conception, which degrades the highest and most important moral tasks of man to affairs fit only for imperfect Christians, and holds only concernment with divine things as moral in the highest sense, is, of course, incompatible with healthy culture. It is at bottom a remnant of the old arrogant overestimate of "philosophizing" among the Greek sages, though religious occupation with God takes the place of "thought" (*vita contemplativa, religiosa*). But it is plain that it is not really founded on the Christian revelation. Christianity demands the perfection of all Christians, and hence cannot think of this as consisting in a special calling. Christianity is revealed as a striving for a lofty and unseen goal, that is attainable by all. And it demands the willingness to let all life be guided by this effort and, if necessary, to surrender all earthly things for it. In this sense evangelical Christianity sees perfection

wherever the earthly calling is pursued with trust in God, patience, and prayer, that is, with living faith. And in the western world even Catholicism, however firmly it holds to the false conception of perfection from which it deduces its false valuation of monastic life, has nevertheless in fact developed this institution almost everywhere in such a way that instruction, benevolence, and civilizing effort have become the real moral content of the consecrated life directed only to God. True Christianity lifts man spiritually above all transitory interests. But it lends all true moral interests an imperishable content. All nature is pure. The world is for the Christian God's world. The great laws of the natural and moral life of man are "of God." And "love" carries with it the inner compulsion to be everywhere, in external as well as in spiritual things, active in helping, improving, and doing. Hence Christianity is a salt that preserves culture from the rottenness of servitude to the world. But it furnishes also the highest motives for vigorous action in the world.

4. The most immediate contact of religion with life is in the cult. This has at first been the whole of religion, and the artificial surrogates for religion still feel themselves forced to create a cult — that is, to be sure, lifeless. Even where the cult has no real meaning, as in Buddhism and among the Chinese, it is nevertheless retained from inner necessity. And even the rationalism of the Positivists and the Simonists as well as of the Independents, has not suppressed the need of a cult. The original cult aimed partly at mysterious union with the divinity in a common blood or by magic rite, partly at gaining its favor by bribery, flattery, and self-abasement. Rite and sacrifice are its two fundamental forms. The community fancies that it attains

communion with the divinity in exciting physical acts, and enjoys it in ecstatic states of the soul. And it aims, by the devotion to the divinity of natural goods that may flatter its love of pleasure and honor, — that is, by sacrifices and asceticism, which is only a special form of sacrifice, — to win the favor of the gods, and to make them serve its own ends. In this the moral value and the character of the acts are entirely indifferent, as is the inner religious and moral participation of the worshipper. Eager participation in these acts depends only on the advantage expected from them and the degree in which they rouse fear and desire. Originally the cult was connected with sacred dwelling-places and symbols of the gods, where their presence could be expected. The temple is a house in which the divinity is conceived as present, physically or in symbol. Each several cult is open only to the members of a particular tribe, and is practised in an established external form. Such a conception survives even in the highest religions. Roman Catholic Christianity has its ample share of sacramental magic, that is effective as *opus operatum* without spiritual participation, in its sacrifice of the mass, in its pilgrimages and scourgings, in the splendor of its feasts and the magnificence of its churches and votive offerings, in its linking the thought of the presence of God with images, in prayers that are only a pious routine act, and in many other traits. But as early as the prophetic religion of the Old Covenant the cult was rejected on principle as the fruit of a false conception of God, and of a selfish and profane frame of mind. The prophets protest against the splendor of the feasts, the number of victims, and the external signs of humility. They declare that all this can give God

nothing nor please him, but only offend him, since he is being treated as a shortsighted being with physical needs. They insist on the worship of moral conduct, on penitence of the heart, and sincere faith. He who thinks to "buy" God for profane ends and with impure mind, tries to deceive the Omniscient. And by the revelation of God in Jesus this confusion is fundamentally done away. God is revealed in Jesus as the love that wills the welfare of men. Thereby all cult is excluded that seeks to gain the favor of God by human acts. God is humanly revealed in Christ. Hence communion with God can no longer be sought in rites, but only in the reception of his historical revelation; that is, in the word and the sacrament. God aims only at the kingdom of the good, to which end his omnipotence has made the world. Hence he can be served only by doing of the good, and time and place are as inessential to his worship as are things of nature and worldly forms. Sacrifice is replaced by the surrender of the personality to God's will, and the solemn ritual expression of this self-consecration by the community. Physical acts of service to God are replaced by the self-surrender of the rational personality. Thereby sacrifice is at once perfected and abolished. Worship becomes the reverent acceptance of the historical revelation. Instead of an ecstatic communion with God in mysterious and unintelligible acts, communion with him is sought where he presents his historically revealed fellowship of love in word and symbol, intelligible to every one and yet above all comprehension. Instead of plunging into the dark life of nature, the Christian submerges himself in the sacred story. Thus the mystery in the sacrament is at once perfected and abolished. Prayer ceases to be a magical formula and be-

comes the religious language of gratitude, of humility, and of trust. The holy place becomes the house of the community (house of prayer) in which God is present, not in bodily form, but in his revelation (word, sacrament), and yet is confined to no one spot. — With this transformation of the cult it loses, it is true, the power to hurry the multitude away in wild ecstasy, and to fill it with enthusiasm for mad deeds. The pagan trait in the human heart has again and again, even in Christianity, bred the temptation to overcome the supposed dulness of Christian worship by sensuous stirring of the soul. From the enthusiasts of the Middle Ages to the "mechanism of conversion" of the Methodists this effort can be traced. And it shows itself in the secret envy of many Protestants of the splendor and the popular appeal that the Roman Church possesses in its pagan element, and in the vain effort to rival the popularity of Catholic festivals and masses by liturgical palliatives. But the real secret of this popularity, the fanatical superstition that hopes by physical means to make God serve man's selfish wishes, can be replaced by no artificial substitutes. The evangelical church must frankly confess that "ecclesiasticism" no longer forms the centre of its religion. But the worship of God in spirit and in truth offers the community the indispensable forces of sanctification and enlightenment, nourishes the strength of the religious life by the food alone adapted to it, furnishes a foundation for the pure and full development of every art, and adjusts itself to every higher development of national civilization. It knows no unchangeable sacred forms except the maintenance of the word and sacrament as means for the self-appropriation of revelation. Thus the genuine Christian church can never grow old with the forms of a cult born of time.

5. In the lowest phases of religion there is neither science nor faith.[1] Nature and history are looked at only from the point of view of religious poetry, unless immediate practical advantage is involved. We have myth instead of science, sacred legend instead of historical investigation. And faith, in its turn, appeals to natural phenomena and historical events, that is, to objects of scientific knowledge. Out of superstitious elements of knowledge and pseudo-scientific statements of faith arise the obscure beginnings of theology. To the people this "doctrine" is wholly a matter of indifference. They demand only the proper performance of the cult. There is no common creed and no religious instruction. To try to convert men of other faiths by teaching seems an absurd idea. To think of salvation as dependent on theological views enters no one's mind. Among the holders of such views the complete tolerance of indifference reigns. With growing culture there is developed in the circles of the priests the beginning of a real knowledge of nature and history (astronomy, medicine) and of a philosophical system (cosmogony). Religion becomes the mother of knowledge. But the false mingling of faith and knowledge is not put away. The learning of the priests is looked on as a sacred religious knowledge and is mixed with elements of vague faith. And thus necessarily with the beginning of a real knowledge the struggle with "theological" knowledge must arise. But by this, at this stage of religion, religion itself is undermined. Theology becomes the enemy of science as the augur who laughs at its own predictions, or else the master of

[1] Schultz, *Die Theologie in ihrem Verhältnisse zu Wissenschaft und Frömmigkeit.* 1890.

ceremonies of a divinity who no longer rules men's minds.

All prophet religions, inasmuch as the revelation of the divine in a human heart is their centre, offer cognition really religious material and thereby the foundation for a real science of belief (theology). They demand the instruction of the community and a confession of faith. Hence they are by their very nature intolerant. Moreover, they cannot help begetting a religious literature that in its turn must become the subject of scientific investigation of later times. Here is given, in principle, the material for a theology that not only is nowhere at odds with genuine science, but is a valuable part of the whole of knowledge. But only if it knows how to distinguish clearly, in the material that it finds in history, the religious content, which is its real material, from the matter bound up with it that belongs to the sciences of nature and history. Hence in the nature of the subject-matter there lie, it is plain, occasions for the conflict of theology and science.

Every founder of a religion must receive the revelation that he experiences under the conditions of his special intellectual development, and communicate it in the forms of culture belonging to his race and his time; that is, under the conditions of the popular notions on science and philosophy current in his race. And the more highly trained he himself is, and the riper the civilization of his race, the more will he make use of such elements. A scholar proper can therefore hardly become the prophet of a new religion, inasmuch as he is personally too closely bound up with the existing system. And because the community receives the divine through his personality, not only will the prophet's revelation of God appear of reli-

gious significance, but also all that is historically connected with his personality. The transmission of the revelation having finally become literature, the reverence of believers will be kindled, not merely by its actual content as revelation (word of God), but also by its form as literature. Hence arises the danger that theology may treat various elements pertaining to the sphere of knowledge in the same way in which it treats the revelation on which religion rests, making them objects of faith.

But in that case it must come, in a manner still more fatal than the theology of the pagan priests, into necessary conflict with true science. For the latter cannot concede that any part of history or any question concerning natural things can be withdrawn from its laws on the ground of belonging to the sphere of faith. Science then seems to theology sceptical, and theology is regarded by science as unveracious. Where religion, as in Islam, has bound itself to its sacred book in the sense that all the scientific statements in it are to be treated as objects of faith, theology must make all true science impossible and be itself opposed and enfeebled by it. It can only suffer beside itself such science as, like logic or mathematics, is of a purely formal kind, or that contents itself with simply objective observation of detail. Dammed up by an Index or by penal legislation, in races of intellectual vigor the scientific impulse will then, openly or in secret, seek its satisfaction at the expense of religion. But this conflict lies only in misapprehension of the revelation, not in the revelation itself.

Jesus has revealed no scientific truths, and the sacred Scriptures of Christians have arisen from human writings that have claimed only to offer the record of revelation and to be inspired by the new spirit of Christianity. Unless

then they be conceived of in a way foreign to them, they do not shrink from scientific treatment in what belongs to science. Christian theology can, in its scientific aspects, be included as a part of historical knowledge and treated by its laws. It can investigate the real content of the history of revelation, the true character and content of the sacred books, and the history of the church and its doctrine, in accordance with the rules of philology and historical study, without fearing to endanger the attitude of religious faith toward Christian revelation thereby. And the revelation of God in a human personality and its world-renewing deed offers theological science a purely religious material in whose ever improved scientific formulation it has an unlimited task and one that can nowhere come in conflict with the claims of other sciences. As systematic theology it has to develop this revelation experienced by faith according to the laws of thought into a scientific whole, and express it consistently in all its details in scientific form. As practical theology it has to find methods to make this content of faith as efficient as possible for the community according to the rules of pedagogics, rhetoric, and ethics.

But even Christianity has in fact suffered from a false conception of theology, and has only begun with the evangelical church, and then with much uncertainty, to gain a right comprehension of theology, religion, and science. When revelation has produced a community, at first the religious and ethical factors rule the whole intellectual life. All culture and all science serve it. Theology can set up its claims at its own pleasure and demand the service of the other sciences. It thus naturally lays claim to the whole realm of knowledge connected with religion as its own, as an object of belief. And every great renewal of

the religious life at first has the same tendency. Even the Reformation has been at first anything but rationalistic. Humanism, which at first was friendly, has soon, in its chief representatives, turned away from it in displeasure because the excess of theological interest seemed to it inimical to culture. When recent Roman Catholic polemics denies that the Reformation has been an ally of science (Janssen), it is quite right. Only its blame is praise. For it witnesses to the purely religious character of the movement. — But things cannot remain permanently as they were in the first vigor of a new religious development. The scientific impulse and the scientific conscience necessarily begin to stir among the people. At first science respects the sphere laid claim to by theology, and theology tries with honest conviction to find a place for science in the religious view of things. This is the stage of Scholasticism that has the courage to include knowledge and faith in one grand system of knowledge. It is grand and imposing where it is the natural expression of the stage reached by religious and scientific culture. So it stands before us in the Middle Ages, and has been able to produce a sublime poetic picture of the world (Dante). But when it is artificially revived, in an age that has long lost that naïve assurance, in order to veil a contradiction that every honest man sees, then scholastic theology is a contemptible piece of insincerity (poor apologetics, compromise). The stage of scholasticism cannot be permanent. Soon the wrongfully claimed elements react as scepticism and, when the church is feeble, as destructive criticism. The theory of a "double truth" (nominalism) veils but poorly the contradiction that soon becomes mockery of theology. Now, of course, the religious interest, as the

more universal and powerful, may be able to maintain for a time the claims of a false theology over against science. The church can compel the Galileos to recant, and can make the multitude suspect the men of science of being godless. But it is a victory at the expense of conscience, and always a temporary one. For science in its results becomes inevitably the common property even of those who are themselves incapable of taking part in it or of checking its conclusions. And a theology that persists in the resolve to ignore these results and to impose on scientific work rules not its own (religious), must more and more fall a prey to mockery and public contempt.

Genuine evangelical Christianity is the only perfect religion, because it can beget a theology that can suffer all true sciences beside it without forfeiting any of its own rights. For the evangelical Christian there is no other object of faith except the revelation of God in Christ that builds by the power of grace the kingdom of God in the heart. From the Gospel, as a centre, everything can be deduced that can claim to condition faith and to be sacred and inviolable for the church. This Gospel, however, has itself no elements in it that are exposed to the attacks of science, or that science could claim as objects of its specific work. The personality of Jesus has stamped its religious quality unmistakably and inerasably on the hearts of men (Holy Scripture), and it addresses to every man the question whether he will acknowledge it or reject it for his own relation to God. The answer to this question science can never give, but only faith or religious doubt, as the case may be. Theology as the science of faith has for its object the conviction that results on the assumption of the answer of faith. And what cannot be

deduced from this Gospel belongs to the science of history, however closely it may be connected with the historical person of Jesus, and with the history of revelation. It concerns theology only in so far as the latter is an historical science. The Gospel is the condition of Christian bliss, not correct historical views of its history or the right scientific development of its doctrine. Faith is concerned with nature and history only in their relation to God, not in their connection with the world. And the sacred records of revelation can be regarded as the decisive norm only for the content of revelation itself, not for what they contain of matters of science or for their own literary origin. On these questions the theologian decides simply as philologist and historian. And both the history of Israel and the scientific views of the prophets serve him simply as material for historical knowledge. But the spirit of veracity that Christianity inspires, and the happy certainty that all truth is of God, make Christianity a power even in science. And in the rich material of the literature that it has produced it offers to the scientific mind an incomparable source of interest. Thus genuine Christianity can beget a sound theology that is a necessary and indisputable part of human science. For the religious life in the individual such a theology is, it is true, not decisive. Piety thrives even amid grave scientific errors. But for the believing community in the world it is an indispensable condition of a good conscience and of a sound spiritual development. — To be sure, such a theology is at present only a postulate. The theology of confessionalism and of ecclesiastical authority persists in asserting the right of religion to prescribe its path also to science, and expects that science will change its course. The theology of compromise is ready

to grant in principle the rights of scientific knowledge. But in any individual case where the history of revelation is involved it aims at a veiling of the plain contrasts by casuistry and concealment. The theology of pious pathos and devout dilettanteism hopes to settle scientific questions by appeals to the feelings and wishes of the heart. But the demand for a genuine theology lies in the nature of Christianity. In it science and faith can keep their own natures and find their true union.

6. Christianity as such demands neither a definite sort of political constitution nor of social order. True Christianity can thrive in any society that is founded on law and offers room for love, and that makes a worthy family life not impossible. But the principle of love must urge Christian nations more and more to reject institutions that rob a part of the people of the respect for its personal dignity that is necessary for true moral fellowship, and of the means for participation in this fellowship. Conditions that practically amount to slavery, false social distinctions that are inconsistent with the true honor of the inferior, the exclusion of women from worthy activities that guarantee personal development, lack of occupation, lack of independence, beggary, etc., a true Christianity must make more and more impossible in the nations whose public life it rules. Thus Christianity is the purest and strongest power to promote the social renovation of nations; not merely by the activities of love that home missions promote, but also by transformation of social conditions in the direction of justice and humanity, with social independence and the personal moral dignity of all as its goal. Christianity has no commands to give concerning trade, labor, or property. And he who uses it as a tool of politi-

cal agitation mistakes its purely religious character and cannot help either corrupting historical Christianity or for the sake of his political ends separating himself, openly or secretly, from Christianity. This must be emphasized in view of the developments of Christian socialism. But it is entirely right to assert that, in its fundamental principle of human love and in its recognition of the kingdom of God as the highest good, Christianity has in it the irrepressible instinct to aim at health and a worthy human existence for all, without which no one can do his personal share for the kingdom of God. It must defend the nobility of all honest toil, preach the conception of wealth as a tool intrusted to us for moral ends, and maintain the possibility of every Christian's attaining perfection by fidelity to his calling. Christianity is the highest humanity. And among the good angels of social progress in our time, that of Christianity is the Holy Spirit.

# INDEX


Abidhamma, Pali work on rites, 181.
Abraham, Mohammed's relation to, 195 ff.
Abu-Bekr, first caliph (573–634), opinion of Mohammed, 197.
Abydos, cults in, 147 f.
Achilles, 163.
Açoka, introduced Buddhism into India, 181.
Adonis, Semitic deity, 132.
Æschylus, 162 f.
Æstheticism, distinguished from religion, 28, 87 f.
Agni, Hindoo deity, 152, 174.
Ahriman, Persian Evil One, 178.
Ahuramazda, Persian deity, 174 ff.
Amesha-Çpentas, Persian spirits, 175.
Ammonites, polytheists, 130.
Anaxagoras (500–428 B.C.), 291.
Animals, their mental life, 23 f.; worship of, 123 f.
Animism, 124 ff.
Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109), ontological argument, 111.
Antonines, apologetics in age of, 6 and note.
Apollo, 163.
Apollonius of Tyana (*ob.* 100 A.D.), 7.
Apologetes, for Islam and Buddhism, 4; of early church, 6 note, 8 note; Tertullian, 6 note; of age of Constantine, 8 note; of Middle Ages, 8 note; of Renaissance, 8 note; of 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries, 9 note; of 19th cent., 10 note, 11.
Apologetics, relation to science, 2; aim of, 1 f., 5; limits of, 1, 277; neglect of, 3; necessity of, 4 f.; new problems for, 4; distinguished from dogmatics, 5; history of, 5 ff.; in early church, 5 f., 8; Tertullian's, 6 note; against Neoplatonism, 7 f.; in Middle Ages, 8; in 16th and 17th cent., 9; against Deism and Rationalism in 18th cent., 9 f.; modern, 10 f.; disclaims scientific knowledge of soul, 22; psychology and, 24 note; of revelation in 18th cent., 271 f.
Arabia, its paganism, 129 ff. See *Islam*.
Arameans, polytheists, 130.
Arhat, Buddhist saint, 183 f.
Aristophanes, 8, 164.
Aristotle, 218, 291.
Armenia, influenced by Babylon, 145.
Art, Christianity and, 262 ff.; neglected by early church, 263 f.; influence of Christianity on, 265 f.
Aryans, see *Indo-Europeans*.
Asceticism, see *Monasticism*.
Asclepius (Esculapius), 163.
Ashantees, serpent worshippers, 123.
Assyria, polytheism of, 130; influenced by Babylon, 145; see also *Babylon*.
Asura, Persian divine name, 174.
Athene, 163.
Augustine, St. (354–430), his pessimism, 98; his ontological argument, 110; 4, 8 note, 30, 242.
Australia, 121, 123, 127.
Avesta, sacred book of Persians, 4, 78, 172 ff., 176 ff., 189 note.
Aztecs, nature religion of, 128 f.

Baal, Babylonian deity, 130, 132.
Babylon, its religion, 142 ff.; Semitic

elements, 142; deities, 143 ff.; cult, 143; cosmogony, 143 f.; nature elements, 144; recalls O. T., 144 f.; immoral elements, 145; 173, 189.
Balder, Scandinavian deity, 160 ff.
Balfour, Arthur, 10 note, 85.
Beck, J. T., 18.
Beersheba, springs of, 130.
Bel, Babylonian deity, 143 ff.
Belief, see *Faith*.
Bender, Wilhelm, 236.
Bentham, Jeremy (1748–1832), 85.
Berkeley, George (1684–1753), 95.
Bethel, sacred stone of, 129.
Bodhisatta, future Buddha, 183.
*Book of the Dead*, Egyptian, 150.
Borneo, 123.
Bo-tree, Buddha under, 180.
Brahma, see *Brahminism*.
Brahma-somaj, described, 159.
Brahminism, pantheistic, 151; pessimistic and ascetic, 151 f.; identity of gods, 152; cult, 152 f.; castes, 153 ff.; Brahmins, 153 f.; process of redemption, 154 f.; ritual prescriptions, 155; meditation, 155 f.; true nature of things, 156; goal, 157 ff.; modern development of, 158 f.; 4, 120, 173, 174, 180 ff.
Brahmins, 153 f.
*Bridgewater Treatises*, 11.
Buddha, see *Buddhism*.
Buddhaghosa, "Voice of Buddha," a Pali commentator, 185, 186 note.
Buddhism, modern apologetes for, 4 f.; its pessimism, 96 f.; Brahminic philosophy in, 157 f.; compared with Confucianism, 171; Buddha, 179 ff.; diffusion of, 181; canon, 181; rites, 181; doctrine, 181 f.; Four Truths, 182 f.; Nirvana, 183 f.; new Buddhas, 184; its salvation, 184 f.; Thibetan form, 185; its ethics, 186 f.; defects, 187; how superior to Christianity, 239; kingdom of God in, 245 ff.; marriage in, 261; church and state in, 268 f., 271; monasticism in, 304; 47 note, 120, 127, 173, 254, 264.
Bundehesh, sacred book of Persia, 173 note.
Byblos, in Phœnicia, cult, 149.

Calderon (1600–1681), 266.
Calvin, John (1509–1564), 30.
Canaanites, 145.
Cartesius, see *Descartes*.
Castes, Hindoo, 153 ff., 182 ff.
Celsus, 6, 23.
Ceylon, Buddhism in, 181.
Chaldea, see *Babylon*.
China, Buddhism in, 181, 187. See *Confucius*.
Christ, see *Jesus*, *Revelation*, *Christianity*.
Christianity, not opposed to reason, 2; aims at happiness, 22; its nature, 204 ff.; as faith in Christ, 220 ff.; objections, 220 f.; their answer, 221 ff.; Christ the revelation of God, 223 ff.; his death and resurrection, 226 f.; faith in him a personal experience, 227 f.; the Law and, 228 f.; growth of doctrine, 229 ff.; eschatology, 231; definition of person of Christ, 231 ff.; distinguished from its dogmas, 233 f.; Scripture sole norm for, 234 f.; the perfect religion, 236 ff.; how proved, 236 ff.; its perfection defined, 240; how inferior to other religions, 239; C. and morality, 254 ff.; C. and marriage, 260 ff.; C. and culture, 262 ff.; C. and art, 265 f.; C. and social intercourse, 266 f.; C. and the state, 267 f.; priesthood in, 302 ff.; monasticism in, 304 ff.; cult in, 308 f. See *Revelation*, *Jesus*.
Church and State, relation under paganism, 267 f.; under Islam, 268; under Buddhism, 268 f.; under Christianity, 270 f.
Cicero, 8, 19 note.
Comte, Auguste (1798–1858), oppo-

sition to Christianity, 5; on origin of religion, 12 note; artificial ritual of, 32 note; his Positivism, 96, 306.
Confucius (551–478 B.C.), his character, 168 f.; worship of Heaven, 169 f.; duties of Emperor, 170; cult, 170 f.; music, 171; defects, 171.
Conscience, 33 ff.
Constantine the Great (274–337), apologetics in age of, 8.
Cortez, Hernando (1485–1547), horse a fetich, 122.
Cult, in primitive religions, 306 f.; in Roman Catholicism, 307; rejected by Hebrew prophets, 307 f.; in Christianity, 308 f.
Culture Religions, see *Babylon*, *Egypt*, *Brahminism*, *Germanic Races*, *Rome*, *Greece*, *Confucius*.
Cyrus, the Elder (*ob.* 529 B.C.), 173.

Daeva, Persian evil spirits, 174 ff.
Dahomey, serpent worship in, 123.
Dalai Lama, 185.
Dante (1265–1313), 266, 314.
Darius I (521–485 B.C.), 173.
Darwin, Charles (1809–1883), theory of evolution, 92.
Deism, in 18th cent., 9 f.; 20.
Delphi, 163.
Descartes, René (1596–1650), animals automata, 23 note; ontological argument of, 111 f.
Dhamma, Buddhist law, 181, 185.
Dhammapada, Pali poem on Buddhist ethics, 181, 186 note.
Dionysus, 138 note.
Dispersion of Jews, larger moral life of, 191, 205 f.
Dorner, Jr., A. J., 18.

Ebionites, influence on Mohammed, 195.
Ebrard, J. H. A., 48 note, 120.
Edda, religion of, 159 ff.; 5, 140.
Edom, 130, 188.
Egypt, sacred animals of, 123; its religion, 141 f., 145 ff.; Nile, 146, 148; Phtah, 146; under Rameses, 146; cult of Ra and Osiris, 147; nature cult of, 147 ff.; eschatology, 149 f.; morality, 150 f.; influence on Israel, 189 f.
El, Babylonian deity, 132.
Elohim, 144.
Epicureanism, gods of, 20; ideal of happiness, 85; influence on Christianity, 217.
Erinyes, 138, 163, 255.
Eschatology, in early church, 231, 248; Egyptian, 149 f.; Persian, 178 f.
Esseans (Essenes), influence on Mohammed, 195; relation to Jesus, 206.
Ethical Poetic Religions, see *Germanic Races*, *Greece*.
Ethical State Religions, see *Confucius*, *Rome*.
Eumenides, 163.
Evolution, theory criticised, 92 ff.
Existence of God, weakness of traditional arguments for, 100 ff.; cosmological argument, 103 ff.; teleological argument, 105 ff.; ontological argument, 110 ff.; Augustine's, 110 f.; Anselm's, 111; Descartes', 111 f.; argument from fact of religion, 113 f.; argument from morality, 114 ff.; *testimonium sp. s.*, 117 f.
Ezra, Mohammed on, 195 note.

Faith, its necessity, 82 ff.; view of piety, 82 f.; not to be replaced by knowledge, 83 f., 89 ff.; results of loss of, 84 ff.; essential to morality, 86 f.; 91 f.; æstheticism no equivalent, 87 f.; value for society, 88 f.; essential to free-will, 91 f.
Fatihah, second Surah of Koran, 199 note.
Fetich worship, 122 ff.; 20 note.
Feuerbach, Ludwig (1804–1872), 5, 12 note, 17 note.
Fichte, I. H., 18.

Fichte, J. G. (1762–1814), 14 f., 42, 83, 158.
Frau Holle, 138.
Freyr, Scandinavian deity, 161.

Ganges, 182.
Gathas, Persian hymns, 173 note, 174, 177.
Gaunilo, contemporary of Anselm, 111.
Gerhard, Paul (1607–1678), German hymn writer, 266.
Germanic races, their religion, 159 ff.; nature myths, 159 f.; cosmogony, 160 ff.; renewal of earth, 161; non-ethical, 161 f.; Christianity and, 239.
Gladstone, W. E. (1809–1898), 48 note, 120.
Gnostics, influence on Mohammed, 195.
God, in what sense personal, 40 ff.; pantheism, 40 ff.; personality not a limitation, 42 ff.; natural law expression of God's freedom, 45. See *Revelation, Existence of God, Religion, Christianity.*
Goethe, J. W. (1749–1832), 85, 87 note, 88, 266.
Greece, indifference to poor, 87; its religion, 162 ff.; deities, 162 ff.; moral inadequacy, 164 ff.; contribution to religion, 166; influence on Christianity, 216 ff.; Christianity and Greek culture, 263.

Hamann, J. G. (1730–1788), 51.
Hamitic Religions, defined, 142. See *Babylon, Egypt.*
Hammurabi, Babylonian monarch (*circ.* 1550 B.C.), 144 note.
Hanifs, Mohammedan saints, 196, 200.
Harms, Friedrich, 113.
Harnack, Adolf, 215.
Hartmann, Eduard v., opposition to Christianity, 5; pantheist, 40 note, 41, 44; on faith, 86; his pessimism, 96 f.; influenced by Orient, 158.
Hase, K. A., 18.
Hegel, G. W. F. (1770–1831), on nature of religion, 15 f.; on knowledge, 83; ontological argument of, 110; on history of religion, 120; influenced by Orient, 158.
Hellenes, see *Greece.*
Heracles, 162 f.
Herbart, J. F. (1776–1841), 18.
Herder, J. G. (1744–1803), 51, 112 note.
Herrmann, Wilhelm, 18, 102 note, 240.
Hesiod, 162.
Highest Good, defined by Christianity, 240 ff., 249 ff.; deductions from idea of, 254 ff.
Hillel, rabbi (75 B.C.–10 A.D.), his ethics, 207 f.
Hindoos, see *Brahminism, Buddhism.*
Hodr, Scandinavian deity, 161.
Holsten, K. J., 18.
Holy Spirit, 79, 117 f. 275 ff. See *Religion, Revelation, Christianity.*
Homer, 135, 139 note, 140, 162.
Horace, 167 note.
Horus, Egyptian deity, 149 f.
Huc, E. R. (1813–1860), in Thibet, 185.
Hulsean Lectures, 11.
Hume, David (1711–1776), 9 note, 12 note, 17 note, 120.
Hyksos, Egyptian dynasty, 146.
Hystaspes, Persian king (*ob.* 521 B.C.), 174.

Immortality, philosophical arguments for, 296 f.; in Christianity, 298 f.
Incas, 128 f.
India, see *Buddhism, Brahminism.*
Indians, American, 123.
Indo-Europeans, paganism, 135 ff.; cult of ancestors, 135 f.; forces of nature, 136 f.; deities, 137; cult, 137 ff.; among Latin-Sabines, 139 f.
Indra, 138, 152, 156.
Innocent III (1198–1216), 98.
Inspiration, defined, 77; literary rec-

ord distinguished from agents, 78 f.; *testimonium sp. s.*, 79; view of piety, 79 f.; of Biblical writers, 80 f.; of early church, 81.
Iran = Persia, 177.
Ishtar, Babylonian deity, 143 f.
Isis, Babylonian deity, 148 f., 166.
Islam, Christianity and, 3; modern, apologetes of, 4; apologetics against, 8; canon, 78; nature religion in, 127; description of, 194 ff.; influenced by O. T., 195; by early sects, 195; by Semitic paganism, 196; Mohammed to be judged by his age, 197 f.; his revelation, 198 f.; its content, 199 f.; defined, 200 f.; injunctions, 201 f.; defects, 202 f.; how superior to Christianity, 239; its kingdom of God, 244 f.; marriage in, 260 f.; church and state under, 268, 271; science and, 312; 254, 264.
Israel, its religion, 187 ff.; origin, 187; henotheistic, 187 f.; no mythology, 188; development under prophets, 188 f.; Jahve, 190 ff.; his will, 190; superstition, 191; Dispersion, 191; combined Persian optimism and Buddhist idealism, 191 f.; morality, 192; doubts, 193; its kingdom of God, 193; contained conditions of piety, 193 f.; doctrine of resurrection, 194; consummated in Christianity, 194; Christ's relation to, 204 ff.; early church and, 228 f.; revelation in, 274.

Jacobi, F. H. (1743–1819), 16, 51.
Jainas, Hindoo sect, 180.
Jalal-uddin Rumi, Persian mystic (1207–1273), 203.
Janssen, Johannes, 314.
Japan, Buddhism in, 181, 187.
Jean Paul Richter (1763–1825), 73.
Jesus, in history, 204 ff.; relation to the law, 205 ff.; his new ideal, 208 ff.; kingdom of God, 210 ff.; his claims, 212 f.; relation to God, 213 ff.; the object of faith, 214 f.; influence of Roman culture on, 215 ff.; influence of Greek spirit on, 217 ff.; faith in him, 220 ff., 227 f.; his death, 226, 289 ff.; his resurrection, 226 f., 279 ff.; dogma of person, 231 ff.; sinlessness of, 283 ff. See also *Christianity*, *Kingdom of God.*
Jews, see *Israel.*
Jinns, Arabian demons, 130.
John, St., influence on dogma, 230 f.; Christ's sinlessness in, 284 f.; 232, 235.
Judaism, Christianity and, 3, 5 f.; apologetics against, 8. See also *Israel.*
Juno, 167.
Jupiter, 167.

Ka, Egyptian shade of dead, 149 note.
Kaaba, sacred stone of Mecca, 196.
Kadesh, sacred springs of, 130.
Kaffirs, 123.
Kaftan, Julius, 18, 20.
Kähler, Martin, 18.
Kant, Immanuel (1724–1804), on nature of religion, 12 ff.; a pessimist, 98; argument for religion, 115 note; 4, 91, 92, 105, 111.
Kareçâçpa, predecessor of Zarathustra, 178.
Karma, Buddhist fate, 183.
Khadijah, Mohammed's wife, 197.
Khasis-Adra, Assyrian Noah, 144.
Khu-en-Aten, pharaoh, 146.
Kingdom of God, Jesus and, 210 ff.; its nature, 236 ff.; the highest good, 240 ff.; in nature religions, 241 ff.; in prophet religions, 243 f.; in Islam, 244 f.; in Buddhism, 245 f.; in Christianity, 247 ff.; its hopes, 247 f.; its ideal, 248 f.; non-egoistic, 249 f.; its social power, 250 ff.; its realization of personality, 253 f.

Kings, Chinese sacred books, 78, 168 note, 169.
Kismet, fate of Islam, 202.
Klopstock, F. G. (1724–1803), 266.
Koran, divinely given, 49, 78; rôle in Islam, 195 ff.
Köstlin, Julius, 18.
Krauss, Alfred, 65.

Lagarde, P. A. de (1827–1891), 5.
Lama, 185.
Lange, A., 65, 90.
Law, Christ and the, 281 f.
Leibnitz, G. W. (1646–1716), compared with Pascal, 9; on necessity of faith, 85; optimism, 98; on God, 112; 69 note, 104.
Lessing, G. E. (1729–1781), 10, 49, 79, 90, 221.
Lhassa, 185.
Lipsius, R. A., 18, 50.
Logos, influence of conception on Christianity, 219; 44 note, 49, 109, 118, 229, 249.
Loki, Scandinavian deity, 160 ff., 176.
Lotze, R. H. (1817–1881), on miracles, 73; against materialism, 94 f., 105.
Lucian of Samosata (born 125 A.D.), 7 note, 8, 164.
Lucretius, 92, 106.
Luther, 207, 304.
Lydia, 145.

Magi, in Persia, 174.
Manichæans, influence on Mohammed, 195.
Manu's Laws, 153 f.
Mara, Buddhist god of sensual pleasure, 180 f.
Mardûk, Babylonian deity, 143 f.
Marriage, in pagan world, 260 f.; in N. T., 261; in Christianity, 261 f.
Materialism, defined, 92 f.; how far valid, 93 f.; fails to explain morality, 94 ff.; necessity of supplementing it with religion (Comte), 96.
Mecca, 195 ff.
Medea, 163.
Media, 174.
Medina, 196, 200.
Memphis, its cult, 146.
Mesopotamia, 4, 141, 142.
Mettaya, last Buddha, 184.
Mexico, religions in, 128 f.
Meyer, J. B., 98.
Mill, J. S. (1806–1873), 15, 85, 110.
Milton, 266.
Miracles, in revelation, 55 ff.; inadequate, 55; essential to revelation, 56; *contra naturam*, 57; laws of nature and, 58 f.; view of piety, 59 f., 65 f., 68 ff., 72 ff.; in Bible, 61 f., 64 f., 66 f., 279; no sure mark of revelation, 62 ff., 272; common to all religions, 63 f.; scholastic conception of, 60, 62; not duty of apologetics to defend, 67 ff.; personality, as a force, 70 ff.; all higher life a miracle, 72 ff. See also *Prophecy*, *Inspiration*.
Mithras, Persian deity, 166, 174, 177 f.
Mitra, Hindoo deity, 152.
Moab, 130, 188.
Mohammed, see *Islam*.
Moloch, Babylonian deity, 132.
Monasticism, in Buddhism, 304; in early church, 304 f.; rejected by evangelical Christianity, 305 f.; in Roman Catholicism, 306.
Mongols, Buddha of, 185.
Montanism, 231.
Morality, religion and, 254 ff.; in nature religions, 255 ff.; in prophet religions, 257; in Christianity, 257 ff.; aims at fellowship, 257 f.; above forms, 258 ff.
Moses, 47 note, 188 ff.
Moslem, see *Islam*.
Motazilites, Mohammedan sect, 203.
Mucius Scævola, 8.
Müller, Max (1823–1900), 120, 137.
Muspelheim, 161.
Mysticism, its one-sidedness, 39; of Sufis, 203.

Nagel, 82, 85, 90, 91.
Nature Religions, primitive, 119 ff.; general character of, 120 f.; in lowest races, 121; fetich worship, 122 ff.; ideas of deity, 123; sanctity of animals, 123 f.; tribal character, 124 f.; attitude toward deity, 125 f.; moral elements, 126 f.; wide diffusion of, 127 f.; Aztecs and Toltecs, 128 f.; kingdom of God in, 241 ff.; morality in, 255 ff. See also *Semitic Paganism*, *Indo-Europeans*.
Nazarites, 188.
Nebuchadnezzar, prayer of, 145 note.
Neoplatonism, hostile to Christianity, 7; aims, 7 f.; weakness, 8; revival in 16th cent., 8 note; mysticism in, 39; reinterpretation of Greek gods, 165; conquered by Christianity, 218.
Nestorians, influence on Mohammed, 195.
Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464), 207.
Niebuhr, B. (1776–1831), 58.
Nietzsche, Friedrich (1844–1900), opposed to Christianity, 5; ethics, 86.
Nile, 142, 146, 148 f.
Niobe, 163.
Nirvana, 183 f.
Norns, 138.
Northmen, see *Germanic Races*.
Novalis, Friedrich v. Hardenberg (1772–1801), 17.

Odin, Scandinavian deity, 138, 160 ff., 176.
Odysseus, 163.
Olympia, 163.
Omar, second caliph (592–644), opinion of Mohammed, 197.
On, Egyptian city, 146 f.
Optimism, in Christianity, 292 f.; a duty, 100.
Ormuzd, Persian deity, 178 f.
Orpheus, 7.
Osiris, Egyptian deity, 147 ff., 176.
Ostiaks, fetiches of, 122.
Paganism, early church and, 5 ff.; church and state under, 267 f.; revelation in, 273; priesthood in, 300. See also *Semites*, *Indo-Europeans*, *Nature Religions*.
Palladium, 122.
Panætius, Stoic (born 180 B.C.), 8.
Pantheism, defects of, 40 f.
Parcæ, 138.
Parsees, 177 f.
Pascal, Blaise (1623–1662), *Pensées*, 9; on faith, 91; on materialism, 93; a pessimist, 98, 100.
Paul, St., influence on dogma, 230; on marriage, 261; on the Resurrection, 280; 215, 218 f., 228 f., 232, 235, 278.
Paulsen, Friedrich, 98.
Persia, see *Zarathustra*.
Personality, defined, 26.
Peschel, Oscar, 18.
Pessimism, not formally hostile to religion, 96 f.; logically destructive of it, 97 f.; involved in religion, 98 f.; false standard of, 99 f.; optimism a duty, 100; in Christianity, 292 f.
Pfleiderer, Otto, 18.
Phidias, 162 f.
Phœnicians, 145.
Phtah, Egyptian deity, 146, 148.
Pindar, 162 f.
*Pirke Aboth*, collection of Rabbinical maxims, 207.
Plato, on knowledge, 83; protest against gods, 164; influence on Christianity, 218; 7, 47 note, 111, 162.
Polynesians, 123.
Praxiteles, 162.
Prayer, of petition, 70.
Priesthood, in paganism, 300; in culture religions, 300 f.; hostile to science, 301 f.; prophets hostile to, 302 ff.; in Christianity, 302 ff.; in Roman Catholicism, 303 f.
Prometheus, 163.
Prophecy, distinguished from sooth-

saying, 74 f.; fulfilment of O. T. prophecies not possible, 75 f.; attitude of apologetics toward, 76 f.
Prophet Religions, defined, 172 f.; kingdom of God in, 243 ff.; morality in, 257; church and state under, 268; revelation in, 273 ff.; priesthood in, 302 ff.; cult in, 307 f. See also *Zarathustra*, *Buddha*, *Israel*, *Islam*.
Pythagoras, 7.

Ra, Egyptian deity, 147 f.
Raghæ, sacred mountain of Persia, 174.
Ramadan, Mohammedan fast, 201.
Rameses, pharaohs, 146.
Rationalism, opposed to Christianity, 3; in 18th cent. 9 f.; conception of revelation, 47; view of miracles, 57.
Rauwenhoff, L. W. E., 18, 100.
Redemption, true nature of, 294 ff.
Reischle, Max, 18, 93.
Religion, its necessity, 3; survey of views of, 12 ff.; popular view, 12; Kant's view, 12 ff.; Fichte's, 14 f.; Hegel's, 15 f.; Schleiermacher's, 16 f.; modern view, 17 ff.; derivation of word, 19 note; presupposes a deity, 20; begets creed and cult, 20 f.; involves morality, 21; its process psychological, 22; based on feeling, 23, 27; limited to man, 24; universal, 25 f.; distinguished from philosophy, 26 f.; conditioned by will, 27 f.; distinguished from æstheticism, 28; roused by God, 28 f.; by world, 29 f.; incapable of formal proof, 30 f.; a longing for freedom, 31; expression in cult, 32; goal, 33; conscience, 33 ff.; science and, 35 ff.; theology and science, 37; faith defined, 37 f.; mysticism, 39.
Renaissance, æstheticism of, 87.
Resurrection of Christ, its credibility, 279; objections to, 279 f.; Paul on, 280; based on faith, 280 f.
Revelation, its nature, 45 ff.; *revelatio generalis*, *specialis*, 46; to be distinguished from its accidents, 46 ff.; no miraculous communication of knowledge, 47 f.; defects of scholastic conception, 48 f.; an act of God, 49 ff.; its agents, 51 ff.; realized in history, 53 f.; miraculous element, 55 ff.; in Christianity, 271 ff.; in paganism, 273; in prophet religions, 273 ff.; in Israel, 274; dangers, 274 f.; nature of Christian, 275 ff.; in Christ's person, 277 f.; proofs of, 278 ff.; not based on miracles, 279; nor on Resurrection, 279 ff.; but on Christ's personality, 281 ff.; as exhibited in SS., 282 ff.; and his death, 289 f.
Ritschl, A., 18, 102, 105.
Rohde, E., 124, 135 note.
Roman Catholicism, historical Christ and, 222; identified with Christianity, 234; priesthood in, 303 f.; monasticism in, 306; cult in, 260, 307, 309.
Rome, Greek art in, 87; religion of Latin-Sabines, 139 f.; religion, 166 ff.; religion and law, 167; deities, 167; love of country, 168; defects, 168; influence on Christianity, 215 ff.
Rothe, R. (1799–1867), 64.
Rousseau, J. J. (1712–1778), 9 note, 10 note, 98.

Sacæan festival, 143, 145.
Sadducees, 194.
Sakhya Muni, name of Buddha, 180 note, 184.
Samsâra, "becoming," 182, 184.
Sankhya, Hindoo philosophy, 182.
Sassanides, Persian dynasty (226–636 A.D.), 173, 178, 189 note.
Saussaye, C. de, 119.
Scandinavia, see *Germanic Races*.
Schelling, Friedrich (1775–1854), 120.
Schenkel, D., 18.

Schiller, Friedrich (1759–1805), 266.
Schleiermacher, Friedrich (1768–1834), nature of religion, 4, 16 f., 102, 113; apologetics, 10; *Reden*, 12, 51; on pantheism, 41; on revelation, 51; 49 note.
Scholasticism, 314 f.
Schopenhauer, Arthur (1788–1860), 15, 90, 96 f., 158.
Science, religion and, 2, 35 ff.; limits, 3; hostility to religion, 5, 310 ff.; theology and, 37; Christianity and, 262 ff.
Scripture, norm of faith, 234 f.; Christ in, 282 f., 289 f.; theology in, 315 f.
Semites, 129 ff., 142 ff. See also *Semitic Paganism*.
Semitic Paganism, where found, 129; associations with natural objects, 129 f.; polytheistic, 130; tribal character, 130 f.; cult, 131 f.; moral elements, 132 ff.; criticism of, 134 f.
Seneca (2–65 A.D.), 8, 33 note.
Serapis, Egyptian deity, 150.
Set, Egyptian deity, 147, 149, 176.
Severi, apologetics in age of, 7.
Shakespeare, 266.
Shiites, Mohammedan sect, 203.
Siberia, 123.
Simonists (St. Simon, 1760–1825), 306.
Sin, true nature revealed in Christianity, 293 f.
Sinlessness of Jesus, in synoptics, 283 f.; in Fourth Gospel, 284 f.; no dogma of apologetics, 285 f.; defined, 286; implied in Jesus' life, 287 ff.
Smith, W. Robertson, 129.
Socialism, Christianity and, 266 note, 317 f.
Socrates, 47 note, 218.
Sophocles, 162 f.
Spencer, Herbert (1820–1903), 31, 40 note.
Spinoza, Baruch (1632–1677), denial of personality of God, 42 f.
State, see *Church and State*.
Stoics, opposed to Christianity, 7; philosophy of, 164; reinterpretation of Greek gods, 165; morality of, 166.
Strauss, David (1808–1874), against Christianity, 5; substitutes for religion, 17 note, 87 note; pantheism, 40 note; world purposeless, 106; evolution, 107.
Sufis, Mohammedan mystics, 203.
Sunday, Christian idea of, 267.
Sunnites, Mohammedan sect, 203.
Sutras, Buddhist maxims, 181.
Sutta Nipata, Pali work, 184.
Syria, 145.

Tammuz, Babylonian deity, 143.
Tantalus, 162.
Taoism, Chinese philosophy, 171.
Taubert, Agnes (Frau v. Hartmann), 96.
Tell-el-Amarna, 145.
Temple, Second, 189 ff., 205.
Tersteegen, Gerhard (1697–1769), German hymn writer, 266.
Tertullian (*ob.* 220 A.D.), apologetics, 6 note.
Thebes, 146 f.
Themis, 163.
Theology, in primitive religions, 310; in culture religions, 310 f.; in prophet religions, 311 f.; conflict with science, 312; in Christianity, 312 f.; false conceptions of, 313 ff.; scholastic, 314; evangelical, 315 f.; false types, 316 f.
Thibet, Buddhism in, 181.
Thor, Scandinavian deity, 138, 160 ff.
Thora, 206 ff.
Thraêtona, predecessor of Zarathustra, 178.
Tiele, C. P. (1830–1890), 18, 119.
Titans, 138, 162.
Toltecs, their religion, 128 f.
Totemism, described, 123; in Egypt, 146 ff.
Trimûrti, Hindoo trinity, 158.

Tripitaka, Buddhist canon, 4, 78, 181.
Tröltsch, Ernst, 18, 237.
Truths, the four, of Buddhism, 182 f.
Tsong Kapa, Thibetan reformer of Buddhism (1358–1419), 185.
Turan, 168, 177.
Tyr, Scandinavian deity, 161.

Uhud, Mt., Mohammed's defeat at, 197.
Upanishads, 153, 155, 157.

Valhalla, 138.
Varro (116–28 B.C.), 140 note, 167.
Varuna, Hindoo deity, 152, 174.
Vedas, 4, 49, 78, 139, 151, 153 f., 157, 182, 301.
Vendidâd, 173 note.
Vinaya, first division of Buddhist canon, 181.
Vinet, A. R., 18.
Vishnu, Hindoo deity, 158.
Vispered, 173 note.
Voltaire (1694–1778), 9 note, 93.

Wahhabi (Wahabites), Mohammedan sect, founded 1745, 200.
Walkyries, 138, 160.
Wellhausen, Julius, 129.
Wolff, Christian (1679–1754), 98.
World, true nature revealed in Christianity, 291 ff.

Xenophanes, eclectic philosopher, 291.

Yaçnas, Persian hymns, 173 note.
Yathrib, old name of Medina, 200.
Yima (Yama) = man, 174, 178.

Zarathustra, literary sources concerning, 173; religion founded by Magi, 174; person, 174 ff.; reformer, 174; relation to Brahminism, 174; Ahuramazda, 175; cult of animals, 175 f.; Angrô Mainyus, 176; ethics, 177; cosmogony, 178; eschatology, 178 f.
Zeller, E., 18.
Zeus, 138, 163.